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Abstract 
 
Performance related pay (PRP) has been widely adopted across public and private 
organisations. However, the evidence for its impact on performance and other possible 
objectives remains contested, and further questions are raised where the concept is imported 
to contexts which are culturally different to those in which PRP was originally developed. 
The aim of this research was to investigate and analyse the impact of performance related pay 
schemes in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on performance in Saudi national firms, through a 
case study of three indigenous Saudi organisations, namely: The Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF; The Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) and; the Saudi Telecoms 
Company (STC). This was based upon an extensive review of the related literature, exploring 
the theories which underpin PRP such as agency theory and expectancy theory, and studies in 
various contexts worldwide. 
 
The study was mixed methods and cross-sectional, and used survey questionnaire with 
employees and face to face interviews with managers. The findings reveal widespread 
dissatisfaction with the PRP schemes in place in two of the companies, and concerns among 
some management that the assessment processes and allocation of bonuses do not allow 
genuine assessment and reward for the best performing employees. There are also concerns 
about the underlying wisdom of differentiating between workers and providing different pay, 
in that it may go against the norms of working culture in Saudi Arabia. There was also 
evidence of moves to adapt what was being implemented in line with these norms. Further, in 
two of the case study organisations, it was felt that the proportion of pay related to 
performance assessment was insufficient to motivate, raising issues regarding how best to 
implement PRP. At the same time, there are also voices in support of the schemes at each 
company, and in SEC, overall satisfaction was expressed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
Pay is a central element in the employer-employee relationship, and due to its great 
importance to the worker, the prospect of using pay as a lever to optimize performance levels 
has been and continues to be a matter of great interest to the employer. At the same time 
however, pay is influenced to a large extent by elements which are external to the core 
relation of worker and employing organisation, whether that organisation be in the private or 
public sphere. These influences include the government of the country within an organisation 
operates, its legal structures and legislation regarding employment and pay, competitors, and 
economic conditions within the company of operation and increasingly clearly, on a more 
global scale. 
 
Notwithstanding the various forces which constrain the employer in determining pay, pay for 
performance has emerged as a major route for shaping pay with the intention of influencing 
employee behaviour, being tried at various levels of the organisational hierarchy and in 
various formats. The development of pay for performance in the human resource 
management literature is viewed as largely based in principal-agent theory, and this is 
coupled with expectancy theory, which underpins the rationale for the employment of such 
approaches to pay (Liang, 2013). Payment by results first attracted wide attention in the 
1980s and 1990s, and over the course of the ensuing period, typical implementation of 
payment schemes in the countries in which this first developed can be said to have altered 
somewhat toward the newer concept of performance related pay (PRP), based on the 
available evidence, with a recent shift toward notions of team-based reward within PRP as 
opposed to earlier consideration of individually based reward schemes which sought to 
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identify and presumably influence performance at this level. As the body of research 
evidence has grown, the success of pay for performance has been disputed, as has its 
psychological, sociological and economic underpinnings.  
 
The narrative presented in the literature of human resource management for the development 
of pay for performance (PRP) approaches is largely situated within the research context of the 
Western world and particularly Anglophone countries such as the USA and the UK, where 
such approaches may be viewed as having emerged more or less organically from the 
prevailing cultures and attitudes within human resource management and in business culture.   
This ignores other settings in countries such as Saudi Arabia and others in the developing 
world, where many practices of Western human resource management have been, so to 
speak, imported, rather than developing out of an organic tradition or approach to pay and the 
management of personnel within the employer-employee relation. The issue is therefore 
connected to debates on convergence versus divergence, which centres on whether global 
human resource practices tend toward a universally accepted set of practices, or diverge to 
reflect more localized norms, and the implications of this for effectiveness. In light of the 
view that human resource management practices, in dealing particularly with people, 
behaviours and relationships, are more based in cultural practice and attitudes than many 
other aspects of the operation of organisations (Hollinshead, 2009), it is important to consider 
the way in which practices taken from other cultures are implemented and responded to when 
applied outside their original setting.  
 
This study aims to shed light on the implementation of PRP schemes within a Saudi Arabian 
cultural and organisational context, and to consider the impact of this introduction of a facet 
of Western human resource management on employees within such organisations. To this 
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end, the study will collect data from employees and managers from three companies in Saudi 
Arabia, namely: The Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), the Saudi Telecoms Company (STC) 
and the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF). This project involves collection of 
primary data encompassing a range of aspects of and expectations regarding pay for 
performance schemes as based on a detailed examination of the available literature in this 
field, in terms of theoretical bases, practices, outcomes and perceptions. In seeking and 
analyzing primary data from the Saudi Arabian context and from three case study companies, 
a rich picture is drawn of implementation of PRP and responses to that implementation within 
discrete organisational cultures and within the wider context of the country studied. 
 
This study is considered to be relevant to the companies studied, the state of human resource 
management within Saudi Arabia and to the body of human relations research in a global 
context. The picture of performance pay within the three companies studied will assist those 
companies in further developing their pay approaches and planning for the future, while 
allowing those responsible for decision-making and human resources professionals to form a 
deeper view of the functioning and impacts of the pay schemes. The study also offers a 
description at a company level of the interaction between human resource management 
concepts formed in the Western context and the new settings to which these are adapted and 
transferred in the developing world as a result of the globalization of business practice more 
generally.  The research seeks through this to assist in the process of finding the best 
approaches to pay policy within the contexts that it covers, to the benefit of organisational 
performance and employee wellbeing.   
 
The first chapter of this thesis provides a brief introduction to the concept of pay 
determination and more specifically to the development of pay for performance approaches, 
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which are covered in more detail in the literature review which is presented in Chapter Two. 
A concise consideration of human resource management in the international context and 
issues arising from this will also be presented. The chapter will go on to introduce the 
original research to be presented in this thesis, setting out the context, aim and objectives of 
the study and the research questions to be answered, as well as considering the relevance and 
importance of the research. Finally, an overview of the structure of the research thesis will be 
offered. 
 
1.2 Pay Determination: background and definitions 
 
Pay is defined by Torrington, Hall and Taylor (2005) as what is provided in financial 
terms by an employer in exchange for a combination of time, dedication, effort and capability 
offered by the worker. While a variety of definitions exist for pay, as considered further in 
Chapter Two, they generally converge around the principle of money offered for work 
undertaken. With this basic definition accepted, pay determination represents the ways in 
which the level of monetary compensation for this work is decided, and here, various theories 
of pay determination and the labour market come into play. Human capital theory states that a 
wide range of stakeholder groups may have input into this process, including the state, trades 
unions, employers and workers of various types grouped according to skills, qualifications 
and experience (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2011). Meanwhile, Colling et al. (2010) state that based 
on the economic model, pay principally functions as a price signal in the labour market and 
as a pay-off to human capital investment, with the result that pay alters with fluctuations in 
demand and supply, with higher wages occurring for a particular profession when there is 
high demand, and lower wages occurring in cases of decreased demand.  
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Various theories of wage determination, including human capital theory, efficiency 
theory and self-selection theory, are discussed in Chapter Two. Bryson and Forth (2006) state 
however that pay determination is not satisfactorily explained by any one of these theories, 
with no universal theory of pay determination being put forward, and gaps in knowledge of 
some significance on this subject,  due it is suggested to ambiguity within the employment 
contract and the precise nature of the exchange which it represents. With this in mind, pay for 
performance is necessarily developed from an incomplete understanding of the full range of 
forces determining pay. 
1.3 Pay for Performance 
 
While there is no standardized version or definition of pay for performance, the term 
describes a general tendency in which organisations have sought new ways to strengthen the 
link between how employees perform and the pay which they receive (Lee & Eyraud, 2008). 
Pay for performance is premised on the notion that reward affects behaviour or individual 
performance in such a way as to impact upon the performance of the organisation (Gerhart & 
Rynes, 2003), and therefore stems at base level from the imperative to increased 
competitiveness experienced by the modern firm.  Within this, Wragg (2004) cites a widely-
viewed desire on the part of the employer to recruit, retain, and inspire the labour force, in 
conjunction with the belief that the possibility of reward for performance will lead to an 
interest in working for the company from the most potentially high-performing candidates. 
Pay for performance and its basis in theoretical constructs is generally explained in terms of 
expectancy theory.  
 
The theory considers that external and clear incentives can be applied to the employee 
in order to extract greater effort toward a particular goal or goals, specifying two conditions 
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for the effectiveness of this: firstly, that the employees should believe in increased efforts 
leading to increased performance; and. secondly, that greater performance will be effective in 
leading to the outcomes which management have set as being desired. According to 
expectancy theory, in this case, workers will generally adapt their expectation of future 
reward and make greater effort based on this (Lunenburg, 2011). The evidence does not 
universally support the applicability of this theory however (Yuan et al., 2013).  Agency 
theory is also regarded as a central theory in the development of performance related pay: this 
theory describes principals, or employers, and agents who the principal employs to act on 
behalf of the organisation, with the problem that the desires and objectives of these two 
parties are not the same (Arrowsmith & Marginson, 2011). Therefore, incentives may, 
according to this theory, be used to bring the agent’s objectives in line with those of the 
employer, leading to greater performance towards organisational goals. However, this ignores 
intrinsic motivation as a prerequisite for high performance as put forward by theories of 
motivation emanating from psychology (Frey, Homberg & Osterloh, 2013; Larkin, Pierce & 
Gino, 2012). This begs the question of how pay for performance impacts upon intrinsic 
motivation and the evidence of the effectiveness of PRP is thus far unclear. This is further 
complicated by the range of approaches encompassed within the general umbrella of 
performance related pay, which makes the evidence challenging to assess.    The theoretical 
background to pay for performance as a management tool to affect the performance of 
employees is explored in greater detail in Chapter Two. A wide range of schemes under the 
label of pay for performance are identified in the literature, including those based on 
individual reward only and others which seek to incorporate an element of reward for team-
based performance, particularly more recently (Larkin, Pierce & Gino, 2012). This is an 
interesting distinction, particularly as the three case study organisations do no follow this 
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trend, despite some evidence in the literature that individually-based performance rewards 
may harm teamwork, and the effects on teamwork are explored in the current study. 
1.4 Pay for Performance and Cultural Context 
Any and all aspects of human resources management and the effectiveness of 
particular approaches can be said to be subject to influence from their context, in terms of the 
individual organisation in which policies are implemented and in terms of culture in the wider 
sense, as may be applicable at country level (Rugman et al., 2006). The cultural content of 
practice and perception is equally applicable to the pay for performance context, and in this 
area, differences appear to arise in the way in which schemes are implemented across 
different countries, being adapted by the culture which adopts the tool, and with possible 
attendant impacts upon the reception of such schemes by the workforce and impacts on 
individual and team performance (Kang and Yanadori, 2011). Hyman (2004) contends that 
the differences in the underlying culture of a society mean that it is not possible to assume 
that similarly designed practices will have comparable effects across different cultural 
contexts.   
The increasing presence of multinational organisations has led to a move to adopt 
practices which are of external origin, often coming from the US, in other cultural contexts, 
but there is doubt as to the actual fit of these practices in each case (Martinez Lucio, 2013). 
This is an issue explored in this research through the examination of PRP as a Western import 
into Saudi Arabian companies which form the case studies.  
 
1.5 Saudi Arabian Context 
 
Saudi Arabia is a largely oil-based economy, and the discovery of this resource 
fuelled rapid development in the country due to its new-found wealth.  While the country 
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retains a traditional absolute monarchy as its political structure, in recent years it has sought 
to develop a more modern economy and to set up advanced infrastructure through a series of 
5-year plans. Further, Saudi Arabia is no stranger to the internationalization of the global 
economy, and the World Bank has rated Saudi Arabia as the easiest place to do business in 
the entire Gulf region (Ramady, 2014). Saudi Arabia permits 100% foreign ownership of 
business ventures and real estate, and in this climate, along with the fact that professionals 
within human resources management and other spheres often undertake part of their 
education abroad, it can easily be understood that there has been a strong influence from 
international business practices within the organisations operating in the country. Pay for 
performance seems to be one aspect of this general situation.  
 
Based on the particular features of Saudi Arabia’s recent history and development, the 
population of Saudi Arabia currently includes immigrants as 30% of its total, due to the 
demand for migrant workers in the labour market (The World Factbook, 2013). This is an 
influential factor in wage differentials and pay determination. Workers from abroad are 
disproportionately clustered in the private sector, and this affects conditions within that 
sector. Meanwhile, for cultural and financial reasons, Saudi citizens tend to prefer roles in the 
public sector. Further factors in this environment include a high level of unemployment and 
of a skills shortage (The World Factbook, 2013). It is clear from this brief outline, which will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, that the situation within Saudi Arabia as regards 
pay determination is complex and unusual, and in this context, pay for performance deserves 
investigation within that setting.  
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1.6 Research Aims and Objectives  
 
The main aim of this research is to investigate and analyse the role and impact of 
Performance Related Pay schemes in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on performance in Saudi 
national firms, as conducted through a case study of three indigenous Saudi organisations, 
namely: The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF; The Saudi Electricity Company 
(SEC) and; the Saudi Telecoms Company (STC). The main question which has been created 
to drive the research process is therefore as follows:- 
What is the impact of PRP on employees’ performance in Saudi national firms in Saudi 
Arabia?   
   In order to inform the work undertaken to answer this question within the case studies 
selected, an extensive review of the literature was firstly undertaken. This has explored the 
theories which underpin PRP as well as research on implementation and impacts of pay for 
performance schemes across the globe. Based on this, the current research aims to explore the 
impact which the PRP system has on individual and team performance under the influence of 
the particular culture of the organisation and the country in question. This aim informs the 
detailed research questions given in the table below, which are divided in to categories of 
performance, teamwork, cultural role, fairness and feedback: 
 
Performance  Q1: Does the introduction of the PRP system 
increase employees’ performance?  
Q2: Does the introduction of the PRP system 
make employees work harder?  
Q3: Will employees be more highly paid if 
they work harder?  
  
Team work  Q 4: Has the introduction of PRP helped in 
encouraging effective work as part of a team? 
Q 5: Has the introduction of PRP helped in 
unifying the goals of both parties within 
industrial relations?  
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Culture role  Q 6: How has PRP influenced organizational 
culture?  
Fairness  Q 7: How fair is the PRP scheme from the 
employee’s perspective?  
Feedback  Q 8: How far are employees satisfied with 
the PRP system’s approaches to the formal 
and informal feedback which they receive?  
It is considered that by answering the questions in the table above, the research will provide a 
clear picture of the impact of PRP within each of the case studies undertaken. This will 
facilitate conclusions to be drawn regarding the effectiveness of the organisations’ use of pay 
as a lever for performance, as well as adding to the body of more general research about the 
effectiveness of PRP at a broader level. 
1.7 Importance of the Study 
 
The three case study organisations are within the same country, Saudi Arabia. This both 
facilitates the research process and allows cautious conclusions to be drawn regarding the 
implementation and effects of PRP within the Saudi cultural context. In doing so, the research 
is of importance due to its potential to shape policy within Saudi organisations as regards 
implementation of PRP schemes and expectations of the likely outcomes of such moves.  
At the same time, in focusing on Saudi Arabia, the research also addresses a gap in the 
literature regarding pay for performance schemes in this area of the world, and adds to the 
small body of PRP research conducted in developing nations. Thus, the research helps to shift 
the focus away from a dominance of Anglophone and Western nations toward a more 
balanced and multi-faceted view of this area of HRM study.  
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This study is presented through a thesis consisting of six chapters. A general outline of the 
content and aim of each chapter is given below. 
 
Chapter One, the current chapter, has introduced the thesis. It has provided background 
information and definitions concerning pay, pay determination and performance related pay 
as the sphere of interest of the study. It   has also considered human resource management in 
an international context and for Saudi Arabia as the context of the study. Chapter One has 
also set out the structure, aims and objectives of the research conducted for this study, and 
considered the importance and relevance of this research. 
 
Chapter Two presents the literature review which informs and underpins the study. As such, 
it will offer a detailed consideration of pay, and pay determination, as considered briefly in 
the first chapter, as well as considering the employment relationship and linking pay to 
productivity. It will then move on to explore pay for performance in detail. Theories drawn 
from economics and psychology which underpin pay for performance approaches will be 
explored, and the common theoretical characterisation of PRP within human relations 
literature will be presented, along with critiques of this characterisation. Types of PRP 
scheme will be considered, as well as prescriptions in the literature for its effective 
implementation. The literature review will also consider evidence drawn from studies 
globally as to the effectiveness or otherwise of PRP, and case studies conducted in this 
regard. Issues in PRP and HRM practice in an international context and across different 
cultures will also be considered. 
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Chapter Three will present the background to the context of the study. This will include an 
overview of the important features and characteristics of Saudi Arabia as the physical, 
political, economic and cultural backdrop for the case studies included in this thesis.  The 
chapter will then focus upon each of the three organisations which have been selected to form 
the case studies for this research. The history, market and operations of each organisation will 
be described in the chapter. 
 
Chapter Four is the methodology chapter. It will offer a detailed presentation of the 
philosophical stance, research approach and methods used in pursuing the current research 
project. With qualitative and quantitative data used and a questionnaire and interview 
approach to data gathering, methods, sampling and ethics will be considered. Further, this 
chapter will apply the standards of reliability and validity to the study in order to justify the 
approaches taken. 
 
Chapter Five presents the findings of the primary research. This includes, for each of the 
three companies studied, a presentation of the data gathered through questionnaire given to 
employees, semi-structured interviews with managers involved in implementing PRP, and 
selected documents which illuminate PRP policy within the organisation. Results are 
compared and contrasted between cases. 
 
Chapter Six presents the conclusion to the study, and thus revisits the aims and objectives 
outlined in Chapter One to consider how far the research questions have been answered. This 
final chapter of the thesis will also draw conclusions from findings, present recommendations 
based on these conclusions and propose avenues for future study.  
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1.9 Chapter Summary 
  
Chapter One has given an introduction to the thesis. As well as outlining the broad subject 
area background in terms of pay and pay determination, the concept and definition of 
performance related pay has been introduced and its development briefly traced. Issues 
concerning the juxtaposition of PRP with the Saudi Arabian culture, in which it did not 
develop, have also been pinpointed for further consideration. The primary aims of the 
research in exploring implementation of PRP within three case study companies in Saudi 
Arabia have been presented, and justified in terms of the relevance of this research for HRM 
policy on the ground in Saudi Arabia and to filling the gap in current research regarding PRP 
outside the Western or developed context.  The next chapter presents a review of the 
literature as relevant to pay for performance, and explores its theoretical underpinnings, 
implementation and documented results.      
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction:  
 
The following chapter outlines the concept of pay and pay determination as a basis 
upon which private and public employers calculate wages for their workers. This chapter, 
therefore, provides a relevant literature review which will assist in justifying and clarifying 
the issues under discussion. The chapter discusses how organizations engage pay models and 
theories of bargaining and negotiating power, and focuses on theoretical and empirical 
arguments about pay and pay determination models. It also presents a scrutiny and critique of 
pay determination models. In line with these conceptions, the chapter provides a comparison 
of pay determination theories while incorporating arguments about bargaining and bargaining 
power and the nature of the employment relationship. It then explores the efforts of the firm 
to use pay systems to maintain or increase productivity in its employees, mainly through 
either time- or reward-based pay in various forms.  Following this, the second main section of 
the chapter considers performance related pay, in terms of definitions, rationale, 
implementation and effectiveness. It considers motivations for applying PRP systems, and 
evaluates evidence for both positive and negative effects of such schemes in the context of 
those motivations. Marsden, French and Kobi (2000) for example find that there are both 
positive and negative impacts from PRP and that these applied to different workers within the 
organisation differently, incentivizing those who gained from the scheme but demotivating 
those who were not rewarded, who formed the bulk of the workforce. The second part of the 
chapter will examine this and other attempts to weigh the impacts of pay for performance to 
provide a background within which to situate the findings of the current study.  
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2.2 Pay and Pay Determination 
Pay and pay determination systems differ among countries. According to Bach (2013, 
p.190), pay determination is the feature of employment activities which is shaped most by 
external forces. Within this, emphasis is typically placed on the role of the government in 
setting wages, due to the diverse constraints which the government can impose. Fiscal 
constraints and reluctance among government agencies may affect the level of institutional 
control over the pay bill, and pay has not tended to rise recently however above inflation in 
most OECD countries. 
2.2.1 The Definition of Pay: 
Pay, basically, refers to the amount of funds disbursed to a worker’s account for the 
work done. According to Leat (2012, p.138), the definition of pay is extensive and 
incorporates “the regular basic or minimal wage or income and any other consideration, that 
could be in terms of cash or in kind, and given to a worker. This amount of money that the 
employee receives; whether indirectly or directly, regarding his or her employment from his 
or her employer”.  
Adopting the economics approach, pay is considered as though it were the cost of any 
good, that is, pay is an outcome of market pressures of supply and demand for labour (Ackers 
& Wilkinson, 2005). In the late 1970s, Phelps Brown (1979) developed and integrated 
notions of pay further in contrasting the economic and sociological approaches to pay, 
considering factors other than pure supply and demand in the hierarchical structures seen in 
pay across a wide range of contexts, and integrating class structures and educational access 
for the workforce in considering pay, and Routh (1980) also helped to clarify the 
characteristics of pay, which provides a picture of various institutional, official and informal 
rule-making procedures in the labour market.  
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Generally however, pay is defined as ‘a transaction between the employee and the 
employer for a specific time, skills, commitment and loyalty’ (Torrington, Hall and Taylor 
2005, p.594). According to Salamon (2000), the term pay refers only to direct monetary 
payments including allowance, premium payments and bonuses. It also includes a range of 
financial welfare benefits such as pensions, company cars, and cheap loans. Pay working 
arrangements can be applied to the way jobs are constructed and the labour is used, or in 
other words, how employee activities are related to the organization’s needs. Thus, the 
standard definition of pay across all organizational settings remains as the amount of money 
received by workers, whether directly or indirectly, in exchange for work done. 
2.2.2 The Definition of Pay Determination: 
Pay determination is the process of determining how much money workers should be 
paid by employers in exchange for their labour service offered. Pay is determined, according 
to human capital theory, by different principles of social agents, such as union, government 
and employer as well as the skilled and less skilled, qualified and unqualified. Polanyi (1957) 
defined income as not only representing economic attributes, but also a range of social, 
political and historical conditions, which often represent conflict. According to Colling et al. 
(2010), the economic model suggests that pay primarily operates as a price signal in the 
labour market and as a pay-off to human capital investment. Therefore, pay can adjust to 
balance supply and demand, rising to attract labour when demand is high and decreasing in 
response to increasing unemployment. 
A set of principles underlies the arguments concerning how pay determination should 
preferably operate, and the conception of an individualized employment interaction plays a 
central role in explaining these arguments (Cutler and Waine, 2008, p.53). The U.S 
Department of Labor (2015) views pay determination as the listing of salaries and fringe 
benefits rates for all classifications of workers. These are wages that the administrator of 
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remuneration and hour division of the United States Department of labor has settled on to 
prevail in a particular area for a particular kind of work (Webapps.dol.gov, 2015, n.p.). While 
testing the evidence on pay and pay determination in the tourism sector, Riley, Ladkin and 
Szivas (2006, p.39) based their evaluation of pay determination on three concrete 
assumptions which are relevant to this literature review. First, they assume that pay 
determination entails not just market rivalry, but also intercompany processes. Second, they 
make an assumption that all disputes concerning determination focus on managerial 
resolution to set the cost of labour (Ibid. p.39). Third, the authors assume that there is 
adequate resemblance between sectors within the same industry so as to facilitate the 
possibility of creating a conceptual framework. These assumptions are significant to this 
study because they facilitate the taking of a particular stance based on the available relevant 
arguments (Rubery, 2005). 
Pay determination is significantly influenced by the economic pressure of supply and 
demand in the labour marketplace. As a result of this, an understanding of pay determination 
and its distribution must be partially based on the factors which influence market mechanisms 
for dispensing labour skills. In the past, people and institutions felt the need for the 
government’s contribution to the power of the public sector agencies (Bach, 2013, p.13). 
Latterly however, governments across the globe pushed for decentralization of pay 
determination (Hegewisch, 1991). This was so because private parties raised disputes based 
on the notion that the state’s determination of remuneration unavoidably gave birth to rates 
that were much higher than necessary (Gernigon, Odero and Guido, 2000). The government’s 
practice of raising wages above the appropriate level was done to attract labour in significant 
local labour markets (Leat, 2012, p.185). It should also be noted however that governments 
may also act to keep wages artificially low. Forces of supply and demand play a crucial role 
in influencing how far organizations would set wages given the state of competition in the 
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labour market. Technically, setting the wage rate higher than expected leads to increased 
influx of labourers willing to work as employers steadily continue to compete for these 
labourers, and pushes employment rates higher. This wage setting raises questions in terms of 
the influence of any performance-related element when considering the effects of a given rate 
of pay 
Notably, the economic forces of supply and demand create an aspect of wage 
agreement between labour unions, where they exist, and employers. Negotiations between 
companies and labour unions are termed collective bargaining, and aims to determine the 
workers’ wage rate (Walton & McKersie, 1991). More specifically, Hayter (2011, p. 1) 
defines collective bargaining as  
“…a process of negotiation between the representatives of an employer (or 
employers) and of workers. The intention of these negotiations is to arrive at a 
collective agreement that will govern the employment relationship. This typically 
covers issues such as wages, working time, and other working conditions” 
 
and goes on to note that collective bargaining is distinct from other forms of governance, 
such as individual contracts, government regulation, and employers’ unilateral decision 
making.  
Collective bargaining is a means of addressing issues related to work in a manner that 
accommodates the interests of all parties. It roots can be traced to the industrial revolution in 
the 18th century as workers sought to protect themselves from the impact of the new 
production methods by creating organisations to represent their interests to employers and the 
government (Hayter, 2011). Collective bargaining thus arose through the organisation and 
activism of working people as a means of balancing otherwise unequal (individual) 
bargaining power in the employment relationship (Thompson, 1980). It also protected 
workers from some of the negative impacts of competition by establishing what is known as a 
‘common rule,’ which is standard rates of pay and conditions of work for workers in a 
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specific factory, trade, industry, or region. While many employers initially resisted workers’ 
attempts to engage in collective bargaining, trade unions were strengthened when many 
countries amended their laws to remove restrictions on the formation of trade unions and 
legal obstacles to workers’ right to strike. 
However, these negotiations have waned in the last three decades as a result of the 
general shift in the wage determination system. The crumpling of industry-wide collective 
negotiations in the late 1980s and 1990s led to crucial consequences for the entire exposure 
of collective bargaining as a wage determination system (White & Druker, 2013, p.36). In 
discussions regarding pay determination, economists identify a relationship between this and 
the ideology of bargaining and bargaining power. Bryson and Freeman (2014) echo the above 
discussion of collective bargaining, alleging that the authority of multi-employer negotiations 
among workplaces in manufacturing impacted considerably on pay determination in work 
environments, with  wage determination in the 1990s featuring  collective negotiations which 
included some aspects of multi-employer bargaining. The next section will provide an 
overview of the influence of three factors in wage determination; the firm, the market and the 
state.  
 
2.3 The Role of the Firm, Market and State in Pay 
Determination 
2.3.1 Role of the Firm in Pay Determination 
The primary role of a firm is to collect and utilize the available factors of production 
including land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship, to produce and supply goods in the 
market. As long as a firm is involved in production, it will have to incur operating costs in 
terms of salaries paid out to its workers. Pay determination models and theories thus provide 
considerable knowledge about how companies determine wages with efficiency, based on 
costs against income. However, it is also crucial to understand the role of firms in pay 
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determination. Apparently, large firms endow employees with high incomes, job security and 
high prospects of internal promotion. With profit maximisation as a central goal, firms 
promote the concept of pay determination by setting goals that are geared towards increasing 
profitability (Marx & Salverda, 2005, p.176). Because many empirical studies show that 
profitability is a crucial determinant of pay, changes in a firm’s profitability might directly 
influence the concept of pay determination. 
Furthermore, the power of companies in local labour markets might also influence 
pay and establish small wage employment pools (Marx & Salverda, 2005; Manning, 2003). 
Traditionally, the principal role of a firm is to amplify the effectiveness of transaction costs 
(Hayek, 1945). Therefore, many firms create and provide opportunities for capacity building 
for their stakeholders. Failure of the firm to promote capability building might result in many 
individuals quitting in search of fresh environments that would help in supporting these 
workers to accelerate capacity building in a more effective way. Conventionally, people 
believe that attention should be given to individuals in terms of offering training and 
augmenting the job experience. Characteristically, recruitment of low-skilled workers is 
significant in pay determination and more specifically, the quality of jobs accessible by such 
categories of labourers. Moreover, firms construct policy measures with an aim of improving 
the quality of labour, but this has restrained beneficial effects in the absence of adjustments in 
the conduct of these firms and the industry as a whole. As a way of determining pay, some 
firms have had policy measures directed to them to regulate their conduct. Such policies 
include minimum wages, the directive for working period and employee health and safety 
legislation which provides the minimum legal framework for hiring of workers and pay 
circumstances. 
According to Clark (2004), institutions, governments and other organizations 
encourage, assist, provide necessary incentives and supervise the efforts of firms to enhance 
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the attractiveness of jobs, and especially through pay and pay determination (Marx & 
Salverda, 2005, p.176; Clark, 2004).  Generally, the role of the firm in pay and pay 
determination necessitates a unique perspective regarding how much firms need to pay 
workers and the expected duties of the employees in the firm. Classical and neo-classical 
theories of the firm stand on the basis of viewing the organisation as existing to create the 
greatest level of profit, while individuals within that organisation have a different objective, 
which is to achieve greatest utility for themselves.  In this view, as developed by Hicks in his 
Theory of Wages the utility perceived by the worker relates to their own work and wage, 
without reference to that of others (Flatau, 2002).  
The following section will consider the role of the labour market and state in 
determining wages.  
2.3.2 The Function of the Market and State in Pay Determination 
The labour market plays a very significant role in determining the wages that firms 
are willing to part with in exchange for work done, and views of the labour market were 
developed by Ricardo in the classical theory, before being extended by neo-classical theorists 
including Marshall (1890) and Hicks (1932, in Hahn, 2005).  In a capitalist system, the price 
of labour is regulated on the basis of supply and demand, and it is generally held that fluid 
markets are essential in allowing workers to move from organisation to organisation in order 
for a market to be categorized as competitive (Lazear and Oyer, 2004).The neoclassical 
theory of the labour market is of a market containing buyers and sellers as for any other 
commodity (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007; Corby et al., 2008; Wilkinson and Dundon, 2006). 
Thus the traditional starting point in economics is the neo-classical model of the labour 
market in which wages, just like any other price, are determined by the forces of demand and 
supply. Employers (generally a firm) will decide how many and which kinds of workers they 
want to employ at wage levels that allow them to trade profitably in their selected product 
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market. The firm will employ workers of each kind needed up to the point where their wage 
is equal to their marginal product (the additional added value gained by the firm from its least 
productive worker) (Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz, 2012). On the supply side of the equation, 
each worker has their own preferences that will determine the amount of labour they are 
willing to supply at each wage rate. Workers will thus offer their labour once they find the 
wage rate to be sufficient inducement to do the job. In a perfectly competitive labour market, 
and with freedom of entry and exit for both firms and workers, the forces of demand and 
supply will produce a single wage rate at which supply and demand are in equilibrium 
(Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007; Wilkinson and Dundon, 2006). 
The influence of the market on pay and pay determination is entirely dependent on the 
natural economic forces of supply and demand for the labour force. The labour market can 
affect both the extent to which companies require to internalize their systems of recruitment 
and the forms of employment techniques that would help them realize their objectives 
(Rubery, 2005, p.51). The labour market is an effective instrument for matching supply and 
demand of labour as a factor of production by engaging the terms of contracts between the 
employer and the labour unions (Nijhof & Brandsma, 2011, p.75). As many forms of work 
continue to exist while being differentiated by the level of proficiency, location, and gender 
among other factors, many markets are created, although these are connected and can 
influence the working of one another. As management has the mandate to set pay rates, the 
power that management has on wage determination exceeds this authority (Riley, Ladkin & 
Szivas, 2006).  Thus, if one upholds the claim that pay is decided in the labour market, then 
the extent to which the market is the agent for employers and labourers is a subject of 
managerial choice. 
As long as companies have to employ and retain labour they cannot completely evade 
the external influences that exist in the external labour market. Since companies operate in a 
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world of imperfect competition, the influences of the commodity market are in competition 
with those existing in the labour market to determine pay. Businesses recognize that there are 
tensions between the productive and allocative elements of pay. Therefore, if pay for a 
particular skill declines to much lower than the prevailing market wage rate, this may result 
in labour turnover. In the perspective of an internal labour market, however, increasing the 
pay for one group might lead to disruptive effects on outlined differentials with the remaining 
group of the company’s workforce (Wilkinson and Dundon, 2006). In addition, Lazear and 
Oyer (2004) state that pay determination over the longer term seems to depend far more 
closely on external than internal wage-setting, and upon the sector and geographical location 
of the business. This may have important implications for the ability of firms to differentiate 
wages effectively through approaches such as PRP. Internal labour markets are a significant 
factor, taking into consideration that in the later stages of their career, workers tend to interact 
directly with the external labour market less frequently, with internal movement depending 
on the level of ex-post or later career fluidity in presence, as opposed to ex-ante or prior 
fluidity which refers to movement among those first entering the labour force (Lazear and 
Oyer, 2004). From the approach of economics, pay is illustrated as if it were the price of a 
particular commodity, which is the result of the external forces of demand and supply of 
labour. 
However, the state intervenes in the process of wage determination, for purposes of 
taxation as well as to promote equality and social stability, and this occurs either directly 
through laws such as the national minimum wage (Edwards, 2003), or, in the UK, indirectly 
through committees and pay review bodies for nursing staff and school teachers (White, 
2000). The state also interferes indirectly in wage determination through imposition and 
collective bargaining. 
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As argued by Ackers and Wilkinson (2005), the method of determination of wages in 
a liberalized market is simply the event of the general theory of value. Like the price of other 
commodities in the product market, wages are costs of labour and are influenced by external 
pressures as a result of supply and demand for labour force if not regulated. In ordinary cases, 
a person’s income is determined by both the market salary for a single unit of human capital 
and the quantity of the human capital that is chosen by the buyer, who is the company, in this 
case. Technically, the human capital accrual is determined on the grounds of how much free 
time and current level of income the potential employer has to forego in order to invest in 
regular prospective flow of income when employed. The opportunity cost here is determined 
by the interest rates that are calculated in the capital market. Hence, it can be established that 
the future earnings of potential employees do not rely on market forces entirely, but also on 
the multimarket equilibrium that occurs as a result of simultaneous resolutions of the factor 
markets. Looking at this issue from an industrial relations perspective, pay does not run as a 
properly-functioning market indicator that provides a guideline for the distribution and 
allocation of labour. This is because the market concept is considered to be problematic in 
itself. Overall, one might support the statement that wages are an outcome of potentially 
conflicting economic, political, and social forces.  The next section describes theories of 
bargaining and bargaining power, and how these interact with pay determination concepts 
and systems. 
2.3.3 Bargaining and Bargaining Power 
Bargaining is a form of negotiation where a consumer and seller of a good or service 
discuss the price and the real nature of the commodity and the transaction as a whole. As it 
relates to bargaining in the workplace, ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service) notes that collective bargaining negotiations concern the terms and conditional of 
employment. According to Brown et al. (2008), the definition of collective bargaining varies 
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depending on the method through which a labour union is recognized by the legislative and 
legal system of a given country. Generally however, collective bargaining refers to a process 
where a union is recognized by the legal and legislative systems and given a mandate to 
conduct negotiations with employers on behalf of a faction or factions of workers.  
The bargaining theory of wages maintains that wages, hours, and employees’ working 
environment are determined by the relative negotiating strength of parties involved in the 
agreement. This is in line with Walton and McKersie’s (1967) theory of labour negotiations. 
According to Bryson et al. (2006), the bargaining theory hypothesizes competition with 
governments for dispensing revenues and expenses in addition to the obvious competition 
from rival firms. The primary task of bargaining theory is to show the possible outcomes of 
conflicting circumstances and to elucidate the empirical outcomes in a test of values. 
Furthermore, the theory of collective bargaining disputes the existence of a single factor or a 
single mixture of factors that calculates wages and posits that no single rate of pay 
necessarily prevails. Alternatively, there exist a variety of rates that might occur 
independently. Atherton (2015) argues that although unions do not negotiate directly with 
respect to price, the wage policies constructed by many unions if considered collectively, 
they affect the general price level (Atherton, 2015, p.44). It appears that unions have an 
enormous influence on negotiations compared to individuals. Given forces of demand and 
supply, the unions act as bargaining units: hence, this gives birth to the concept of bargaining 
power. 
With respect to pay determination and the general bargaining theory, bargaining 
power describes the relative ability of a bargaining unit to influence the decisions of the 
employer. Bargaining power in its general sense is simply political power possessed and 
implemented bilaterally. The idea of ‘mutual gains’ bargaining has gained prominence 
however, and this refers to more cooperative labour relations (Bacon and Blyton, 2007; 
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Prowse and Prowse, 2006). Mutual gains bargaining “encourages parties in a negotiation to 
focus on interests rather than positions, agree on objective criteria for evaluation of 
settlements, separate problems from people involved, and explore solutions without early 
commitment” (Hunter and McKersie, 1992, p. 319). 
In bargaining, each party’s power is restricted by the power of the other party and the 
relative negotiating authority that ascertains the outcome occurs because of the resisted power 
of the two opposing parties (Snyder & Diesing, 2015, p.189). More specifically, bargaining 
power describes the capacity of a negotiating unit to yield results; the power that manifests in 
the product. According to Bowles (2008, p.349), bargaining power relates to outcomes: that 
is, how much merit one might earn more willingly than any given means of achieving this 
outcome. Concerning bargaining power, the employee has all the negotiating power (Bowles, 
2008). Interestingly, while this power may be wielded through union or non-union voice, 
Willman et al. (2007) suggest that non-union voice brings most benefit to workers, although 
it is not clear whether this voice is direct or in a representative form. The authors also propose 
that, while a mixture of union and non-union voice is beneficial, for the organisation, 
productivity may be best served by non-union voice only (Willman et al., 2007).  
Governments usually possess unique negotiating powers that are different from rival 
organizations in a market setting. Governments compete for economic gains, substantiate the 
rules of competition, and have enormous control over the production resources in terms of 
inputs.   Therefore, bargaining power can be explained as the ability of one party to control 
the other as a result of influence, authority, size or status. In negotiations, the power to 
discuss prices between two parties could be achieved through a combination of diverse 
persuasive tactics instead of one single idea. 
 
 
   
27 
2.4 The Employment Relationship and Productivity 
 
The preceding sections of this chapter have considered pay and pay determination, which 
forms an aspect of the employment relationship. This section will briefly consider the nature 
of that relationship further, before considering management attempts and approaches to 
linking pay with productivity.  
 
As stated in Section 2.3.1, the main role of the business organisation is to collect and utilize 
the available factors of production, including land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship, to 
produce and supply goods in the market. While employees were traditionally viewed by 
economic theorists as a factor of production which once acquired simply supplied that labour 
at the given cost, in the 20th Century, a new focus was created (as proposed by Simon, 1950, 
for example) to take into account the more complex nature of labour as compared with other 
assets of the firm The need for labour thus specifies the necessary existence of a relation in 
which workers are employed by the firm.  
 
The International Labor Organisation (ILO, 2015a) defines the employment relationship as 
“the legal link between employers and employees [which] exists when a person performs 
work or services under certain conditions in return for remuneration”. The employee-
employer relation is governed partly by a contract which is entered into at the beginning of 
the relationship. However, where an employment relationship exists, laws and regulations 
governing this type of relation also come into play. Within this relationship, both the 
employee and employer have certain responsibilities and enjoy certain rights, depending on 
the country and structures within which the relationship is established (ILO, 2015a), possibly 
including union representation for workers, offering certain protections and collective 
bargaining opportunities, as discussed in Section 2.3.3. 
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The ILO (2015a) points to a lack of transparency and enforcement appearing in an 
international context in employment relations, to the detriment of employee rights. 
Meanwhile, within the firm, it may not be clear who is managing the employee-employer 
relationship in the absence of union-management interactions.  HR departments might be 
considered to have the skills and focus to manage the employment relationship, but in the UK 
at least, the WERS (2011) study casts doubt on the degree of autonomy and actual capability 
of HR professionals to influence or shape this relation. Nevertheless, the discipline of HRM 
contains focus on managing the employment relationship, and considering the role of the 
state in governing the employment relation through regulatory channels and laws, the 
majority of larger firms include in their HR departments staff dedicated to managing this 
relation in accordance with law and in the interests of the firm (Bratton & Gold, 2007). 
 
 
2.4.1 Linking productivity to pay systems on the basis of time.   
Management of the employment relation is undertaken by the firm to maintain or increase 
productivity, and principals task managers with the problem of ensuring a productive 
workforce (WERS, 2011). However, actually identifying all of the variables which feed into 
this and controlling these specifically is reported as prohibitively costly, or more likely, 
impossible. In this context, instruments must be found which can be used to influence 
productivity, and one such lever available to management is the pay system. Strategic reward 
approaches therefore encompass the goal of alignment with other HR management practices 
to increase productivity (Armstrong, 2006). 
 
A major approach within pay system design is that of time-based pay, with regulation of 
working time generally being specifically set out as part of contractual arrangements, and 
   
29 
much of union negotiation with employers concerning time-based rates of pay (Hart & Ma, 
2008). Within this, market rate analysis, job evaluation or some strategy for assessing the 
reward level of a particular role is combined with the hours set to determine final pay 
(Armstrong, 2006). Carmichael (1983, cited in Hart & Ma, 2008) developed a 2-phase theory 
of time-based pay, with the early part of a contractual employment relationship being taken 
up partly with training and the development of the requisite skills and experience to perform 
productively. During this period, the time-based reward might exceed the actual productive 
return of the employee, but this is compensated by the later period of employment, in which 
productivity rises and the level of pay for time is justified by return. Hart and Ma (2008) 
extend this model to consider overtime reward for workers in the second period of 
employment, and find that the inclusion of hours in negotiations enhances efficiency, and 
further that systems of premium overtime payment are widely adopted and may also offer 
benefit for the firm.  Thus, time-based reward has some support in the literature as an 
effective lever for productivity. 
 
2.4.2. Linking productivity to pay on the basis of performance measures. 
The main logic historically put forward for developing incentive-based pay linked to 
performance has been to bring the interests of the agents carrying out or arranging the work 
more closely into line with those of the principals who stand to profit from the firm’s success. 
Other possible rationales and potential consequences are plentiful in the literature, as 
discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.2., and include for example self-selection effects when 
offering incentive pay and thus a potential rationale to influence the make-up of the 
workforce through self-selection at the recruitment stage (Dohmen and Falks, 2006).    
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However, while historically, the parties to the employment contract are held to be completely 
selfish in their interest in the employment relation, Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2005, in 
Dohmen and Falks, 2006) report that regard for fairness influences the actions of at least 
some employees and that this influences the positive and negative impacts of reward for 
performance pay systems, depending on the basis on which they are set up.  With this in 
mind, and also considering Dohmen and Falks’ (2006) finding of self-sorting effects on 
recruitment for PRP-based contracts, the approach to designing strategic PRP schemes 
becomes complex, and it is unsurprising that a range of designs for this have been 
implemented, as listed and discussed briefly below.  
 
Payment by Results: This is the oldest and simplest type of shop floor reward 
scheme. Under this system, workers are paid at a certain rate depending on their output or the 
quantity of pieces of production. The plan is organized in factions or on an individual basis 
where the individual is rewarded for his or her effort based on norms and conventions, 
whereas group piecework occurs only when the work process makes it appropriate (Melling 
& Booth, 2008, p.54). In this scenario, the employee effectively selects their production rate 
and thus their pay. The pay is in direct proportion to the output; however, many piecework 
schemes give a fall-back rate that shows a minimum earnings level. The ratio of the minimum 
rate in relation to the average returns differs accordingly. The plan involves paying a price for 
the output depending on a system designed to indicate the units of production which 
employees can accomplish in a specified time. An argument against the piecework plan is 
that, while payment rises with increase in production, this system mostly guarantees a base 
pay that is defined in the jurisdictions where there is legislation for the lowest wage payable 
for a piece of work. 
This scheme might be appropriate in operations where the task is relatively repetitive 
and unskillful, where the employees can manage the rate of production and their output by 
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the use of their energy and dedication. Also, the scheme might be appropriate where speeding 
up in tasks does not significantly alter quality standards (Armstrong & Murlis, 2007, p.408). 
Furthermore, this system can be appropriate because it is easy to operate and illustrate to 
workers. Piecework systems tend to match all the criteria for reward schemes. Moreover, the 
piecework plan is easy to understand, and workers can quickly take control of their income 
by moderating their speed at work. However, the scheme might imply fluctuating earnings in 
the long run, thus making it hard for employees to budget for their ordinary items of 
expenditure. Another concern about this system is that the plan can operate well as a reward 
system but only if the rates are fair, and might be difficult to realize under ordinary 
circumstances. 
Merit Pay: This plan pays strongly performing workers with extra payment and is 
usually associated with a performance appraisal which is carried out by a superior employee 
in the management or a line manager (ACAS, 2015). Merit pay systems typically illustrate an 
event in which the compensation or salary paid to a worker lies within a range for that 
particular job (Macky & Wilson, 2013, p.64) In simple terms, the bonus payments or pay 
levels are normally based on the general evaluation of a worker’s contribution to the general 
organizational performance and may also be based on statistical figures. In some companies, 
these additional earnings are based on the accomplishment of goals and objectives 
predetermined at the start of the company’s appraisal period. During the process of 
evaluation, the assessing officers might opt to include desired behaviours, for instance, 
cooperation and leadership. In most cases, this performance related payment plan is taken to 
be fair, and especially when the performance of the employees is evaluated using an 
appropriate appraisal system. Merit payment of individual workers is typically included in the 
final base pay. 
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Team-Oriented Pay: This plan is given to workers in the form of a bonus and is 
awarded to members of a formally founded and recognized team as connected to their 
performance. This system can strengthen group resources as well as client alignment 
(Lucifora and Origo, 2012). The major aim of this is to encourage team members to 
cooperate in order to increase team performance. An example of a team-based payment is 
where an individual team is given a bonus by the management when a newly introduced 
product accomplishes the regulatory process successfully. This plan is suitable for many 
companies on condition that the teams are clearly defined, the objectives of the group are 
explicitly underlined and the performance of this team can be measured or weighed on an 
individual scale that is acceptable to the management. Further, Lucifora and Origo (2012) 
caution against overly complicated schemes or direct link to profit generation in the team 
context. 
Profit-Sharing PRP Plan: This system is based on the performance of a company 
and facilitates the workers to contribute to the prosperity and achievement of the business 
(Gernigon et al., 2000). The plan is regarded as being an efficient way through which 
employers can promote individual effort and motivation (Sutherland & Canwell, 2005). A 
certain ratio of the company’s revenue is apportioned and reimbursed to the employees across 
the organization as a bonus payment. Statistically, this payment is an adjustable factor in the 
form of PRP that is remitted when revenues exceed the threshold earnings limit. 
Occasionally, profit-sharing assumes the form of shares instead of cash, where the workers 
can purchase shares of the business at the preferential prices. This may take the form of the 
organisation matching shares bought by employees, which Bryson and Freeman (2014) argue 
as both a ‘gift’ which may attract reciprocity and as a link to performance. The plan usually 
grants the employees an opportunity to become the partial owners of the company, whereby 
they earn a constant income paid out on the shares in the form of dividends. 
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Bonuses: This PRP scheme entails payment of additional income to a person, group 
or departments as an appreciation for the accomplishment of the predetermined performance 
goals. Bonus schemes relate to pay given to employees for the number of items they produce 
(Singh, 2012). These payment plans might be designed for any group of workers: for 
instance, in a manufacturing industry setting, workers are usually paid for enhanced 
productivity or quality advancements. In most cases, bonuses are paid as a variable payment 
and have to be re-earned for subsequent years. Notably, it is challenging to design a reward 
system that is affordable, comprehensible and motivational in promoting employee behaviors 
that yield an organizational competitive advantage. 
Gain-Sharing Scheme: Under this system, firms try to accumulate savings by 
altering the work practices and this is based on the method of rewards calculated by 
measuring performance (Singh, 2012, p.163). The amount remitted as the gain is determined 
using an accepted formula and then allocated between workers and the company. The plan, 
however, necessitates a joint implementation with an involvement formation to create more 
ideas. Notably, the measures opted for in this scheme must be employee oriented. 
Commission: This is a plan that involves payment on sales which is given to sales 
advocates or sales agents stationed in the company’s retail stores. The additional funds for 
workers eligible for a commission involve a direct payment that depends on sales 
performance (Singh, 2012). It includes payment of as a percentage of total sales made by the 
sales advocate, and the amount is generally paid to workers in addition to an agreed base pay. 
This ratio may differ depending on quantity, rewarding topmost achievers at a higher value 
when sales rise beyond a predetermined threshold. The plan attracts potential employees who 
are principally inspired by monetary rewards, and it performs best for workers who are 
capable of carrying out their assigned tasks with minimal monitoring by the company 
executives. 
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Organization-Specific Benefits Scheme: Although organizations operate with 
organization-specific benefits, this technique can permit workers to apportion a given amount 
of money as a ratio of their wage on restricted menu benefits. Here, flexible benefits plans 
assist workers to restrict their contributions to those benefits which have rising costs. Some 
organizations negotiate rates for this scheme and later settle the benefits either wholly or 
partially. However, in some cases, the employers tend to be benevolent such that they extend 
the benefits to cover the families of the workers. 
2.5 Performance Related Pay 
This section and the subsequent one cover the core issues on PRP and its implementation, 
definitions, theoretical underpinnings, rationale for the use of performance related pay and 
the various types of scheme that this umbrella term refers to. In particular, PRP may find its 
logical basis in Vroom’s (1964) expectancy model as the theory which underpins notions of 
behavioural alterations as motivated by offered reward, and this will be considered in detail 
in Section 2.6. It also explores research and debate on the effects of PRP systems on 
performance, and the empirical literature regarding the take-up and evaluation of such 
schemes.  
2.5.1 Definition: 
Performance related pay is a financial reward system for employees that involves 
monetary compensation based on an individual’s performance as evaluated relative to 
particular criteria stated by the company (ACAS, 2015). Within the business concept, PRP 
relates to how an individual, a faction or team performs during a specified timeframe and in 
assigned projects. Although the meaning of performance related pay has differed across 
companies, evidence indicates that more and more businesses have been trying to bring in a 
particular type of new compensation to affirm the connection between pay and performance 
of the workers (Lee & Eyraud, 2008). However, there seems to be almost no connection 
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between a company’s performance and its choice to bring in performance related pay, 
including both profitable and non-profitable companies attempting to introduce performance 
pay. The definition of performance related pay stresses that performance relates to what has 
been realized and how it has been realized (Armstrong & Cummins, 2011). 
   
2.5.2 The Rationale for Performance Related Pay: 
Pay for performance stems from the concept that reward affects behaviour or 
individual performance in a way which is meaningful for organisational performance 
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Pfeffer, 1998; Rigby, 2001; Rosenthal et al., 2005). In addition, 
there exists the view that fixed pay allows a culture of entitlement to prevail and does not sit 
with modern drives to increase competitive edge, teamwork and flexibility while de-
emphasising organisational hierarchy (Baker, 1993). Society is continuously evolving with 
changing times and certain changes need to be made in order to adjust to such changes, 
requiring management to consider use of incentives and the application of a range of human 
resource management skills to apply persuasion and a feeling of personal ownership for 
completing its goals. According to the competitive perspective, the requirement for change is 
related to the need of business to maintain competitiveness within the marketplace. The drive 
for staying competitive leads to the requirement for incentives for increasing production. The 
driving force behind performance related pay schemes may therefore be broadly encapsulated 
as the search for a means to enhance competitiveness in the market.       
Often however, the more precise rationale for performance related payments is 
indistinct, although a transparent method circumvents the uncertainty and ideologies of 
unfairness and decreases the chances of individual claims. The primary reasons for 
performance related pay are usually said to be to recruit, retain, and inspire the labour force 
(Wragg, 2004). This rationale is based on the belief that top-quality employees are attracted 
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to a company where they hope that their energy will be acknowledged through reward. 
Dohmen and Falks’ (2006) study in fact suggests various self-sorting effects when 
individuals choose between fixed and variable payment schemes, and therefore suggest that 
job applicants’ characteristics are affected by implementing PRP. Furthermore, the theoretical 
purpose for performance related pay is based on the notion that workers act to optimize their 
welfare (Dufour & Curtis, 2011).  Yuan et al. (2013), categorise three bases for introducing 
incentive pay in the teaching profession which differ somewhat from this however. 
Motivation is the first of these, desired in the belief that this will lead working practices to be 
altered, including changing activities, increasing time spent on work and undertaking more 
professional development activities. The second basis is also similar to other accounts, being 
the intention to attract a larger number of candidates for recruitment or those entering the 
profession. The third basis differs however, in seeking to alter professionals’ work 
environment through affecting changes in behaviour through PRP (Yuan et al., 2013).  
Overall, seven main desires behind the introduction of PRP schemes within a firm 
have been identified from the literature. These are; motivation, changing organisational 
culture, pay system fairness, making managers manage, reduction of trade union influence, 
recruitment and retention of staff, and political imperatives. The seven desires are discussed 
in turn in the subsections which follow.  
2.5.3 Motivation 
While human relations literature emphasises factors other than pay in motivation, pay is 
considered by authors such as Armstrong and Murlis (2007) to be capable of playing a role in 
motivation provided the pay for reward scheme is of appropriate design. Expectancy theory 
(Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) is taken in most PRP literature to underlie approaches 
to motivation (Lewis, 1997). Employee motivation hinges on the individual linking effort 
made to work achieved, and linking work achieved with a desirable reward. For the 
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organisation to draw benefit from this, such perceptions must be strong, and strengthening 
these is a goal of PRP. Some part of the PRP literature however adopts goal-setting theory , 
which emphasises the importance of defining particular working goals or set working 
approaches to be taken, in agreement with the employees concerned (Lewis, 1997).  Yuan et 
al. (2013) examine PRP through goal-setting theory and consider that the theory that goals 
increase expectancy may be applied on a team as well as an individual basis, with potential 
for improving performance therefore in settings where individuals must work closely together 
to achieve goals. Most PRP schemes, whether recent or long-established, are introduced with 
motivation as a goal (Frey and Jegen, 2000).  Cannell and Wood (1992) meanwhile 
concluded in a large postal survey for the Institute of Personnel Management that providing 
reward for good performance was of greater importance than motivation in underpinning PRP 
strategy.  
 
2.5.4 Changing organizational culture. 
Performance management techniques in general, of which PRP may be considered a part, are 
attributed the aim of improving systems used by the organisation and enhancing 
organisational learning. This is thought to occur via enhancements brought in clarification of 
managerial goals, accountability and commitment to objectives (European Commission, 
2012). Hartog and Verburg (2004) emphasise the impact of reward scheme upon 
organisational culture, and whether that culture is associated with participation, innovation, 
and value placed upon employees. This role of pay schemes is also supported by French and 
Marsden (1998), who argue that PRP has been used to negotiating higher performance 
standards. Further, Marsden (2004) argues that the main reason for introducing PRP was the 
desire to raise standards of management, change the organisational culture in the public 
sector as these organisations are pushed to become more performance-focused, This is 
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supported by an LGMB study of local authorities (1994). Kessler and Bach (2011) also 
observed change in organisational culture to be a factor in the implementation of PRP across 
both public and private organizations. 
 
2.5.5 Pay system fairness. 
Janssen (2001) and Bartol and Srivastava (2002a) suggest that perceptions of equity are an 
important function of any reward system, with Hackett (1979) contending that it is essential 
that reward be based upon performance.  Further, Fehr, Goette, and Zehnde (2008) state that 
fairness should form the basis of pay calculation, which is in line with Kanter’s (1987) 
assertion that a pay system which ties salary to position runs counter to this aim. Indeed, Fehr 
et al. (2008, p. 2) argue that “[t]he fact that many employment relationships are characterised 
by long-term relations greatly amplifies the importance of fairness preferences.” According to 
a study by Bryson and Freeman (2006, in Bryson and Forth, 2006), individual performance 
related pay is the only form of pay for performance to significantly influence gross earnings 
of the individual, and to affect pay dispersal at the level of the workplace: it may therefore be 
regarded as a tool which is capable of exerting impact at this level, although this does not 
necessarily imply an impact on performance. 
However, Lewis (1997) highlights the need to distinguish between notions of fair reward and 
the need to provide incentives to employees with the aim of increasing productivity.  He goes 
on to question the meaning of ‘fairness’ in the context of studies into pay systems, 
considering that the moral implications of the term may not represent the basis of the desire 
of management to provide it. 
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2.5.6 Making managers manage. 
PRP has necessary impacts upon the working practices of managers, who gain responsibility 
for assessing and comparing worker performance. Managers are pivotal to the PRP process 
(Selden and Sowa, 2011) in terms of setting requirements, communicating, and implementing 
tasks (Storey and Sisson, 2005). The personnel department is also responsible for information 
provision, but the desire to place responsibility in the areas of pay and performance in 
managers’ hands leads to perceptions that managers in general need to improve their handling 
of these spheres, being restricted by a reluctance to be involved in unpopular or difficult 
decisions (Lawler, 1990), and also to the need for greater accountability and opportunity for 
systemic change engendered by the flat or decentralised organisation (Selden and Sowa, 
2011). Further, there is a view of performance management techniques such as PRP as being 
utilized to create a more general understanding of impacts of processes undertaken, as well as 
inputs and outputs (European Commission, 2012).  
 
2.5.7 An attempt to lessen trade union influence. 
   One of the characteristics of PRP is a blow to the collectivism of the trade union 
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2011), and indeed Heery (2013) attributes the introduction of 
PRP in some cases to a move against union power, in some instances leading to de-
recognition. The possibility of the use of PRP to affect the power of collective bargaining, 
which he states may be restricted in either scope or depth, with union involvement being 
reduced. This is in line with research by Kang and Yanadori (2011) indicating that political 
factors affect the introduction of PRP schemes, indicating the importance of institutional 
factors on the use of PRP in a country. More specifically, Arrowsmith and Marginson (2011) 
examined the impact of more variable pay schemes on collective pay determination in the UK 
banking industry and found that “the growth of bonus schemes has both supplanted collective 
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profit-share and permitted greater standardisation of merit-pay awards. Unions have therefore 
achieved some success in terms of limiting variation in base pay, at the same time as the 
overall purchase of collective bargaining on employee earnings has diminished” (p. 54). 
 
PRP may also act to remove the perception of employees that trade union representation is 
necessary for them, through decreasing its instrumental value, removing the prevalence of 
unionism in the workplace culture, tending to diminish perceptions of managerial acceptance 
of trade union membership, and finally by decreasing unresolved disputes in the case that the 
scheme works well. On the other hand, Heery (2013) also states that in cases where PRP 
systems are apparently unfair, the perceived value of trade union membership may increase: 
this is associated with increased overall labour costs (Bryson et al., 2005). 
 
2.5.8 Recruitment and retention of staff. 
While pay in general is viewed as a tool for recruitment and retention, the picture as regards 
PRP is more complex.  It is clear that PRP is often utilised with this aim in mind (Hasnain 
and Pierskalla Henryk, 2012; Marsden, 2004). However, Lawler states that reward for good 
performance should assist in recruitment and retention of high achievers, ACAS (2015) states 
that using PRP in such a way, and especially targeted at roles in demand in the market, 
gravitates against perceptions of its fairness. 
The potential benefits for recruitment and retention of PRP are as follows: the extra pay 
works twice, in both attracting staff and resulting in better performance, and furthermore is 
channeled only to those whose performance is good; and also may attract those inclined to 
give thought to achieving high performance (Gerhart and Fang, 2014; Lewis, 1997).   
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2.5.9 Political imperatives. 
The political imperative can be another reason for the widespread introduction of PRP across 
a country. For example, as ideologically founded in the development of neoliberal ideas in 
the postwar era by Hayek (1945 and Friedman (1962), the Conservative government of the 
UK in the 1980s imported ideas from the private sector. This was criticised for tending to 
emulate private sector practice without proper evaluation of its effectiveness (Hughes, 2012).   
Other sources such as Weerakkody, Janssen, and Dwivedi (2011) however provide evidence 
of a change of attitude within the public sector toward greater customer focus. 
A fundamental value of performance related payment is that the concept attempts to 
eradicate the notion of entitlement. While companies engage merit pay with an aim of 
generating and maintaining a performance-based culture, it is debatable whether this actually 
encourages the workers to optimize productivity. For this reason, motivation is regarded as a 
function of sophisticated variables, the most compelling of which could turn out to be non-
economic. However, employers can show that reward is dependent on performance and 
contribution.  
 
2.6 Theoretical basis of Performance Related Pay Models  
Performance related pay is an idea which was developed based on the combination of several 
theoretical strands from different disciplines. Liang (2013) views the foundations of PRP as 
the principal agent theory as an economic base, while its psychological underpinning comes 
from expectancy theory. 
2.6.1 Expectancy theory 
Support for PRP is grounded theoretically in expectancy theory and reinforcement theory. 
Expectancy theory follows upon psychological insights on repeated behavioural patterns and 
learning through positive and negative stimuli. According to Perry, Engbers, and Jun (2009, 
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p. 40), “[e]xpectancy theory is predicated on a belief that individuals will exert effort if they 
expect it will result in an outcome that they value.” Thus in the context of PRP it is expected 
that workers will exert more effort if they value monetary rewards and believe that those 
awards will result from them working harder. 
 
In its simplest form, the theory points out those explicit incentives in form of performance 
related pay work as per certain conditions. Firstly, the employees should believe in increased 
efforts leading to increased performance. Secondly, increased performance brings the 
desirable outcomes which are recognized by management. Whenever the two conditions 
meet, employees tend to form a behaviourally salient expectation on future reward and adjust 
their work effort upwardly (Lunenburg, 2011). In other words,  
“Employees will respond to the incentive or reward on offer if they value it (its 
valence), if they believe good performance will be instrumental in bringing the 
desired reward (instrumentality), and if they expect their efforts will achieve the 
desired performance (expectancy)” (Marsden, 2004, p.353). 
 
Like agency theory, expectancy theory presents workers as having some amount of choice 
and strongly emphasises the motivational effects of incentives and the issues that arise when 
targets are poorly designed. 
 
Doubt has been cast on the translation of expectancy theory into practice in some quarters 
however. For instance, Yuan et al. (2013), in reviewing the evidence for expectancy theory in 
incentive pay in the teaching profession, find little impact of PRP on expectancy and report 
that many teachers, while affirming a link between their performance and student 
achievement, do not view an onward link toward attainment of organizational goals, due to 
the part played by factors beyond their control in achieving those goals (in this case, 
characteristics of the student population). In this case, the reality has failed to meet the 
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second condition of the theory, in which increased performance will bring desirable (in 
personal financial reward terms) to the worker. This research is in line with Marsden’s (2004) 
argument that the valence-instrumentality-expectancy virtuous circle can be broken at various 
points.  Further, a study of the Taiwanese hotel industry by Chiang and Fang (2008), while it 
supported the tenets of expectancy theory in broad terms, found a clear emphasis upon 
intrinsic motivation and intrinsic valence among the workforce in the case study 
organisations as opposed to external factors, and thus recommend that employers in this 
sector develop strategies to improve intrinsic elements in motivating staff. While the study 
did not explicitly address performance related pay, this finding suggests a mismatch between 
the real applicability of expectancy theory and its use to support PRP, which is founded on 
the external facet of the theory.  
2.6.2 Reinforcement theory 
Reinforcement theory emphasizes the effect of cultivating a behavioural norm of high work 
effort by reinforcing behaviour with positive rewards. In other words,  
“[r]einforcement theory posits a direct relationship between a desired target behavior 
(e.g., performance) and its consequences (e.g., pay). It suggests that pay can be used 
to create consequences for desired behaviors such as high performance that will 
reinforce the behaviours” (Perry, Engbers, and Jun, 2009, p. 41).  
Barring the straight link between performance and individual rewards, advocates within the 
public administration field highlight secondary effects related to performance related pay. 
This helps in recruiting and retaining skilled and motivated staff who would presumably do 
better with such an arrangement. The awareness of the organisation’s goals is increased 
through definition of explicit performance standards. This also weakens the strength of public 
sector unions, making managers more responsible. It signals the key organisational goals to 
exterior actors increasing the connection between individual and organisational job goals 
(Perry et al., 2009).  
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The dual conditions of expectancy theory may not be always fulfilled, argue critics. In 
practice, it is difficult to design performance related pay schemes which work as intended. 
Humans may not every time approach work effort and salary assessment in a fully rational 
way. Some of the services performed by government officers could be difficult to measure, 
non-measurable or outputs which are not market priced. For example, teacher performance is 
not measurable on the basis of mechanics student test scores. This kind of practice normally 
invites behaviour which may contradict the overall goals of the teaching profession (Marsden 
& Richardson, 1992).  
2.6.3 Agents and Principals 
One of the main arguments for performance related pay is sourced in the microeconomic 
principal agent labour relations model. Here, a principal or employer wants to induce an 
agent or employee to do a certain job. Such kind of principal agent relationships are very 
commonly affected by double problems, namely, adverse selection and moral hazard. In case 
of moral hazard, the agent’s action may influence the principal’s payoff. However, the action 
is not directly observable to the principal in this case. Such circumstances occur in the 
workplace setting irrespective of whether it is private or public. The employee’s effort at 
work is not directly observable but may influence productivity and those outcomes for which 
the employers care.  
Against this theoretical background, and using jockeys, who are agents rather than principals, 
as a case study, Fernie and Metcalf (1999) find that the monitoring and incentive approach 
outlined in the literature is widely applied to in the horse racing industry, with an unusually 
significant proportion of pay hinging on performance. Further, the study finds that pay for 
performance brings results in terms of outcomes which are greatly superior to non-contingent 
systems, suggesting confirmation that pay systems have the capacity to exert a strong 
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influence on outcomes. Indeed in cases where jockeys were paid by retainer, eliminating any 
performance element, outcomes were appreciably poorer (Fernie & Metcalf, 1999). 
There may be contracts which tie observable outputs which again are correlated with 
unobservable effort towards desirable pay incentives and can mitigate efficiencies within 
principle agent relationship from the employer’s perspective. Providing a fixed pay contract 
provides the employer little leverage for influencing employee effort once the hiring 
decisions are finalized.  The issue regarding incentives is exacerbated when employees are 
very challenging to fire. As a result, performance related pay schemes are a way to design 
incentive schemes which addresses moral hazard. However, Kang and Yanadori (2011) find a 
limitation of agency theory as applied to PRP, in that it contains no specification of the 
particular mechanisms in creating the pay performance link, and thus it is not clear how it 
applies to the different available models of PRP. 
 
In a critique of agent-principal theory from a public sector management perspective, Frey, 
Homberg and Osterloh (2013) contend that in failing to factor in theories of intrinsic 
motivation, this perspective cannot provide a sound foundation for pay for performance in 
that sector. If this is so, it could also be assumed that this criticism would apply in some 
measure to other sectors also. This is supported by earlier research by Beer and Katz (2003), 
who find that attempts to increase external motivation through financial reward decreased 
intrinsic motivation. Further, Larkin, Pierce and Gino (2012) consider that agency theory 
discounts the psychological aspect of pay, and seek to integrate economic and psychological 
considerations in their own work. Meanwhile, in preference to principal-agent theory, Frey, 
Homberg and Osterloh (2013) turn to behavioural economics to consider PRP in the public 
sector. In brief, this view separates and takes into consideration both extrinsic motivation and 
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intrinsic motivation as playing separate roles and stemming from separate sources. The next 
section discusses the role that adverse selection and incentives schemes play in PRP models. 
 
2.6.4 The role of adverse selection and incentive schemes in performance 
related pay models 
 
Adverse selection refers to the asymmetry of information in existence between buyer and 
seller, or in the case of the employer-employee relationship, the principal and the agent. 
Moral hazard may arise from this situation, with the agent acting in their own interests or 
taking risks which do not benefit the principal, but are outwith the principal’s knowledge or 
control. Prevention of this situation is attempted through incentivizing actions which are in 
line with the principal’s interest, through applications of performance related pay. These 
incentive schemes may fundamentally need the capacity to measure a range of relevant 
outputs. They also require the design of a link which properly connects unobserved actions to 
outcomes and offers the bonuses which induce agents to give more effort in line with 
principal’s objectives. The incentives may work perfectly provided the agent’s actions are 
closely related to observable outcomes: i.e. if random noise is not overpowering for 
measurement of incentive effects.   
Incentive schemes are also influenced by risk-aversion in employees. Any incentive scheme 
may link to results which are only partially under the control of the agent. As a result, making 
ultimate pay outcome-dependent lowers the utility of risk-averse employees and demands 
upward adjustment of average pay to compensate for the increase in risk. With even 
simplistic models, the optimality of this incentive scheme tends to be sensitive to various 
significant design aspects such as bonus schedules and based on the particularities of an 
employee’s job.  
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However, the nature of the functional link between the outcomes and tasks may lead to 
decline in outcomes. As an example, while the tasks of a teacher can involve instruction 
related the curriculum set as well as coaching based on test taking strategies, poorly designed 
incentives may inspire teachers to re-allocate effort towards the latter, away from the former 
and to the detriment of human capital accumulation (Shilongo, 2013).                                                      
2.6.5 Rationale for PRP 
The rationale for encouragement of various forms of PRP is a belief which states that such 
mechanisms increase the labour market flexibility and generate high productivity or 
employment. This is premised on the notion that holding workers accountable for specific 
outcomes will raise their performance levels in the organisation (Dubnick, 2005, cited in 
Frey, Homberg and Osterloh, 2013). There are many private companies with global 
operations that have introduced a performance related pay system. Sales roles in several 
companies require professionals to fulfil targets on a monthly or periodic basis, and 
performance-related reward might be paid in addition to an employee’s salary.  
The payment system can contain some variants on which it is dependent. These include the 
performance of the entire organisation, team, group and individual results. PRP may involve 
certain stages such as development of the criteria through which performance is assessed. 
Another stage involves definition of employees meeting the fixed criteria and linking the 
achievements of employees to payment structure. There may be varied performance 
parameters such as knowledge, behavioural indicators, experience and skills.  
2.7 Arguments in favour of PRP 
Some arguments are put forward in the literature in favour of the use of PRP. One of these is 
that due to PRP, motivation and cooperation is established and enhanced among workers, 
resulting in optimum output. Similarly, the counter argument states that risks of the company 
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are transferred in a way to the employees. As a result, their performance can be affected very 
negatively.  
Performance related schemes normally differentiate on the basis of criteria. These may be 
related to the area in which the business works, company size and approaches to employee 
choices. However, it is still possible to create a distinction between the most common 
characteristics. These are as mentioned below: 
1. Performance review is done regularly, such as yearly or monthly. It is usually 
assessed on the basis of recognized criteria or standards. Such a procedure is known 
as performance appraisal. As soon as the appraisal procedure is complete, the 
employees are further subdivided into various groups on basis of their performance 
rates. Reward is being defined as per each group of employees. The method of reward 
can vary but more often, it involves a cash bonus or increase in salary.  
2. There are several reasons driving employers when they decide in favour of 
implementing such schemes into their practice. Firstly, this kind of payment system 
may be a convenient means of identifying a company’s problems regarding 
underperformance and rewarding achievements. It is widely considered that in this 
way, the employees tend to become motivated to produce better results and 
achievement of company’s targets.  
3. Through PRP, objectives are clarified and communicated effectively which leads to a 
clearer understanding of the company’s mission and goals. A flexible system of 
payments is introduced through this payment procedure. At the same time it can serve 
as a solution to retention and recruitment problems. The particularities of the system 
are dependent upon its various categories. It is the responsibility of each organisation 
to understand the form of PRP suitable in their individual circumstances. After a deep 
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analysis, they should work on carefully choosing and developing the PRP scheme 
(National Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education, 1999).  
2.8 A Review of PRP schemes 
 
Doubt has long been cast upon the wisdom of implementing PRP widely or even at all within 
the organisation (Frey, Homberg and Osterloh, 2013).  While it is clear that PRP schemes 
were widely applied within organisations in the 1990s, and were often applied to the majority 
of an organisation’s employees and in a meaningful way in terms of the amount of pay 
variation concerned, the outcome of this move in terms of worker performance is subject to 
debate, as the literature presents a conflicting picture. For instance, Belfield & Marsden, 
(2003) report that they found strong evidence that using PRP led to better performance 
outcomes in the organisation, while Frey, Homberg and Osterloh (2013) argue that PRP can 
lead to negative outcomes under certain conditions. Congruent with this, Ray et al. (2014, p. 
6) note the following in terms of the public sector: 
“There is some evidence of positive effects from PRP schemes on directly 
incentivised outcomes across education, health and the civil service. However, the 
overall conclusion is that findings are mixed, and often context- or outcome-specific, 
making it difficult to draw overall conclusions about the effectiveness of PRP for a 
particular public service.” 
 
Forth, Bryson and Stokes (2014) find an apparent discrepancy between support in the 
literature for the effectiveness of PRP and its trajectory as far as take up in market economies 
has played out over the 2000s, with numbers employed via such contracts leveling out and 
even falling: especially among lower paid workers. In line with this Ray et al. (2014) report 
that PRP is still relatively uncommon in the UK public sector. It is also interesting to note 
that the majority of studies of PRP refer to executive pay schemes (see, for example, Larkin, 
Pierce and Gino, 2012). This is in line with research by Bryson, Forth, and Stokes (2014) 
indicating that PRP contracts are used more often in higher paying workplaces. In Britain, 
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while percentage share of pay attributable to PRP rose in the middle of the 2000s, PRP 
contracts as a percentage of employment fell, suggesting greater impact of PRP from those 
receiving it, but not greater use of the tool. Additionally, the perceived benefits of PRP are 
most likely not universally felt or are outweighed by other factors, as otherwise firms would 
have more enthusiastically adopted them in pursuit of competitive edge. This is supported by 
Larkin, Pierce and Gino (2012), who argue that psychological costs are underestimated by 
agency theory, and that these costs render individual performance-based pay unbeneficial. 
Meanwhile, Kang and Yanoki (2011) question the way in which theoretical models of PRP 
can be translated into effective practice. The advantages and disadvantages put forward for 
PRP in the literature are put forward in the subsections below.  
2.8.1  Advantages of PRP schemes 
 
PRP schemes are attached to expected benefits in various fields for employees and 
employers. One of the benefits of successful implementation for employees would be the 
possibilities of a career boost. When effectively implemented, employees with its help can 
monitor their own performance and also further their careers. For people with good 
performance, it is possible to back up their argument that they deserve an incentive or a 
salary increase. Employees can receive cash rewards and pay increases through PRP. In some 
cases, after receiving the minimum wage, they increase their income through PRP. A feeling 
of work appreciation and reward may lead to an increase in the standard of job satisfaction. 
Forth, Bryson and Stokes (2014) state that supportive evidence is wide–ranging for PRP 
schemes in terms of their benefits to productivity and in the attraction of high-capability staff. 
Indeed, based on the literature, PRP is advantageous for companies in various ways.  
1. It is generally considered that after receiving a bonus for real work, staff may be more 
result oriented and motivated.  
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2. This kind of approach attracts newer talents in the form of qualified professionals.  
3. Through the selection of a proper PRP scheme, staff productivity can be increased.  
4. Many longer-standing employees stick to their jobs and those performing well are 
rewarded, for which they are likely to remain loyal towards their company.  
5. Introduction of this payment scheme encourages the staff to achieve their company’s 
goals.  
6. According to some theories, the PRP schemes in middle income countries are quite 
effective for boosting performance levels. The reason for this is that participants in 
these studies focus more on the signaling functions performed by these schemes. 
7. PRP schemes, as offering contracts based on outcomes rather than behaviours, have 
the potential to avoid the costs and challenges of effective behavioural monitoring of 
the employee by the organisation (Kang and Yanadori, 2011).  
2.8.2 Disadvantages of PRP Schemes 
Recent research shows that take-up of PRP across developed nations has not followed the 
upward trend which might be expected based on the proposed benefits. In the United States, 
where it has been most widely taken up, PRP has fallen since the 1990s (Forth, Bryson and 
Stokes, 2014). There are arguments in the literature which emphasise the potential problems 
arising due to PRP as outlined below.  
1. At times, the scheme may not be as effective as it should be.  
2. Within the public sector, the way in which PRP is structured is limited by cash 
availability. As a result, the money offered in the form of reward fails to motivate 
employees.  
3. Bias and personal favouritism as employed by some managers may influence the 
outcome of payment decisions. If the employees have a feeling of unfair evaluation of 
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their efforts, this may give rise to negative feelings, with results such as a fall in 
performance of offended staff and ultimately whole organisation.  
4. Short term focus is boosted, which undermines team work. This may result in people 
believing that their pay is not dependent on performance but rather on expertise in 
establishing a connection with supervisors. 
5. PRP is known to accentuate differences between the highest and lowest paid workers. 
It can be real challenge to design appropriate objectives so that all employees consider 
them as realistic and fair.  
6. Performance measurement in the case of separate incentive programmes can be 
expensive to implement. Selecting the proper time frames to give rewards can be 
difficult.  
7. The output of the work team may exceed the amount in terms of individual 
contribution. There are challenges to properly evaluating the contribution of each 
employee into the firm’s total performance.  
Further, Redman et al. (2000) highlight the difficulty cited by managers in measuring the 
effect of particular objectives, and in prioritising those objectives. Further, Marsden and 
Richardson (1992) point to a knowledge imbalance in favour of the manager in PRP schemes, 
which they assert is a barrier to perceptions of fairness. A further criticism of PRP is in the 
difficulty in providing equally achievable objectives across all jobs (Hasnain and Pierskalla 
Henryk, 2012), even provided that employees have the freedom to alter their working 
performance to any significant extent (Marsden and Richardson, 1992). 
Lazear (1995) links PRP systems with inequity in pay, as individuals are subject to greater 
levels of differentiation than when pay is calculated based upon time spent and other inputs.  
While this is seen by Metcalf (1995) as having positive implications for organisational 
performance, equity theory on the other hand suggests a withdrawal of effort from those 
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employees whose efforts are not rewarded in line with that of their counterparts in their own 
and other similar organisations, and especially for those who work toward team rather than 
individual goals (Trevor, Reilly, and Gerhart, 2012). Belfield and Marsden (2003) combine 
these two views to suggest that there exists both a positive impact from PRP in its role as 
incentive, and a negative impact from the unequal pay which arises from it.  They emphasise 
that the key point is to determine the relative strength of these two opposing forces in 
establishing whether PRP is likely to be a success and conclude that in general the incentive 
force of PRP outweighs pay inequality in terms of effect on performance. While evidence for 
the balance of harm/benefit is unclear, as will be described below, Lazear and Oyer (2004) 
state that the greater power of external labour markets in pay determination in the long term 
limits the ultimate power of the organisation to extract greater value from workers through 
this medium.  
Available research outcomes reveal a contradictory picture of the influence of these schemes. 
Forth, Bryson and Stokes (2014) additionally point out that various recent studies call into 
question the reality of the theoretical ‘sorting’ effect which has been held an advantage of 
PRP in terms of attracting high-capability employees, by finding that the sorting effect does 
not hold true for black men or for women who have children (Heywood and Parent, 2012, 
2013, cited in Forth, Bryson and Stokes, 2014).  Brown and Armstrong (1999) shed light on 
the work satisfaction level of employees. Some factors which influence job satisfaction levels 
were defined in one of the studies, and this revealed that employees enjoy those work 
environments where their productivity is properly rewarded. As a result, this also boosts their 
optimism levels. High performance office spaces contribute well to the employee’s sense of 
belonging, esteem and commitment.  
Another study conducted by Godard and Bauer finds a positive connection between PRP and 
extreme job satisfaction levels, taking the view that one of the key reasons for PRP schemes 
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contributing to work dissatisfaction levels would be inappropriately selected scheme. In cases 
where workers have a feeling of dissatisfaction in terms of the fairness of the bonus 
distribution or similar aspects, it is not possible to be satisfied with their workplace. These 
payment schemes can be implemented as a disciplinary measure. As a result, they may lead 
to increased work effort and lower satisfaction, which amounts to negative influence.  
In a different study conducted by Chiang and Fang (2008), varied dimensions of job 
satisfaction levels were thoroughly analysed. The evidence revealed that in general, internal 
and not external factors increased job satisfaction, and addressed concerns that over-focus on 
external motivation may not be effective.   
2.8.3 Focussing on Models of Performance-related Pay 
The achievement of complete organisational alignment, including goals, objectives, missions, 
pay and performance is simpler to talk and write about than to approach in reality. It is a kind 
of alignment which requires commitment, for it involves starting from the highest aspiration 
for the organisation and working from there down to identifying and inspiring the smallest 
outcome or behaviour to reach this. Considering the variation noted in PRP schemes 
employed by different firms, it is not sufficient to establish whether PRP in general might 
bring benefit to a particular organisation, but also to identify a specific design of scheme in 
order to have a chance of bringing the desired benefit (Kang and Yanadori, 2011). For this, 
the organisation must explore the meaning, aspects, requirements, and procedures for PRP 
and PRP should be undertaken and designed in a way such that it becomes the basis for 
management, measurement, and compensation for performances. 
Performance related pay models have their teams of detractors and supporters. According to 
the detractors, more and more PRP models have been designed, but without any desirable 
outcome. In this view, schemes have more often than not failed, or success has been very 
small, with performance related pay schemes tending to hurt performance for most tasks and 
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specifically those which require creativity and unknown solutions. Performance levels may 
drop with the carrot and stick management technique. Whenever performance related pay 
models turn out to be task oriented, they involve the highest possibility of failing.            
The performance related pay models meet success where the goals and performance measures 
are based on overall enterprise goals, expected performance and to outcomes versus tasks. 
This approach is not an easy option for most of organisations and is where most failed 
performance related pay models have been let down. At this juncture, there is a meeting 
between human behavioural science and business. Making such schemes work involves 
providing clear cut articulated goals, a sense of purpose, increased individual, team and 
complete enterprise accountability. 
The vast pool of performance related pay plans are primarily based on a starting market value 
for certain jobs. After this, the future compensation is basically guided by time in the job, 
with a complete corporate merit pool target percentage, etc. Performance related pay plans 
take a quite varied approach through assertion of the fact that there exists a clear difference 
between ordinary and extraordinary performance which merits a distinct difference in the 
compensation. Organisations seek performance related pay models to assist in strengthening 
the link between rewards and performance outcomes.  Performance related pay plans may 
enable an organisation to base pay on the achievement of certain improvements, based on 
corporate performance and also on overall employee effectiveness. The primary research for 
this study examines whether the aims of the case study organisations reflect this picture, and 
in considering how effective the selection of PRP as a system of pay is. Therefore, it is vital 
to understand the various approaches to PRP and where the case study organisations sit 
within the range described by literature and elucidated in the next subsection.     
   
56 
2.9 Implementation of Performance-related Pay 
 
The performance of the organisation needs to be in a similar direction and in connection with 
the pay scheme to ensure the optimum level of performance for both organisation and staff. 
Additionally, the organisation may undertake pay for performance as part of its plan as 
evidence suggests that pay incentives raise employee productivity and efficiency. However, 
Where PRP does not succeed, Makinson (2000) points to the possibility of ineffective 
implementation, and states that, the compensation and reward system set up by the 
organisation needs to be consistent, reasonable, fair, and logical. It is up to the organisation to 
focus on the acquisition and utilization of human resources. This remains the key factor 
generally addressed by organisations to support the policies and regulations of the 
organisation in forming an effective compensation system. Despite doubt expressed for 
example by Marsden (2009) and Beer and Katz (2003) that failing PRP schemes can 
necessarily be rescued by keeping the PRP principle and changing the implementation, the 
practical factors involved in individual schemes must be considered relevant and influential 
for results at some level, and   
Lewis (1997) summarizes prescriptions in the literature for the effective implementation of 
PRP, although he cautions that these do not enjoy the backing of empirical evidence.  These 
prescriptions are categorised into two streams.  The first concerns management processes 
surrounding PRP, while the second focuses upon the suitability of the payment system in its 
wider context within the organization 
 
According to Kang and Yanadori (2011), the decision to implement PRP in general may be 
taken due to various factors and external influences, but these same factors do not tend to go 
on to influence the specific details of the scheme, creating a disconnect. There is a need to 
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select PRP schemes wisely in order to create employee satisfaction and maximize output. The 
steps below can be used to formulate and implement such policies after detailed 
consideration.  
Negotiability in objective and design: Right from the start, employees need to 
participate in formulating criteria. This is for future assessment and other relevant 
measures. 
Transparency: At individual and collective levels, the procedure of rewards and 
appraisal distribution needs to be transparent and clear.  
Training: Both management and staff should undergo appropriate training.  
Piloting: It is essential to have the scheme piloted to ensure and confirm its effectiveness.  
Realistic goals: There is a necessity to define the goals and objectives which can be 
achieved.  
Fairness in functioning: The scheme realization procedure should be clear cut and fair 
for all employees, as perceptions of unfairness may demotivate staff.  
Adequate appraisal: The company managers should have plenty of time to make their 
appraisal, in order to make justified links between performance and reward.  
System explanation: It is essential to make sure that the PRP schemes are clear and 
understandable to all employees and managers, as without such clarity, objectives cannot 
be conveyed and therefore any motivation produced may not be directed toward the 
intended goals. Additionally, perceptions of fairness may be negatively affected by lack 
of clarity.   
  
   
58 
Reward systems are considered to be significant in terms of organisational effectiveness and 
much effort should be exerted to design effective reward systems. The PRP system focuses 
more upon employees’ effort with their own performance however owing to the inherent 
features of the payment mechanism. It is also doubtful how performance related pay would 
be beneficial to expert and older employees. The former tend to give extra focus on quality 
instead of quantity. As a result, their performance cannot be compared to those employees 
who are merely concerned about product quantity. One of the parameters to measure 
performance should be flexibility. Salary and compensation to be given must consider 
limitations and ability (Atkinson et al., 2009). 
 
Various possible issues arise in relation to implementation of PRP and ensuring a strong link 
between performance and pay. Performance can be linked to pay via three mechanisms 
(ACAS, 2015): as a percentage on top of the basic salary rise; by faster progress through set 
pay increments; and thirdly as a one-off bonus. Private sector organizations tend to utilise the 
first method, and public sector organizations the second, with the third method increasing in 
popularity across sectors. The benefits of cash bonuses as put forward by proponents of this 
approach as including its higher visibility, the fact that it can easily be kept separate from pay 
in general and thus does not increase pay permanently or affect pensions, and that this 
approach keeps fixed labour costs low.   
In terms of the proportion of salary linked to performance, the literature mainly sets a 
minimum of 10% if this is to be an effective motivational tool.  However, due to the 
establishment of fixed budgets for PRP in many organizations, the actual allocation of PRP 
does not approach this level, and many schemes suffer from the unintentional adoption of a 
normal distribution curve which does not fit patterns of workforce performance where many 
workers perform well, and instead brands half of employees as below average (Lewis, 1997). 
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The organisation’s implemented performance related pay system may cause the employees to 
focus on financial reward more than quality. Emphasizing too much cash incentives may not 
bring the desired results. Employees can start behaving in a manner equivalent to seals in a 
circus which do tricks when a fish is on offer. According to the European Commission 
(2012), Public Employment Service organisations report that priorities are altered as a result 
of processes of performance evaluation and resetting of targets on a departmental level, with 
changes in short-term targets and activities to reach these, and that this distracts staff and 
management from the basic functions of their work. Employees may be more happy and 
content when their effort brings unexpected rewards such as free vouchers for restaurant 
outings, vouchers for treatment or check-up at a discounted price, payment for vacations, 
medical insurance etc. Those performing well and achieving the goals of the organisation can 
be enrolled for training to improve their skills and increase their efficiency. Whenever 
teamwork thrives, it motivates the full team to try harder. Training programmes can be 
designed to encourage the employees in cooperating with colleagues such as communications 
skills training to avoid conflicts.  
Performance related pay or PRP is used to motivate employees to raise their performance 
levels. Workers may end up placing too much emphasis on production compared to 
relationships with others however. This is likely to give rise to mistrust and lack of 
collaboration. It is sensible for employees to understand the why they are paid.  
Merit based and goal based payment are two possible approaches in performance related pay. 
Goal based PRP involves employee achievement in terms of their objectives. A score is 
evaluated for rating staff which is based on a pay level set up and offered by the organisation. 
As a result, the employee may solely focus on what they believe will enable them to achieve 
these objectives. One of the major benefits of the method is that the goals and objectives 
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become the priority of the individual. It allows companies to communicate with clarity their 
strategy in a specific way. In order to implement performance based pay in a firm to achieve 
the organisation’s goal at a higher level, the main factor to affect performance of the 
organisation is the performance and perception of employees.  
 Implementation of PRP systems is the subject of a number of suggestions in the literature 
(Kessler, 1994; Kang and Yanadori, 2011). For example, Annual appraisal more often 
determines the performance rating which governs the sum total of performance related pay. 
This means that the line manager or person responsible for the appraisal must make sure that 
discrimination does not take place. It is extremely significant that people who will be 
undertaking appraisals should be trained. They should have access to advice on the 
performance system and on the avoidance of bias.      
  
Another suggestion is to look throughout the company at various performance assessments 
and payments. This involves looking at each grade, distribution of assessments and of 
payments related to each of the grades. There is also the perception that the criteria for 
rewarding performance should be defined clearly and achievable. The targets designed should 
be fair throughout all the departments involved. Performance may be linked to a measurable 
factor such as sales which may be viewed as objective. Soft skills like personnel management 
which are often done by women can be quite challenging to quantify. However, they should 
not be excluded from access to performance pay.  
The firm is also advised in the literature to make sure that training is given in equal 
opportunities, which leads to avoidance of bias for those involved in appraisals. Limits 
should also be exercised upon the element of discretion with regard to appraisal, and a clearly 
defined explanation of the system should be given to the staff so that each and every one 
understands it properly. Groups of managers may be used for reviewing the nominations 
   
61 
together and for reaching consensus on assessment of performance. This is specifically at the 
highest and lowest level, thereby lowering the risk of individual bias and for the promotion of 
fairness and consistency.               
 
2.10 Empirical Research 
The rise of PRP schemes in 1990s and early 2000s is well-documented, spreading in 
popularity and in scope across sectors and spreading down the organisational ladder.  In the 
public sector for example, Frey, Homberg and Osterloh (2013) report a situation in which 
public sector organisations have come to view PRP as the norm as a result of the movement 
towards New Public Management of previous years, which included PRP as one of its tenets, 
seeking to raise performance and service quality by rewarding outputs. With this, literature 
concerning PRP’s implementation has also grown, and a general consensus formed which 
cites employee involvement in set-up, and a positive attitude from higher management as pre-
requisites, in addition to adequate planning (Kessler, 1994).  At the same time, doubt has 
been cast upon the wisdom of implementing PRP widely or even at all within the 
organisation.  While it is clear that PRP schemes were widely applied within organisations in 
the 1990s, and were applied to the majority of employees and in a meaningful way in terms 
of the amount of pay variation concerned, the outcome of this move in terms of worker 
performance is subject to debate, as the literature presents a conflicting picture (Belfield & 
Marsden, 2003). In any case, the growth in PRP in percentage of employment terms does not 
appear to have continued to the present time (Forth, Bryson and Stokes, 2014), raising 
questions as to the scope of its utility. Larkin, Pierce and Gino (2012) state that PRP on the 
individual level is currently used only for 50% of Fortune 100 companies, and in most of 
these for a small minority of employees, mainly in senior positions. This suggests that PRP is 
not universally effective, based on the assumption that effective strategies would come to 
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dominate pay in such companies. On the other hand, team-based versions of PRP are more 
widespread, indicating greater efficacy. 
 
Marsden (2004) argues that performance related pay should be examined with higher 
analytical foresight and from a better controlled perspective. This should not be from the 
normal starting position of whether PRP is motivational or not.  Two procedures could be 
explored here, with one of them being effort bargain. This involves the reorganisation of 
work in a bid to standardize effort measurement, which is combined with attempts for 
intensifying effort levels. The other possible procedure is the process bargain, including 
changes or reforms to the administrative system of an organisation.  
 
Examples include human resource management, varying systems of budget control and 
performance management, all of which involve subsequent changes to rules systems, control 
and measurement. Importantly, it may be argued that this is not a search for control per se as 
a simple labour process theory can predict. Representation of reactions and control as 
homogenous is misleading and dangerous. It also leads to labour control systems turning out 
to be a real focus of crisis. Rather, performance related pay is representative of a wider quest 
for competitive advantage which may involve restructuring and changes to the organisation.  
 
Early practitioner accounts highlight variety in approaches to PRP along with general 
similarities such as the intention to facilitate change through such schemes.  Management 
aims have been subject to more rigorous scrutiny by academic studies, which also provide an 
examination of implementation of PRP.  Kessler (1994) approaches the subject with the 
intention of uncovering reasons why schemes are implemented in various organisations, as 
well as examining why an organisation implements PRP in a particular way.  
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2.10.1 Evidence of link to motivation. 
Beer and Katz (2003) contend that in the humanist perspective, pay is not able to influence 
motivation, irrespective of the way the pay scheme is designed. Lovrich’s (1987) study 
supported the humanist view that pay is not an effective motivator, with findings favouring 
participation and job enrichment as motivating factors. This is somewhat reflected in a review 
of evidence in the education sector (Yuan et al., 2013) which found that teachers, while 
finding financial reward desirable, cited their main motivations as stemming from factors 
independent of this reward, such as student achievement. Meanwhile, the original research 
conducted by Yuan et al. (2013) found no impact of PRP on motivation. In line with this, 
research by Bellé (2015, p. 230) in the healthcare sector actually showed a negative 
relationship between PRP and task performance, which he argued is “consistent with 
theoretical predictions that monetary incentives for activities with a prosocial impact may 
crowd out employee image motivation.” This provides empirical support for the motivation 
crowding effect in which it is posited that an external intervention such as monetary 
incentives can undermine employees’ intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2000). 
Beer et al. (1985), following the human relations school, set out four factors underpinning 
worker satisfaction, namely how the reality of reward matches expectation; how it compares 
with the individual’s peers; how the individual perceives the reward which others receive, 
rightly or wrongly; and the combination of reward received, including both intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors. However, Marsden and Richardson’s (1992) survey of employees at the 
Inland Revenue found little perceived alteration in work or behaviour as a result of the 
introduction of PRP: a picture of PRP’s failure to motivate which was supported more recent 
research in both the public and private sector (Frey, Homberg, and Osterloh, 2013). Overall, 
Perry et al.’s (2009, p. 46) review of 57 studies on PRP in the public sector led them to 
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conclude that “performance-related pay continues to be adopted but persistently fails to 
deliver its promise.” 
 
 Marsden, French and Kobi (2000) reports that the majority of employees would rate their 
performance as above average, and comment that this has implications for PRP, as in this 
case, such schemes do not address the motivational needs of the bulk of the workforce. 
Further, Bregn (2013) found that  perceived unfairness in PRP systems may have a 
detrimental effect on performance Indeed, sometimes employees see PRP as arbitrary, unfair, 
and tending to reward work of peripheral significance, with knock-on effects for attitudes to 
managers, organisational change and the process of appraisal (Lundström, 2012). 
 
Frey, Homberg and Osterloh (2013) emphasise the need to include detailed consideration of 
intrinsic motivation in evaluating performance related pay, and report two types of intrinsic 
motivation: the first stems from the inherently satisfying characteristics of the content of the 
work for an individual, while the second is based in feelings of obligation which cause the 
individual to wish to perform work well, such as in situations where fulfilment of the work 
has important implications for others (for example in caring professions).  
 
PRP may also be assessed upon its ability to create fairness in pay systems. PRP is often seen 
as unfair by employees, but this is often related by such employees to technical aspects of its 
delivery and to performance measurement rather than to inherent unfairness in such an 
approach.  For example, Marsden and Richardson (1992) found that employees suspected the 
application of a quota system to performance ratings, with a resultant feeling of unfairness, in 
addition to perceptions of the unsuitability of the assessment system for particular roles and 
suspicions of favouritism. Marsden (2004, in Bryson and Forth, 2006) also points to the 
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possibility of flawed measurement tools in assessing performance, and to lack of staff 
consultation over measurement criteria as major factors in leading PRP to be seen as unfair. 
 
2.10.2  Evidence of effect on organisational culture 
PRP’s effectiveness in addressing cultural change within an organisation is based upon the 
challenge of assessing that change. There is the problematic concept of organisational culture 
as an asset which is held as opposed to an essential quality as seen by the anthropological 
tradition (Alvesson, 2012).  As a result, there is uncertainty whether respondents in studies 
such as that by the LGMB (1994) were able to attach sufficient meaning to questions 
regarding this topic to give their answers validity. 
 
 On the other hand, research by Lazear (2000) and Paarsch and Shearer (2000) indicated that 
the introduction of piece rate schemes increased the productivity by 40% and 23%, 
respectively, and more recently, Gielen, Kerkhofs, and van Ours (2010) report that the 
introduction of PRP led to productivity gains at the firm level of 9%. Bento and Ferreira 
(1992) compared the cultural assumptions of those responsible for PRP with those subjected 
to it and noted significant differences. In line with this Harris (2001) reported that middle 
managers often do not share the principles or the stated objectives of the PRP schemes which 
they have to implement. 
 
There is conflict between the concept of teamwork and individually-focused PRP, as the 
element of competition for a finite overall amount of available financial reward creates 
conflict between workers, increases their rating of self against that of others, and reduces 
communication between co-workers (Woodfield and Kennie, 2008). This notion of conflict 
reflects earlier empirical findings by Marsden and Richardson (1992) and Cannell and Wood 
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(1992), although in the latter study, teamwork was taken into account in the planning of 
employee objectives. Meanwhile, an LGMB survey (1994) reports enhanced teamwork in 
fact, there appears to be a movement toward the award of team based pay incentives (Larkin, 
Pierce and Gino, 2012). A wider but relevant point concerning the influence of performance 
competition in general is thrown up by a case study of a performance management system 
introduced in the UK’s Public Employment Services, known as the JET or job entry target 
scheme (European Commission, 2012). This scheme involved frequent scrutiny of 
individuals’ performance against set targets represented on a ‘points’ basis, and fostered a 
highly competitive culture, even though performance was not linked to pay. Problems arising 
as a result of this focus included decreased information sharing by employees as well as 
inappropriate interventions with the public focused on improving the employee’s points 
score. In addition to highlighting the possibility of competitive focus on performance in the 
absence of PRP, this case study raises the possibility of this focus misdirecting employee 
efforts if not channeled appropriately, which may be challenging. 
 
A European Commission paper (Nunn, 2012) considers the case of German public 
employment services, in which pay for performance is utilized at the level of the team rather 
than the individual employee, through PRP for the manager, while individuals are aware of 
the 13 targets set nationally for the organisation’s activities, and pay incentives are offered 
for the achievement of these. Management appraisals include assessment of performance 
against these elements, and on this basis the possibility of bonus payments is determined. The 
bonus in this case is reported as being small. In contrast, PRP was implemented with a 
significant reward element in the analogous organisation in Austria, and is reported to have 
led to a stronger sense of individual accountability on the part of regional managers toward 
enhancing performance (Ecorys, in European Commission, 2012). However, the Austrian 
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system has been criticised for attributing variations between regions to strongly to team 
performance rather that separate variables which also change over time, and also for driving 
unsuitable job placements for clients due to the focus on quantifiable targets (European 
Commission, 2012).  
 
Wilkinson and Dundon (2006) suggest that choice of approach in consideration of the 
organizational context is the key to success, but also that such choices are subject to strong 
influences coming from this same context, in terms of organizational culture and history, as 
well as the influence of the particular objectives held for the scheme on the part of 
management.  In a comparative case study conducted through documentary analysis and 
interview, Kessler (1994) examines PRP schemes and the choices made regarding them in 
light of their wider organisational context.  At Newsco, PRP was introduced against a 
background of weakened but nonetheless significant trade union power, and was clearly 
aimed at strengthening the power of the editorial manager at the expense of this union power 
by widening the managerial influence upon individual wages, as well as reasserting a stronger 
role generally for line management.  The PRP scheme was in effect used to strongly confront 
the organisation’s existing culture, as advocated by Fombrun et al. (1984).  While the 
confrontational aspect of this was not embraced by all management and pay decisions in large 
part remained in the remit of union-organisation dialogue, the desire to assert management 
control was clear in the fact that the setting aside of funds for performance pay was not 
subject to negotiation with the trade union, that no appeals procedure was initially allowed 
for, and that criteria for award of this pay were vague and procedures opaque. Means of 
participation in the scheme’s design and operation was therefore closed to employees and the 
unions, reinforcing management power.  The lack of clarity in criteria is also taken by 
Kessler to reflect a culture where the creation of extensive documentation would be resisted 
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as a burden.  The adversarial context of the introduction of PRP is further reflected in the 
swift introduction of the scheme, lack of consultation and minimal training or preparation 
which would lay management intentions bare.  Beer et al. (2004) also take the stance that 
PRP should not be used as the major driver of organisational change, but as an adjunct to a 
wider strategy. 
 
2.10.3     Effects on organizational performance 
The difficulty of establishing a link between the performance of the employee and that of the 
organization, which compounds the difficulty of connecting PRP with organizational 
performance, is discussed in the literature. however, in an Institute of Personnel Management 
study from 1992, the majority of those surveyed noted a positive effect of PRP on itself on 
the organization’s performance, and almost 95% noted this where PRP was run in 
conjunction with a range of performance management tools. Therefore, it may be considered 
that PRP should be part of a set of performance management activities if it is to maximise its 
effect on organizational performance.  However, caution may be needed in interpreting its 
effectiveness here, due to a lack of evidence. Further, Nunn and Devins (2012) put forward 
the possibility that introducing new performance management approaches within an 
organisation may influence performance positively on a temporary basis only, with reversion 
to the status quo over time. Bryson and Forth’s (2006) assessment is that no direct link is in 
evidence to connect performance related pay to productivity or further to performance. 
Further, it is proposed by Freeman and Kleiner (2005, in Bryson and Forth, 2006) that the 
costs associated with establishing and running PRP systems could prove to be greater than the 
benefit gained in doing so. 
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 Belfield and Marsden’s (2003) wide-ranging study based upon the Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS) 1998 and 1990, examines the effectiveness of PRP through “New 
Economics of Personnel” (NEP), which is premised on the concept that the choice of purely 
input-based pay or of a scheme which includes a performance-based element depends upon 
conditions in the particular firm (Lazear, 1995; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). The influence of 
the “monitoring environment” in the workplace on the success of pay schemes, and the 
interdependence of these factors in impacting on organisational success is emphasised in this 
view. Belfield and Marsden (2003) therefore advocate a trial and error approach if managers 
are to achieve the best interaction between pay scheme and monitoring environment, 
especially as the variables involved are complex, making their analysis by managers highly 
challenging.  NEP assumes a direct positive effect on individual and organisational 
performance coming from truly accurate assessment and reward of employee contribution, 
and a negative effect from either under- or over-estimation such that in this case input based 
pay would be preferable. From this perspective, the possibility of a PRP scheme achieving its 
goals hinges on establishing the real value of each individual to organisational success: a 
challenging task, and more costly and time-consuming than providing fixed pay (Beer et al., 
2004).  Performance assessment within a given organisation may be seen as consisting of a 
“bundle of variables” which make up the “monitoring environment” (Belfield & Marsden, 
2003).   Taken together, this group of variables may create a climate which is either 
favourable for input- or performance based pay in order to enhance organisational 
performance.  
 
Lucifora and Origo (2012) examine group as opposed to individual PRP schemes, in the 
context of the metal and engineering sector in Italy, and utilising both panel data and a quasi-
natural study of a firm in which unionized collective bargaining and fixed pay was replaced 
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with group-based PRP. The results show an appreciable change in performance on 
introducing team PRP in which organisations’ performance moves by an average of three 
percentile points and 8% of average overall productivity increases attributed to PRP. Detailed 
findings suggest that this positive effect is limited to organisations comprising over 20 
individuals and stronger in both less unionized workforces and higher technology areas for 
the sector. Interestingly, in light of a general dearth of evidence regarding type and 
implementation of PRP scheme, Lucifora and Origo (2012) find that schemes with a higher 
complexity level are slightly less positively correlated with performance, and that there is a 
significant negative difference when considering schemes where reward is linked to profit on 
a direct basis. The case studies in the current thesis do not concern PRP with a group element, 
and the context, with no trade union influence, also differs considerably. 
 
Bryson and Freeman (2014) look at indicators for effort in employees participating and 
declining to participate in a share plan in which one multinational corporation across four 
regional sites offers to match shares bought by employees. This is seen by the authors as 
representing both a reciprocal ‘gift’ and a pay for performance element.  The authors attempt 
to control for other variables which may affect effort, to examine the effect of membership of 
the share scheme itself. The findings show a higher perception among plan participants as to 
how hardworking they are, and also a perception of being more hardworking than others. In 
addition, plan members are found to work more hours over their basic hours than non-plan 
participants. Further, the perception by participants that they work harder than those within 
their working environment goes down where take-up of the share-matching plan is higher. 
However, Bryson and Freeman attribute this more to the share scheme in its role as ‘gift’ than 
in seeing a genuine pay to motivation to performance link as in an attempt to raise share price 
through individual effort. Frey, Homberg and Osterloh (2012) support the notion that rewards 
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which are seen as gifts rather than a strategy of control are better received, with lesser 
negative effect on or ‘crowding out’ of intrinsic motivation, than reward which transparently 
seeks to affect behaviours. 
 
Some research has suggested that pay for performance gives positive results in terms of 
performance, but despite the wide range of research undertaken, there is a lack of focus upon 
the importance of managerial approaches to implementation and of managerial decision-
making upon the success of such strategies (Beer & Cannon, 2004).  What research does exist 
suggests that the manager’s role is key (Gerhard &Rynes, 2003) and that implementation is 
indeed problematic, throwing up unintended consequences such as hindering creativity, 
damaging collaboration and reducing the effects of intrinsic motivation (Beer & Katz, 2003). 
Employees may narrow their focus to that which is laid out in the incentive scheme, which 
may not be in the best interest of the company, and as Beer and Cannon (2014) point out, is 
not a question of design alone but also of effective implementation working alongside this, 
especially as implementation can be hindered by a ‘knowing-doing’ gap among managers, 
where knowledge exists without the ability to put it into practice (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2001).  
Beer and Cannon (2004) delineate two main areas of focus:  firstly, assessing the connection 
between effort and performance, for which they claim that performance must be effectively 
measured and managers must overcome any reluctance to differentiate between individuals, 
and influential external factors must be taken into account. Secondly, fairly and transparently 
linking performance to pay is suggested as important, against a constantly changing 
technological and organisational environment and employees who adapt to such changes, 
leading to both payout and performance standards which are subject to change, and bearing in 
mind a tendency on the part of employees to inflate the value of their contribution, as well as 
budgetary constraints.  While constantly adapting to the above factors, the pay scheme’s 
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reputation for fairness is also cited as an important factor which must be maintained. 
Furthermore, Lazear and Oyer (2011) suggest that at higher levels, effort extracted from 
employees promotes dislike, which may affect performance in other ways. 
 
Beer and Cannon (2004) examine PRP implementation in a high-commitment environment 
from the perspective of local managers in five Hewlett Packard offices, and conclude that the 
culture of the individual organisation may dictate the most suitable approach to pay schemes, 
rather than advocating any model as ideal for all.  Gerhart (2001) suggests that there are 
certain attributes which indicate the suitability of pay-for-performance schemes, including a 
strong company line on opportunism as well as an environment in which professional and 
personal reputation is valued. Hewlett-Packard was a case which seems to fit these 
conditions, where managers enjoyed both support and a good degree of autonomy as well as 
an environment of trust between employees and management (Beer & Cannon, 2004). The 
managers, however, after expending considerable time and effort designing a pay for 
performance system, including careful attention to metrics, and implementing this system, 
discontinued their use based partly on the perception that it was not as effective as hoped, 
suggesting perhaps that their expectations of the potential of PRP were unrealistic: this is held 
by Rigby (2001) to be a facet of human nature, and also highlighted is a failure on the part of 
managers to sufficiently foresee the complexity and effort involved in maintaining an 
effective PRP system in constantly changing conditions, as well as potential for harm to 
morale and trust involved. The HP managers felt that the system they had implemented was 
harmful to the culture of trust within the organisation.  It was also found to be divisive, with 
problems in reallocating members of low-performing teams to better performing ones. Beer 
and Cannon (2004) therefore argue that, while high-commitment cultures may appear to have 
more to gain from PRP, the commitment they enjoy means that they also have more to lose 
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from such systems.  They advocate that in high-commitment cultures, management should 
seek input from and dialogue with employees when introducing a new payment system, and 
further that this input should inform design and evaluation of that system: both management 
and employees should understand what each side seeks to gain from the system and be 
involved in assessing whether these expectations are in fact met by it.   
 
They further warn against the evaluation of pay for performance based purely on the 
organisation’s financial performance as being inappropriately simplistic.  Also, while in the 
cases studied by Beer and Cannon (2004) the newly-implemented pay systems showed 
themselves to be successful in terms of employees reaching the targets set within the system, 
the authors argue that set against loss of the trust and commitment which firms have 
historically relied upon to succeed, this is not in itself an adequate goal. In this view, 
commitment is the superior force, and this is created through equitable treatment and 
employee voice (Beer et al., 1985).  Evidence from a US study suggests that workers paid a 
fixed but higher-than-market rate less frequently ignored unacceptable lack of effort among 
their co-workers, suggesting an effect of fixed pay on commitment to the firm in situations 
where close monitoring of work by management is not practicable (Freeman et al., 2006, in 
Bryson and Forth, 2006). In high-commitment firms, Beer and Cannon (2004) suggest that 
implementation of pay for performance may prove too costly to employee trust to achieve 
any net benefit. The European Commission (2012) when considering public employment 
service organisations, warns against indiscriminate use of reward for performance 
approaches, stating that outsourced payment for results services have not been consistent in 
giving the promised advantages. 
During research, a vagueness within the objective setting procedure was common to several 
organisations. It is also noted that changes in the companies were complicated by the search 
   
74 
for consent, control and compliance. Moreover, the outcomes were majorly specific to each 
of the organisations, depending upon negotiation of politics of pay. Some of the companies 
used certain mechanisms to in order to do this which included controlling labour charges and 
their distribution, flexible standardization, individual but only standardized contracts and 
mass individualism.            
The countries with significant performance related pay elements connected to posts such as 
senior and middle public service mangers include Australia, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Denmark, Canada, the UK and New Zealand (Cardona, 2007). For managerial positions, this 
is used to fill the void between public service manager salaries and those in private sector.  
This is for attracting and retaining private sector managers into public administration for 
assistance in building up a business-like public administration.  However, it has given rise to 
problems regarding internal compatibility, triggering pressure for the internal equalisation of 
salaries.  
Evaluations based on a performance management and recognition system were set up in the 
US in 1984 and abolished in 1993. Evaluation of the UK Inland Revenue service scheme 
concluded that most of the staff hardly scored anything less than satisfactory performance 
(Marsden & French 1998). As only employees with the achievement of outstanding 
performance were entitled to performance related pay incentives, in practice only limited 
staff received the bonus. On the other hand, most employees performed satisfactorily and 
were not rewarded with a bonus. They found the system to be discouraging, triggering 
jealousy and leading the staff to question it, which de-legitimized the established 
performance related pay. Such uninspiring outcomes were quite consistent with comparable 
evaluations made in Australia.           
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To research performance related pay, Chiang (2010) evaluated the tourism industry in Hong 
Kong hotels. Questionnaires were distributed among service employees through the 
assistance of different hotel departments. A sum total of 258 responses were recorded from 
more than seven hotels located in Bangkok. Correlation coefficients and descriptive statistics 
were used for all the study variables presented. Hierarchical regression procedure was used 
for the analysis. It was revealed through this research that perceiving a high PRP link, the 
employees exhibited a more positive work attitude. Reward practices like PRP schemes play 
a crucial role in alignment of employee-organisation service quality values. Apart from 
establishing a simple relationship between performance and reward, PRP tends to enhance 
commitment and job satisfaction.  
 In another research study by Bulan (2010), longitudinal data was used on worker 
productivity with two plants after each of them changed their payment scheme. This was 
done in order to measure the outcome of performance based payment on the productivity of 
the workforce. Robustness checks and an empirical model were used. This study it showed 
the same effect of change in incentive schemes for high ability and low ability workers. The 
results showed effects on high ability workers by incentive effect of piece rate component. 
However, it does not show the reason behind low ability workers raising their level of 
production post-implementation of piece rate policy alongside a basic wage (Bulan, 2010).  
 
2.11 Gaps in the Literature 
There are significant gaps in the justification provided for pay and pay determination 
theories and also in the general understanding of performance-related pay. Bryson and Forth 
(2006) report that studies exploring variables which impact upon wage setting, including 
features of the organisation, role and worker, attribute just half of hourly wage variation to 
the factors measured. Concerning occupational segregation and pay determinant theories, 
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although a large amount of theoretical literature has been written and reviewed, and theories 
formulated, the issue of occupational segregation has not been addressed satisfactorily, and 
hence it needs further research. Labour market issues in the form of occupational segregation 
and structuring of job duties is likely to result in a gender pay gap. The gap not only emanates 
from gender disparity in basic pay rates, but also via minimized access to wages, promotion, 
training, and professional improvement opportunities (Özbilgin & Tatli, 2008). In addition, 
reimbursement of bonuses and performance related payment and on-job training activities are 
usually minimal in feminine occupational capacities. Moreover, society is still based on the 
traditional thinking that places more value on the male figure. Hence, women face more 
resistance from the community itself whenever they try to compete with men in top 
managerial and executive positions, and especially in the public sector. 
Another gap arises from the job-matching theory, which suggests that the experience 
of the labourers is a good that has unknown characteristics. This raises a question regarding 
how companies manage to recruit competent employees for them to obtain high-quality 
productivity. According to the fundamental argument upon which this theory is based, the 
experience of employees is a good which has actual features that are revealed after some time 
by productivity performance (Heibel, 2009). This model was originally suggested by 
Jovanovic (1979) and was chosen as a benchmark model of employee turnover in global 
labour economics. It is important to value the experience of workers: especially when 
recruiting new employees. Essentially, the fact that a person’s experience is not known to the 
company at the time of hiring is the greatest uncertainty and barrier to the concept of job-
matching. Hence, more literature is needed to justify the assumptions of this model and to test 
whether the theory conforms to other assumptions stated under this theory. 
2.12 Conclusion 
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This chapter firstly described theories of pay determination, considering the role of 
the state, the market and the firm in this, as well as theories of supply and demand combined 
with approaches to pay based in sociology and the role of hierarchical systems in defining 
pay by occupation and position. From this, it is apparent that there is no definitive view of the 
mechanisms which determine pay, and that the factors involved in this are complex and 
multiple. Payment systems may be strategically used within the employment relationship to 
seek to influence productivity however, whether based on time or performance or a 
combination of both. In terms of the foundation of theory for performance pay, the principal-
agent function is applied, and expectancy theory provides an avenue for external motivation 
and valency to feed into increased motivation in line with objectives set, and, by implication, 
better performance. However, perspectives and evidence conflict as to whether this 
theoretical potential is seen in reality, with some evidence to suggest that intrinsic 
motivational elements are of greater value and may be negatively impacted in PRP for those 
not receiving a reward.   
Possible desires driving the implementation of PRP were also identified, to include; 
motivation, changing organisational culture, pay system fairness, making managers manage, 
reduction of trade union influence, recruitment and retention of staff, and political 
imperatives. However, of these, motivation and change in culture seemed to be the most 
frequently sought. As well as multiple objectives, PRP schemes have been implemented in 
multiple forms leading to a need to evaluate such schemes on a case by case basis, and with 
possible potential to match contexts to scheme types rather than prescribe a system to fit all 
organisations. Having said this, the increasing popularity of team incentives may indicate a 
benefit to this type of scheme, which is not seen in any of the case study companies in the 
primary research for this study. 
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The macro environment of a company comprises significant general features in the 
company’s surroundings that are capable of altering the organization’s goals, objectives, and 
strategies. Socio-cultural factors are among the macro environmental aspects which have the 
power to affect a company’s operations. While performance related pay is considered by 
Poutsma et al. (2006) to represent a natural extension of previous practices among Anglo-
American cultures and the United States in particular, Kang and Yanadori (2011) highlight 
the point that in Eastern cultures, PRP does not represent an evolution of existing practice but 
a replacement of a different system, and thus may face various problems of acceptance and/or 
applicability not considered in its original setting. The socio-cultural determinants to be 
considered in this literature review include customs, lifestyles and societal values of the Saudi 
business environment. Since these factors have the power to influence the company’s ability 
to obtain resources and operate within society, they have a significant impact on pay and PRP 
systems. They also include socio-cultural variables such as demographics of the Saudi 
population, education levels, principles and values, and the attitude toward providing social 
responsibility. 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the ability to reward good performance is accessible to the 
management to because it has the mandate to approve additional payments of up to 3 months 
of the worker’s basic pay for achieving good performance (OECD & OCDE, 2013, p.167). 
Structural and cultural forces are ideologically influenced by the need to alter tasks and 
technologies, and faced with a long-term failure to manage essential motivation, these have 
resulted in the entire panoply of modern-day KITAs. This has led to desperate efforts to 
restate power over rewards in performance related payment (Thompson & McHugh, 2009). 
Considering the Saudi context, in a country where the society accords more emphasis on 
customs and religious beliefs, a performance related pay system might prove to be 
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unnecessary. However, a blend of skills insufficiency and a mounting wage bill has resulted 
in calls for a rethink of how health facilities and health personnel are financed and 
compensated (Oxford Business Group, 2014). Although Saudi Arabia’s public sector has not 
yet adopted performance-oriented fees, their introduction will be welcomed (Oxford Business 
Group, 2014). This is because of the challenges occurring due to increasing shortages in the 
labour market. 
However, Kang and Yanadori (2011) point to an emerging situation wherein socially 
legitimized business practices are introduced in contexts where they may be challenging or 
not compatible, but in such a way that they do not materially alter the current organizational 
culture or operations, while being employed in an ineffective manner. This view has 
important implications in the Saudi scenario, and especially in light of the already opaque 
picture of the aims and effectiveness of PRP as described previously in the chapter.   
 
Many companies consider that recognizing the efforts of their employees may boost 
not only the level of participation of these workers but also enhance business revenues. 
Apparently, workers tend to be attracted to employers who reward their additional capability 
and will automatically wish to be employed by these types of companies. Motivation is 
usually an essential factor of employee performance, and especially the type of motivation 
that involves monetary bonuses in addition to the workers’ base pay. Therefore, performance 
related payment is a key potential tool in the running of a business.  
However, from the variety of PRP systems discussed in this chapter, and the 
conflicting evidence as to the effectiveness of PRP in general in achieving the various aims 
ascribed to it, it is apparent that adoption and implementation of PRP is not a straightforward 
decision. Any company adopting PRP should undertake an evaluation of these schemes based 
on other testable variables as a function of profitability. This should not be restricted to one 
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system, but one after the other should be tested in order to decide on the most effectual plan 
that will facilitate the achievement of the set target. Further, in the Saudi context, the 
possibility of conflicting socio-cultural conditions and the potential for a surface-only 
application of alien systems adopted raises further questions about the potential of such 
schemes for success. With this in mind, the next chapter will provide a background to Saudi 
Arabia as the broad context of this study, and an introduction to the three organisations 
participating in this research. 
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CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND 
 
The first section of this chapter provides a general guide to the political and economic 
structure of Saudi Arabia, with geographic, demographic and social features discussed. The 
second section covers the background, size and product of the three firms under study. In 
light of the convergence/divergence debate considering whether human resource management 
practices in different parts of the world are similar, applied in the same ways or yield the 
same results, the country background is an important part of the contextualisation of the 
study. The data collected for this study reveals the suggestion that the technique of 
performance related pay schemes has been imported and then applied in the Saudi context, 
and that this has implications for the way in which it is implemented and the perceptions of 
affected parties towards it, as well, possibly, on its utility. This chapter will provide an 
introductory context for those findings by firstly offering general insights into the relevant 
features of the country and culture, and then considering the organisations which were 
investigated in this study;. 
 
3.1 Saudi Arabia: Political structure. 
Saudi Arabia’s government and legal system is based firmly upon Islamic principles and 
teachings, as is set out in the Basic Law of Governance (1992). Its official language is Arabic 
and its official religion Islam.  The State is a monarchy and power lies in the hands of the 
King, to whom all citizens are bound to pledge their allegiance, as the head of the royal 
family. This role passes down the male line via the Crown Prince.   While the King’s power 
is supreme, it is balanced by the law, which lays down the need for justice, consultation and 
the rule of Islamic Shari’a. The family is viewed as being at the core of Saudi society and the 
law and government of the country is designed to strengthen and maintain the centrality of 
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the family unit, while inculcating within this unit Islamic and Arab values.  A duty of care 
toward and to develop the potential of all citizens is also placed upon the State. 
 
 The Law of Governance (1992) is clear in prescribing the duty of citizens to maintain a 
unified whole, supporting each other, the State, and Islam: the intention of the state to work 
to eliminate disunity and discourage dissent is also laid out.  Meanwhile, the Law places 
emphasis upon Islam, national feeling and the need to contribute to society as the 
cornerstones of the education system.  
 
In the Law of Governance, the State lays claim to all natural resources within the Kingdom 
and its waters, which are to be preserved or utilised in service of the State only as detailed in 
law: the right to exploit such resources may not be sold or given except through processes of 
law. In addition, a duty is placed upon the citizen, other residents and the State to protect 
public property.   Meanwhile, private property and ownership of capital and labour is allowed 
by the Law of Governance as an important foundation for economic activity in the Kingdom 
as well as for the structure of Saudi society.  This is set out in law with reference to Islamic 
Shari’ah. Further, the imposition of taxes must be justified in terms of the public need and 
must follow legal process.  The right to hold private property and protection of that property 
is also enshrined in law by the Law of Governance, with the provision that where the public 
interest dictates that property be taken, this may occur, but only with the provision of 
appropriate compensation.  Public expropriation of property is prevented by this law, and 
private expropriation may only be made through proper legal process.  
3.2 The Country and the Culture  
Saudi Arabia’s population stands at 27 million, of whom 8.4 million are not Saudi nationals.  
The Kingdom occupies the greatest area of the Arabian Peninsula, and enjoys a varied terrain 
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comprising mountain, plain, forest and desert, and a range of climates. However, the country 
receives only 4 inches of rain per year on average.  Despite this, a programme of reclamation 
of desert land has resulted in dramatic progress in agricultural production, and allows the 
export of various produce, from wheat, vegetables, fruit and flowers to fish, poultry, eggs and 
dairy produce.      
 
Since the country’s founding in 1932, Saudi Arabia has modernised quickly while still 
retaining many of its unique cultural features. Bedouin and Arab cultural traditions are 
important to Saudi Arabian culture, and Arab hospitality is an example of this.  The chief 
cultural influences upon the Kingdom also include its historical importance as a centre for 
trade, stretching back at least 5,000 years, and connecting the Indian sub-continent and the 
Far East with the Mediterranean and the Byzantine Empire.  Another pillar of Saudi culture is 
formed by Islam, adopted in the 7th Century AD and soon afterwards leading to a ‘Golden 
Age’ of scientific and cultural development.  Muslim observance shapes the year, including 
the month-long daylight hours fast of Ramadan and the festival of Eid-Al-Fitr which follows 
it. In addition, Saudi Arabia’s role as a religious centre for Islam leads to cultural enrichment 
by means of the large numbers of pilgrims coming to the country each year for the Hajj, or 
pilgrimage to Makkah. 
3.3 Emergence of the Saudi Labour Market 
In Saudi Arabia, prior to the production of oil, the labour market was restricted and 
did not show a distinct dissection of classes. Many Saudis were involved in traditional 
categories of occupation, and some were self-employed. Most people lived an itinerant life 
due to the physical setting of the country. Neither did the country have a strong fundamental 
administration nor a compound classification of the workforce. Later, with the unearthing of 
oil in the late 1930s, its economic structures experienced the start of modifications which 
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would make the petroleum industry the key to the Saudi financial set-up (Woodward, 1988, 
pp. 45-51).  
The start of the creation of the salaried labour market was with the Arabian-American 
Oil Company (ARAMCO). ARAMCO provided many Saudis with oil-related jobs and other 
job activities linked to the company. Between the 1940s and 1960s, oil production and other 
related jobs were the main economy driver, although this had little impact on the country as a 
whole. During the initial period of planned progress, it was ostensible that Saudi Arabia’s 
population and the magnitude of its countrywide labour power were inadequate to provide the 
entire manpower necessary for the quickly evolving economy. It was then decided to import 
additional workers to enable attainment of the country’s development goals (Sirageldin & 
Sherbiny, 1984, p. 36). 
In the 1970s, the basis of the economic structure was recognized. Development plans 
to consider the complete variety of human needs were addressed. Capital from the Saudi 
government plus imported manpower made this achievable, and imported labour dependence 
increased each year as stated by Sirageldin and Sherbiny (1984). Most of the imported labor 
was from neighbouring Arab nations. The ratio of external manpower has progressively 
reduced as from the end of the 1970s. 
3.4 Overview of the current situation 
The problem related to international labour in Saudi Arabia is known to be one 
touching each and every corner of the world. The total population of Saudi Arabia is 27.3 
million, out of which 30 % are immigrants from other nations (The World Factbook, 2013). 
This has resulted in changes in the labour laws of Saudi Arabia which not only influence 
labour, but also result in influence on workers’ families, and this issue is spread all across the 
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globe. According to a study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2013), the value of 
remittances from the international labour in Saudi Arabia holds accountability for 6.2 % of 
the Gross Domestic product in Saudi Arabia. This is out of $927.8 billion, and can be 
considered as a significant source for income for a number of nations.  
Apart from this, the nationals of Saudi Arabia have been witnessing a high degree of 
unemployment for the last decade. There was a peak of unemployment in 2011, reaching 12.4 
% (The World Factbook, 2013). This is known to be due mainly to problems of structure, 
including competing with lower levels of payment necessary for international workers. Apart 
from that, there was also the issue of a number of unskilled workers of Saudi Arabia who 
were in need of training for integration into the employment market. In this context, it can be 
stated that there is a problem concerning demographic factors. The biggest group by age 
consists of the younger population, those between the ages of 20 and 34. The employment 
market thus has a need to accommodate a huge group of workers on a yearly basis (Saudi 
Ministry of Labor, 2012).  
Therefore, the government of Saudi Arabia, with the new Minister for the Labour 
Market, Adel Fakeid, who was appointed in the late months of 2010, started to take measures 
to drastically lower the rate of unemployment by the introduction of innovative programmes. 
This resulted in impact upon the level of demand and supply for labour in Saudi Arabia. The 
policies as well as institutions of the labour market affect the success enjoyed by economic 
reform, and these stem more from the political environment in comparison with the economy. 
Hence, in order to be more effective, policies focus on the rigidity of the labour market as 
related to political in comparison with economic reasons (Jebreel, 2012). 
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3.5 Employment Structure 
The labour market in Saudi Arabia has long suffered from a number of different 
imbalances of structure which include high dependency upon international labour, a serious 
gap in gender in the supply related to labour, high disparities in wages amongst similarly 
educated and trained non-Saudis and Saudis and a high level of unemployment amongst the 
people of Saudi Arabia, and particularly the youth (Saudi Ministry of Labor, 2012; ILO, 
2015b). As a matter of fact, in the year 2009, the 10.5 % rate of unemployment amongst 
Saudi nationals was almost double the total rate of unemployment, which was 5.7 %.  The 
rate of unemployment amongst those between the age of 20 and 24 was 30.2 %.  These 
figures highlight the difficulties being faced in the country in relation to labour market 
management. 
Two interrelated and dominant features in the structure of the Saudi labour market are 
known to be the utilization of international workers within the private sector and their 
different conditions of employment and wages (Saudi Ministry of Labor, 2012). These 
conditions have been identified to be unattractive for the national, and there is known to be a 
strong preference among nationals for working within the public sector. Due to this, the 
population of Saudi Arabia seems to be dominating employment within the public sector, 
whereas non- Saudis dominate employment within the private sector despite efforts by the 
government to increase the representation of Saudi workers in these areas (Peck, 2014).  To 
understand the labour market more effectively examination of its structure through economic 
activity was undertaken. 
3.5.1 Employment structure by economic activity 
Within Saudi Arabia, a major current feature of the employment structure is formed 
by the policies of Saudization focusing upon indigenization of the forces of labour with a 
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specific focus created for the private sector (Sadi, 2013). For this particular purpose, the 
adoption of a number of different approaches is in evidence. Some of these measures entail 
the imposition of minimum-level quotas for the nationals of Saudi Arabia within specific 
industries (The World Factbook, 2013), placing jobs under blanket reservation with respect to 
specific occupations for domestic nationals (Ramady, 2013). Others focus on improving 
employability and the skills of workers in Saudi Arabia, along with their accessibility for the 
jobs which might otherwise have been carried out by the international workers, (Alfawaz et 
al., 2014) and over the creation of new opportunities for job seekers from Saudi Arabia 
within the private sector. With respect to this latter regard, creation of new employment is 
known to have a close link with the diversification taking place in the economy of Saudi 
Arabia apart from the lucrative but volatile oil sector (Albassam, 2015; Cole, 2015). The 
relation between PRP and Saudisation has not been made clear by previous research 
evidence. Introducing PRP seems to represent the import of Western employment theories 
and condition, but on the other hand could be argued as an incentive to Saudi nationals to 
view working in the private sector as an opportunity to gain more in financial terms from this 
sector. With the governmental imperative for private sector organisations to in increase the 
proportion of employees recruited from the Saudi labour force, HRM in general and pay and 
conditions in particular may offer an important avenue for research in order to implement this 
policy effectively.   
However, in the historical context, Saudization is known to have restricted levels of 
success in terms of numerical targets which were rarely met (Saudi Ministry of Labor, 2012). 
Challenges related to greater employment amongst the population of Saudi Arabia involve a 
mismatch related to skills because of deficiencies in the system of education, with the 
entrenchment of perceptions that prevent nationals from the pursuing specific categories of 
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work, and the low involvement of females within the employment force (Torofdor et al, 
2012). Competitiveness and productivity are also known to pose challenges.  
3.5.2  Labour Demand 
As the recovery of the global economy lifted oil prices in 2010, the economy of Saudi 
Arabia showed higher growth and the enlargement of fiscal spending by the authority of 
government. This resulted in boosting demand at domestic level and in the acceleration of 
GDP growth in non-oil areas, which is estimated for 2015 at US$ 805 billion (Global Finance 
Magazine, 2015). 
 
At the same time, there is a predicted SR715bn for the 2015 budget, which leaves a 
deficit of SR145 (5% of GDP) and foreign reserves are at $736bn (98% of GDP), according 
to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth office (gov.uk, 2015). Furthermore, government debt 
to GDP has reduced dramatically in the last few years as the figure below indicates. 
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Figure 1 Government Debt to GDP 
 
Source: Trading Economics, (2015) 
The effect of this improved economy on labour demand is that there is increasing 
opportunities for those that were unemployed during the recession.  At the same time there is 
pressure from employment regulation and the way the labour market is run, including the role 
of recruitment agencies. 
3.5.3 Employment regulation and recruitment agencies in the Saudi labour 
market 
Article 14 under the Executive Regulation of Labour Law covers the work standards 
to be followed at local recruitment agencies. These organisations facilitate the recruitment of 
workers who are non-Saudi, and recruitment at domestic and international levels. The 
population of workers recruited should not exceed the needs set by those employers who are 
successful in receiving approval for the recruitment of international workers (Ramady, 2010). 
The recruitment officer may also recruit workers in accordance with the set limits of the 
Ministry. These employment services are offered to employers who are facing failure in the 
recruitment of their own individual workers. The recruitment agencies have responsibility for 
making payments to workers and giving guarantees over their rights (Flynn, 2011). Further, 
Article 14 subsection 2 covers the conditions which have to be met by Saudi nationals to 
obtain a license for the establishment of recruitment offices (The World Factbook, 2013).  
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3.5.4 New entrants to the labour market by level of educational attainment 
The Ministry of the Interior estimates the immigrant population at 6.2 million, drawn 
from a number of different nations, and in particular from North Africa and the Middle East. 
As per the official data from the Ministry of planning, the total workforce population in Saudi 
Arabia was 7.2 million at the end of the year 2000 (Saudi Ministry of Labor, 2012). This 
population was constituted as 44.2 % or 3.12 million from the Saudi population 56.8 % or 
4.02 million non-Saudis (The World Factbook, 2013).  
At the same time, the country aims to reduce its dependence on foreign labour.  
Irrespective of the other major efforts made through development plans, the main tool for 
increasing the supply of qualified Saudi workers from Saudi Arabia was rapid expansion of 
systems of training and education (Sadi and Al-Buraey, 2009). However, although the 
number of participants from the foreign labour force within the state sector has diminished in 
a significant manner, Saudi Arabia still seems to be relying largely on an international work 
force, which is known to be of high quality in comparison with its counterpart Saudi 
workforce (Ramady, 2013). In addition, there is a further key issue which hinders the labour 
force of Saudi Arabia, which is the restricted participation of females within each and every 
sector of the economy (Saudi Ministry of Labor, 2012; Al-Salloum & Bin, 2012). Even with 
an increase in the level of demand for labour, approximately one half of the population of 
Saudi does not seem to be participating within the activities of the economy which are 
beyond the domestic front. The female labour force within the urban region only contributes 
to approximately one % of the economy (Borjas, 2011). This particularly small percentage 
additionally seems to be working only within the reaches of social institutions (The World 
Factbook, 2013). The participation of rural women is known to be greater in the provision of 
income for the family: however, the lower level of productivity results in reduced share 
within the total range of national product. 
Foreign manpower from specific countries provides particular types of labour force. Koreans 
are mainly construction labourers, while most Thais work in service industries, and most 
westerners are found at management levels.    The figure below shows the estimated country 
of origin of foreign workers. 
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Figure 2 Country of Origin of Expatriate Workers 
 
Source: Bel-Air (2014) 
 
The alignment of imported labour was focused on making prompt alteration in Saudi Arabia 
(Roy, 2009). Despite attempts to increase the supply of competent Saudis through the rapid 
increase of the learning and training schemes, Saudi Arabia still depends greatly on foreign 
labor which is of advanced level in some sectors compared to that of Saudi. In Saudi Arabia, 
there are approximately as many foreigners as citizens working in the country as the figure 
above indicates. Further, female labour is minimal relative to other labour markets 
internationally.  This limited input of female labour is a drawback limiting the Saudi labour 
market, and most planning strategies ignore this primary resource. The percentage of work 
provided by men is ten times that of females (Sirageldin & Sherbiny, 1984). The chart below 
shows manpower distribution in the Saudi labour market in relation to Saudi males and 
females and expatriate workers.  
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Figure 3 Saudi and Non-Saudi's in the work force 
Source: CDSI (2014). 
 
One of the development objectives is to increase native Saudis’ involvement in the private 
sector and raise the percentage contribution of women in the labour market.  As the figure 
below indicates, there is a clear dominance of Saudis in the public sector. 
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Figure 4 Labour Market Breakdown by Industry 
 
 
Source: CDSI (2014).  
 
Currently, many women work in the public sector: mainly for the Ministries of Education and 
Labour. The overall separation between genders makes it almost impossible for females to 
find appropriate employment in many other sectors, with female involvement in the private 
sector was until recently almost null, as noted by Sirageldin and Sherbiny (1984).  Although 
this has now risen as Achoui (2009) highlights, female participation remains low unless they 
are setting up their own enterprises, a view also indicated by Alothman and Mishra (2014). 
  
In conclusion, there are several causes for the figures regarding foreign employees in Saudi 
Arabia. The evolvement of private fields, a small and young Saudi population with 
insufficient skills, restriction of the employment of women due to cultural practices and the 
fact that most work categories are negatively valued are some of the reasons involved.  
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3.6 Special features of the Saudi labour market 
 
As previously mentioned, the Saudi Arabian workforce is mainly employed in the public 
sector.  However, most increased development is seen in areas that classically rely on 
imported manpower. Recently, Saudi Arabia has invested in public development on massive 
infrastructure projects.  
 
The primary construction of roads was undertaken by expatriate Korean labourers who 
possessed the necessary skills (Woodward, 1988). Easy access to low wage, low-skilled 
expatriate labour makes sectors such as transport and individual services the core drivers of 
private sector development. These individual divisions have however, not assisted in 
reducing Saudi unemployment.  Public sector labour forces and wage policies are another 
distinct feature of the labour market in Saudi Arabia. The accessibility of government jobs, 
with additional substantial reimbursement packages, has impacted on registration pay chiefly 
for low-educated Saudis, which is relatively higher than the salary of equally skilled non-
Saudis in the private sector (Moussa, 2013). However, vocation in this sector has developed 
at a slower rate than in the individual segment. In this connection, the effectively expansive 
government compensation bill (in per cent of GDP) has involved slower development in civil 
occupations, in spite of the fact that business development has escalated since 2012, 
according to the International Monetary Fund (2012). 
 
Private sector salary dissimilarities mean that a Saudi with the same level of education or 
skills as a foreigner is paid higher than the foreigner in the same sector (IMF, 2012). The 
private sector utilizes remote work, and endeavours to help in promoting private sector jobs 
for nationals have yielded indifferent results. In Saudi Arabia, outside workers take up more 
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than 80 percent of private sector occupations; this is in spite of the execution of work share 
plans to raise the numbers of nationals in private-sector employment in the long run. 
However, the use of nationals in the private sector is skewed towards highly-paid positions, 
with small numbers of Saudi citizens working in low-wage sectors, and the vast majority 
utilized in supervisory positions, according to the International Monetary Fund (2012).  
 
 
3.6.1 Labour market segmentation and wage determination.  
The labour force in Saudi Arabia is subdivided into public and private sectors. The public 
segment has in many ways outdone the lower-paying private sector. Due to this, many Saudis 
prefer to work as civil servants than in private sector employment. According to the Saudi 
Central Department of Statistics & Information (SUSRIS, n.d.), average salaries for all levels 
of education are higher in the public sector (Ramady, 2014). Wages in the private sector 
increase at a low rate compared to quickly increasing salaries in the public sector.  
 
Peripheral reimbursements such as allowances in the public sector are a major factor tending 
to raise the preference towards civil service as a career. In the private sector, the working 
hours are comparatively higher, at approximately 48 or more per week, than in the public 
sector. The risk of losing employment in the public sector is low and rises in wages happen 
frequently compared to private employment. The chart below, as shown by Narea (2011), 
displays the salaries in both public and private sectors.  
 
Private sector compensation for foreigners’ work is inherently lower than that for nationals at 
comparative educational levels; this creates an inclination for managers to contract in outside 
labour, particularly at the lower skill levels. Aside from the compensation differential, the 
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absence of motivators for nationals to gain skills for the private sector likewise makes 
managers inclined toward outside labour (International Monetary Funds, 2012). Workers 
from abroad are less lavish, not so versatile but rather more malleable, at least in the service 
industries and private sector, perhaps because they rely on upon the employer for their 
legitimate status.  
 
Up to date figures on monthly wages were not available, however, the figure below indicates 
the differentials that existed between the private and public sector in 2008.  public sector 
wages have grown faster than private sector, reinforcing the desire of Saudi nationals to work 
in this area, and encouraging a higher level of foreign nationals in the public sector (Hertog, 
2013).  
Figure 5 Public and Private Sector Wages to 2008 
 
Source: Hertog (2013) 
A second labour market segmentation is by gender. Female workers have significantly lower 
salaries than male workers, despite the fact that women perform better than men 
educationally. The population of unemployed women is very high compared to unemployed 
men (Roy, 2009, pp. 44-51).  
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Woodward (1988) states that culture and religion make it difficult for them to find suitable 
employment. The Saudi ethos is altering, and more females want to join the labour market 
instead of remaining at home to bring up children. Lastly, when the lower pay was 
familiarized, joblessness for women went up, since they had a lower wage proportion 
compared to males, and then the gap broadened separating those seeking a job and those who 
gained employment. Recently, Saudi Arabia barred gender-based discrimination between 
males and females employed in the same occupations, and the changes that have occurred in 
relation to education, employment sector and wages between 2009-2012 are shown in the 
figure below. 
 
Figure 6 Change in Saudi employment by gender, education level and wage 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2013) 
Age is another means of segmenting the labour market of Saudi Arabia. Most of the 
employed population is aged between 15 and 29 years, as indicated in figure 10 later in this 
section, with the least employed part of the working population aging 45 years and more; this 
means that young people are earning a larger share of wages on offer than older people. 
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Nationality is another subdivision which determines the wage of any person in any 
professional field. In the private sector, Saudis are paid more than the expatriate workforce. 
In the private sector, Saudi pay ratio is an average of twice as high as the pay of foreigners. 
The share of unskilled workers among non-Saudis is greater than that of unskilled Saudis; 
therefore the highly paid Saudis may be more valuable employees in both public and private 
sectors, as Sirageldin and Sherbiny (1984) argue. Apart from the very uppermost levels of 
skills, Saudis tend to be more expensive to employ than non-Saudis, as they have advanced 
pay prospects, as shown in the chart above. This has implications for the possible utility of 
PRP, as on the one hand the prospect of a significant pay increase may attract workers, while 
on the other the potential for demotivation in those who do not receive bonus payments, and 
comparisons with the state sector, may lead to higher turnover or poorer response to 
vacancies by Saudi workers.  
3.6.2 Labour market demand and wage determination.  
 
Labour in Saudi Arabia is required based on qualifications and education levels. Medical 
professionals, engineers, chartered accountants, lecturers, and bankers are the most in 
demand professionals in Saudi Arabia (Al-Rajhi et al, 2014). Highly skilled workforce 
members such as project managers, heavy machinery operators, financial managers, 
hospitality service providers, systems analysts, computer programmers and school teachers 
are also in high demand in the Kingdom. Skilled or semi-skilled workers and the low-skilled 
workforce are also in demand however. Most of the professionals required are provided by 
the foreign workforce (Ali, 2009, p. 76).  
 
The highly in-demand skilled workers are mainly employed and well-paid compared to the 
less skilled labour for both natives and non-Saudis (Ramady, 2013).   The following two 
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figures show the educational level of both Saudi’s and non-Saudi’s and their percentage share 
of the labour market. 
 
Figure 7 Saudi National's Share of Labour Market by Education Level 
 
Source: Source: CDSI (2014).  
Figure 8 Non-Saudi's Education Level in the Labour Market 
 
Source: Source: CDSI (2014).  
What the two figures indicate is that Saudi nationals s are employed in a greater proportion of 
the higher skilled areas of the labour market, and thus receiving higher wage levels.  
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Many of the highly qualified Saudis therefore are focused on finding work in the public 
sector.   Part of the reason for this is that The Saudi Arabian government has created 
additional privileges to attract the population to the public sector. These opportunities lead 
most Saudi employees opt to work for the government rather than working in the private 
sector, even if this means being unemployed till a job opportunity arises (Al-Waqfi and 
Fortstenlechter, 2012). The variations that exist in the public versus private sector are shown 
in the figure below 
 
Figure 9 Labour Market Evolutions in Saudi private and public sectors 
 
 
 
Source: Riskreporter (2014) 
 
 
Moreover, public sector pay is better than for those working in the private sector,  (Narea, 
2011, pp. 98-100).  These wage differentials are a further issue within the Saudi labour 
market. 
 
3.6.3 Wage differential and wage discrimination.  
Roy (2009) notes that the salaries and perks for foreigners compared to Saudi nationals are 
not similar. Apart from the very uppermost levels of skills, Saudis tend to be more expensive 
to employ than non-Saudis, as they are considered to have advanced pay prospects. This is 
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imitated in typical private sector salary levels, but the differentials have also been impacted 
by the introduction, in 2012 of a minimum wage for both Saudi nationals and expatriates.  
However, as Pupic, (2014) highlights the potential decision of the government to set the 
minimum wage for Saudi nationals at twice that of expatriates in 2015 is likely to increase the 
differentials.  The aim is to increase the attractiveness of working in the private sector for 
Saudi nationals.    
 
The rationale for this is that the vast compensation differential between the public and private 
sectors represents a motivator for nationals, and especially those individuals who are less 
educated, to lean toward public sector careers.  Ramady (2013) states that the decision by 
Saudi Arabia to give high pay and advantages to public sector workers has prompted strong 
reservation compensation for nationals: reasonable wages in the public sector are frequently 
several times those of the private sector: especially for low-skilled workers and it is this 
difference that minium wage is trying to close (Alhamad, 2014). Non-wage advantages such 
as working hours, and professional stability are additionally more alluring in the public 
sector. High public wages and advantages can make a disincentive for nationals to put 
resources into aptitudes that are critical for the private sector.  
 
Expenses for foreign labour can help limit the compensation differential with nationals, while 
minimum wages focused at nationals are prone to go the other way (Alhamd, 2014). As these 
are lower in Saudi than in different nations, and in connection with the pay differential, it is 
unrealistic to expect to close the compensation differential naturally.  However, , but this 
approach however can be utilized in conjunction with pay sponsorships, which the expenses 
could help to store according to Ali (2009). Regarding least wages, global experience 
recommends only an unobtrusive adverse effect on work from a small increment in the lowest 
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pay allowed by the law. Be that as it may, in Saudi, minimum wages have been set in an 
abnormal state, and are prone to augmenting the compensation differential.  
 
Other workers who are not fully Saudi will no longer be discriminated against, and should 
receive fair wages like the rest of the Saudis workers according to the new regulations 
announced. Female discrimination has been banned, and women given equal rights and equal 
wages to any male in the same job. The “Saudization” (Sirageldin & Sherbiny, 1984, pp. 66-
69) plan is strategically planned to inspire more citizens to work and try to reduce the rising 
unemployment rate among Saudis. Saudi Arabia has thus been looking to replace many 
foreign workers with nationals as part of this strategy and thus reduce unemployment 
amongst nationals (Abouraia, 2014). 
 
3.6.4 General conditions of labour market demand and supply in Saudi Arabia.  
Lack of jobs among Saudis is however still a significant problem. Most of the unemployed 
are recent university graduates looking for public jobs; occupation holders looking for better 
occupations; and due to traditional practices as well as family ties hindering workforce 
mobility: especially among women (Ali, 2009, p. 56). However, in other situations, 
unemployment is becoming a more instant economic and social concern, and in addition, the 
government is dealing with the problems of creating new chances for productive jobs for its 
citizens.  
 
In this context, the developing supply-demand subtleties of the workforce propose additional 
constrictions. More precisely, the developing supply of labour which echoes both the high 
population growth and rising contribution levels is outstripping demand for work, which is 
being curbed as a result of slower economic growth and additionally from changes in the 
   
103 
forms of production. These conditions are intricate, as a result of the rising incongruity 
between educational and practical skills of emerging applicants as well as the necessities of 
the market (Ramady, 2013). 
 
Unemployment of nationals differs among Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the 
Gulf nations, notwithstanding times of substantial non-oil development. Unemployment in 
Saudi has stayed flat because of a moderately sized populace which is to a great extent 
utilized in the public sector. In Saudi Arabia, unemployment among nationals has expanded 
from 10.5 percent at the end of 2009 to 12.1 percent at the end of 2012 and is concentrated 
among highly qualified females and lower qualified men -IMF Country Report 13/230- 
(Funds, 2012). For Saudis, unemployment was measured at 14 percent among nationals in 
2009. Rising female work interest rates are to a limited extent because of falling incomes and 
increasing educational levels among females, and have added to high female unemployment 
against the setting of constrained job opportunities. In Saudi Arabia, female unemployment 
rates are higher than for males, coming to about 35 percent.  As the figure below indicates, 
the rates of unemployment are higher for those in the 15-24 year age bracket for both males 
and females, but overall unemployment is much higher for females in the country.  
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Figure 10 Unemployment Levels by Gender and Age 
 
Source: Central Department of Statistics (2014)  
 
On the demand side, the government, the main employment channel previously, can no 
longer act as such, due to the necessity of trimming the high government pay bill. In addition, 
there is a robust connection between civil expenditure and domestic economic activity in the 
Gulf nations and government spending impacts the demand for the workforce, according to 
Ali Abbas (2009). Consequently, the private sector has remained unable to pick up the 
shortfall, due to labour market inflexibility. 
Generally, the movement for individuals in public employment to help raise their way of life 
through private-sector work creation for nationals has been constrained. Public sector use of 
merchandise and administration has reinforced local interest and citizens have formed a 
higher expectation for everyday comfort through enhanced foundations and social policies 
and in addition, work (Ali, 2009, p. 76).  
 
This situation has thrown up challenges as far as private sector work creation for nationals is 
concerned; low-skilled foreign labourers hold more than 80 percent of private sector 
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occupations. Unemployment is high and citizens depend fundamentally on the public sector 
for employment. This has likewise brought about poor profitability development.   
 
 
3.7 Saudi Arabia’s Business Environment 
The business culture of the Western world gives a definite separation between work 
and religious conviction. Even devout Christians do not mix divine scriptures with typical 
business practice. However, doing business in Saudi Arabia is a different experience, and it is 
paramount to consider the entirely pervasive nature of Islam and its impact on company 
activities in the Gulf region. According to International Business Publications (2013, p.65), 
the internationalization of the global economy dictates that Saudi Arabia’s business 
environment must be attractive to be competitive. In fact, the World Bank has rated Saudi 
Arabia as the easiest place to do business in the entire Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf region (Ramady, 2014,). The business environment in the Kingdom mirrors 
the tradition of independent private projects. That is; Saudi Arabia’s new Foreign Investment 
Law permits 100% foreign ownership of business ventures and real estates. 
 
 
 
As depicted by economic reports and analysts’ estimates, the economic growth of 
Saudi Arabia has been extremely stable over the last decade. According to a statement by the 
Oxford Business Group (2013, p.26), and flying in the face of the existing world economic 
depression that has seen many Western financial systems under pressure to regain their 
stability, Saudi Arabia continues to register high economic growth, albeit with high levels of 
unemployment. This growth relies on its thriving hydrocarbon sector, bolstered by steady 
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political and financial support. Mounting oil prices and production led to the country 
celebrating one of the world’s topmost average rates of growth in GDP in the period 2002 –
to- 2011. When expressed in terms of dollars, Saudi’s GDP tripled to approximately $580 
billion. This amount equals a yearly average growth rate which exceeds 20 percent, and over 
15 percent when inflation is considered. According to Cordesman (2009, p.65), Saudi Arabia 
registered SR590 (US$157.49bn) in excess of its budget for the 2008 fiscal year, and the 
country had a healthy overall economic performance in 2008 despite the unexpected global 
financial crisis (Cordesman, 2009, p.65). The country has the largest economy in the Middle 
East, and it contributes about half of the pooled GDP in the Gulf region. The fact that Saudi 
Arabia’s economy is the largest in the Gulf region has steadily grown implies that the country 
has a favourable environment which can promote business projects. 
 
Saudi Arabia’s economy has been termed an economy in transition. The emergence of 
the Saudi Arabian economy as the foremost and most encouraging economy in the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf region (Saudi Arabia Report, 2010, 
p.52), has supported economic reform to transfer the economy from the traditional financial 
system platform into a skill-oriented economy, thus joining the leading economies 
internationally. The impact of the global financial crisis is steadily fading over time. Given 
the continued economic recovery of Saudi Arabia’s economy in the global and regional 
economy, the country’s business outlook is quite encouraging (Saudi Arabia Report, 2013 
p.52). The clear indications of healthy economic revitalization were supported by oil prices in 
2010, and significant recent economic developments have promoted optimism in the business 
environment. In particular, business prospects rely entirely on the current and prospective 
path of the Saudi Arabia economy: especially high foreign and domestic demand, the 
increasing growth in the stock market, and constant government support (Saudi Arabia 
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Report, 2010, pp.52-53). Evidently, the ongoing positive economic changes suggest the 
profitability of projects in the Saudi business environment. Along with the global interest in 
performance related pay, it is therefore pertinent to consider the status and effectiveness of 
these schemes in the Saudi context.   
3.8 Brief Introduction to the Firms and their Products. 
The organisations included in this study are all large in the context of national firms, and all 
have had governmental support or are semi-privatised national interests, with the state 
retaining a share in their stock. The firms concerned include Saudi Telecoms Company, 
previously entirely state-owned and still by far the largest provider in the telecommunications 
sector. Also, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund is surveyed, and represents government 
investment fund to promote commercial development in the country. Finally, the Saudi 
Electric Company controls the electricity supply within the country as well as having various 
interests abroad. Further background to each of the companies will be provided in the 
subsections which follow. 
3.8.1 Saudi Telecoms Company 
In 1998 the Saudi Telecoms Company was created as a Joint Stock Company, and inherited 
all technological, human and administrative working assets from the government Ministry of 
Post, Telegraph and Telephone’s telegraph and telephone division, to become a separate 
entity but remaining fully state-owned at that time. Four years later, in 2002 however, the 
government of the KSA made a share offering of 30% of the company,   with two-thirds of 
this offering taken up by private individuals (within Saudi Arabia only) and the remainder 
purchased by the General organization for Social Security and the Public Pension Fund. 
Thus, the company remains mostly state-owned, and is a clear descendant of the Government 
department to whom its functions previously belonged. However, since that time the 
company has expanded its interests dramatically through the cultivation of links and 
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investment in companies with similar interests both at home and in other countries of the 
Middle East. For example, STC owns 100% of Arabian Internet and Communications 
Services and the Telecom Investment Company in Saudi Arabia, as well as of STC Bahrain. 
It is also the majority shareholder in NTS Indonesia and Gulf Digital Media Holding in 
Bahrain, with 50% shares in Arab Submarines Cable Company Ltd as well as in the Call 
Centre Company in Saudi. It also has minority stakes in Kuwait Telecom Company, the Arab 
Satellite Company, Oger Telecom in the UAE and Binariang GSM in Malaysia.  
 
With head offices in Riyadh, STC provides services in telecommunications and is by far the 
largest player in this market in Saudi Arabia. The company and the companies in which it has 
stakes provide various services in this area locally, nationally and internationally, and cover 
both mobile and fixed line services, data services, line lease and Internet provision for homes 
and businesses. The company has an extensive infrastructure, as a part of which the company 
invests in cabling through sea and over land. 
 
3.8.2 Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
The Saudi Investment Development Fund (SIDF) was founded in 1394H, based upon a royal 
decree. The organisation is an affiliate of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, and 
was set up for the purpose of acting as a lender to support the industrial sector through soft 
loans repayable over the medium- and long term. In addition, SIDF provides consultancy for 
the sector in the areas of finance, administration, technical services and marketing. The 
overarching aim of the organisation is to facilitate expansion and development of the 
industries of Saudi Arabia. 
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The Company is currently supported by Government through a capital fund of SR 20 billion, 
expanded from its opening allocation of SR 500 million. Thus, SIDF is the major 
organisation concerned with meeting Government targets in its programmes for the 
development of private industry and manufacturing. Its mission included the encouragement 
of sustainability in growth, while also enabling companies to enhance performance. 
 
In greater detail, the work of SIDF involves investigation of the projects for which 
organisations apply for loans, in consideration of their likely impact in micro- and macro-
economic terms, and assisting in ensuring that capital is directed in the best manner to 
achieve a successful project outcome. This work is conducted within a framework of stated 
objectives which include return on investments, decreased reliance on imports through local 
production, increase in goods exports other than oil, integrating different industrial sectors, 
increased employment for Saudi citizens, utilisation of local natural resources, development 
of technology level and use, increased foreign investment, enhanced safety compliance in 
industry and greater environmental protection. 
   
3.8.3 Saudi Electric Company 
       
  The Saudi Electric Company was established on 05/04/2000 as a Saudi joint stock company 
with 33,758,632,650 Billon SR (around 5,626,438,775 Billon GBP) in paid-up capital. It was 
split into 675,172,653 shares. Ten small firms which operated in each province of Saudi 
Arabia, and all other electricity operations became guided by the General Electricity 
Corporation. This become a single joint stock company in 2000, and is known today as the 
Saudi Electricity Company (www.se.com.sa, 2011). Its total employee base has reached 
28,603 with 22,489 employees regarded as core staff. The objectives of SEC are to generate 
and supply electricity services in Saudi Arabia, either alone, or through partial subsidiaries 
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(TADAWUL, 2011).  The stated vision of the firm is to “help and improve the standard of 
living and enhance the economic competitiveness of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in all 
domains” (www.se.com.sa, 2011).  
 
The impossibility of storing electricity means that it must be produced at the time of demand 
for it. Demand is not constant but rather varies greatly over time, and furthermore the 
expectation of the consumer is that electricity supply should be reliable and uninterrupted.  
Therefore, a margin of excess production must be maintained.  In practice, larger numbers of 
consumers require a smaller margin per head, thus reducing costs: thus the electricity industry 
naturally tends toward a monopolistic model.  This is further influenced by fact that the 
electricity supply system works as a whole entity, and thus the performance of individual 
generators affect the entire network.  This also means that any improvement in one part of the 
network benefits all, and implies that the public good is served by a monopolistic approach.  
However, the electricity industry contains the multiple functions of generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply, and these tend to be viewed as distinct by reforms in regulation, as 
they possess different economic characteristics. 
 
         The generation of electricity represents the greatest part of the cost of electricity supply, 
and relies upon transforming energy from various sources into electrical energy: each source 
requires different technology and involves different costs, depending on capital costs, 
operational and maintenance costs, and fuel costs. The nuclear method involves high capital 
costs but incurs consistently low fuel and operational costs, while hydro generation also 
presents little variation in costs, which are fixed by natural features including climate.  Fossil 
fuels such as coal or oil are sources for generation in which costs may vary significantly 
according to fuel prices while enjoying relatively lower capital costs.  In terms of the whole 
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network, efficiency is achieved through a multiple-source approach where coal, hydro and 
nuclear power supply the base requirements while other more costly sources provide for 
peaks in demand.  This approach is known as the “least-cost merit order”. 
       
 Transmission refers to the high-voltage transmission of electricity through the network, and 
management to maintain voltage and frequency:  competition in this area would be inefficient 
as duplication would be created and costs increased, and thus this function suits a monopoly. 
Rate-of return regulatory approaches however are suggested by Averch and Johnson (1962) to 
work against cost-minimisation as there tends to be over-investment in capital.  This 
drawback is an argument against the inclusion of generation in the same monopolistic 
regulatory framework, even though least-cost merit management of generation suggests this 
approach.  Distribution, which refers to low-voltage distribution, is a natural monopoly for 
the same reasons as transmission. Supply however is not, comprising marketing, metering 
and billing of end-customers. 
3.8.4 Pay systems in place at the case study companies 
Each of the three case study companies is known to employ a form of pay for performance as 
part of strategic pay for its workforce.  However, the primary sources and information related 
to the exact workings of each scheme were limited due to confidentiality concerns, as may be 
expected in any large firm. Documentation obtained is contained within Appendices 1-3, and 
this section will provide a brief overview of the system in place at each firm, as far as can be 
ascertained. 
Saudi Telecoms Company (STC) 
The pay system employed by STC involved a performance-based element as of the year 
2014. Based on the documentation provided (see Appendix 2), the bonus awarded for 
performance is calculated as a percentage of base pay and ratings are subject to a capped 
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percentage of employees who can receive this reward. Measurement of performance 
outcomes is made firstly by the development of a minimum of 4 individually-tailored 
SMART goals with the line manager, and then by assessment of the fulfilment of these, as 
well as evaluation of competencies, with each rated according to the following categories: 
Significantly Exceeds Expectations; Exceeds Expectations; Meets Expectations; Partially 
Meets Expectations; and Does Not Meet Expectations. The criteria seem to be assessed by 
the same manager following the performance period, with a requirement for ongoing 
feedback during this time. A bell-curve is then applied to determine the proportion of 
employees to receive a bonus. It is assumed from the evidence from interviews that this is 
applied by someone other than the line managers. 
Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) 
In common with the schemes in place at the other two companies, SIDF implements a merit 
pay scheme which uses a bonus as percentage of base pay, and in which a fixed proportion of 
employees are awarde a bonus. Assessment is via line managers, who submit an assessment 
form to the HR Department (see Appendix 1). Criteria from the form on which performance 
is measured for grades 11-14 are as follows:  punctuality; supervision required; acceptance of 
direction; relations with other employees; knowledge and experience; enthusiasm; 
productivity and quality of work; general conduct; and physical aptitude. These are rated on a 
scale including the categories; poor, acceptable, good, very good and outstanding. 
Meanwhile, higher grades are rated on criteria grouped in the following categories: job 
knowledge; job execution; administration; personal characteristics; relationship with others; 
and supervisory abilities, if applicable. It should be noted here that while these rating criteria 
have the arguable advantage that they can be applied to all employees across the company 
notwithstanding their role or department, they do not allow for ratings to reflect particular 
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objectives of a specific role as it contributes to the company’s goals. Equally, the reverse is 
true of the assessment criteria employed at STC, as described earlier in this section. 
Saudi Electric Company (SEC) 
In comparison with the other two companies, little could be gleaned from the primary 
documentation provided by the company regarding the driteria on which performance of 
workers is assessed (see Appendix 3). However the existence of pay bands with a two-tier 
system for Saudi and non-Saudi employees and the assessment of employees against 
expectations set by class level is ascertained. Employees’ performance is rated in the 
following categories: much above expectations; above expectations; achieved all 
expectations; achieved the least of expectations; and did not achieve expectations. However, 
prescriptive percentages appear to be allotted to govern the proportion of employees assessed 
at each level, with 15% in the top category, 20% in the second, 60% in the third and 5% 
across the bottom two ratings. It is also shown that an employee achieving the second top 
rating at the same time as being promoted by 1 grade can achieve a bonus of 10%, which is a 
addition to the salary.  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a general background to the context for the study, namely, Saudi 
Arabia. The particular features of the labour market in the Kingdom include a large 
proportion of foreign labour, skilled and unskilled, with a wage differential between the two 
as enforced by Saudi law. The labour force is also divided by sector, with the bulk of foreign 
workers employed in the private sector, whereas the public sector is populated mainly by 
Saudi nationals, with a preference noted for this sector due to issues of status, pay and skills 
match. Furthermore, the Saudi workforce presents a notable low proportion of female 
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workers. High youth unemployment is also a feature of the country, with a rising youth 
population but skills gaps in terms of jobs for this group. 
 
This chapter also offered introductory information regarding the three case study companies, 
Saudi Electricity Company, Saudi Telecoms Company and the Saudi Industrial Development 
Fund.  The chapter which follows will present a discussion of the methodology selected for 
the study.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In any given research carried out by an individual or a group, it is necessary to show how 
results were obtained. The providence of the research methodology not only helps readers 
who wish to know more about the research, but it also helps the researcher in the process of 
considering and presenting analysis of the study and its findings.  Thus, it is of much 
importance to provide the full methodology in any research carried out. This chapter 
therefore describes and justifies the research methodology employed in developing this study 
on performance related pay and perceptions of such pay in three firms in Saudi Arabia. The 
study takes a largely social constructionist approach, and relies upon qualitative approaches 
to data collection for an in-depth analysis of the insights of managers administering the PRP 
systems in place, as supported by a quantitative approach and questionnaire to gather 
perceptions from rank and file staff who are subject to the system. A limited number of 
secondary sources were also obtained and are utilised as part of the study to provide a richer 
picture of context. 
  The objectives of this chapter are as follows: firstly, it will identify the gap in the literature 
review, and reiterate the research question and conceptual framework of the research. 
Thirdly, it will theoretically describe how the research is designed and conducted, and also, it 
will illustrate methods through which the data is examined. Lastly, it provides a discussion 
about the validity and reliability of the samples chosen.  
 
   The chapter discusses methodology selection and presents a justification for use of a mixed 
methods approach utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods, which has proved to be 
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more appropriate over other methods. The chapter will also consider the data collection 
methods chosen for the study, which include both questionnaires and interviews used to 
engage three sample populations from three different firms. The major sections of this 
research methodology include the research design and sampling techniques, data collection, 
questionnaire design and distribution, and interviews. Furthermore, the chapter will assess the 
ethical impact of the study, as well as evaluate secondary data obtained by looking at 
company regulations and other documentary sources, in which the research will use a 
“narrow-angle lens” (Johnson & Christensen, 2010, p. 35), focusing on the motivating system 
of PRP and its relation to bias and the use of quotas. The chapter will also examine the 
validity and reliability of the research methodology, and finally, the chapter will undertake a 
data analysis of the collection of statistical data. For reasons of clarity, the methodology 
chapter outlines how the interviews are conducted and the procedures for locating the sample 
population in the three selected firms. However, the first part of this chapter gives a 
justification for the choice and use of mixed methods instead of the conventional single 
research methodology. 
  
4.2 Research Objectives and research questions:-  
 
The main aim of this research is to investigate and analyse the role and impact of 
Performance Related Pay schemes in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on performance in Saudi 
national firms. The main question created for the research is therefore as follows:- 
What is the impact of PRP on employees’ performance in Saudi national firms in Saudi 
Arabia?   
   In order to answer this question, different theories about PRP have been reviewed, with the 
aim of exploring the impact the PRP system on individual and team performance under the 
influence of different cultures. Many motivational and sociological theories have been 
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reviewed, including agency theory, human capital and various compensation theories. Based 
on this, a number of research variables have been developed as follows: 
 
Performance  Q1: Does the introduction of the PRP system 
increase employees’ performance?  
Q2: Does the introduction of the PRP system 
make employees work harder?  
Q3: Will employees be more highly paid if 
they work harder?  
  
Team work  Q 4: Has the introduction of PRP helped in 
encouraging effective work as part of a team? 
Q 5: Has the introduction of PRP helped in 
unifying the goals of both parties within 
industrial relations?  
 
Culture role  Q 6: How has PRP influenced organizational 
culture?  
Fairness  Q 7: How fair is the PRP scheme from the 
employee’s perspective?  
Feedback  Q 8: How far are employees satisfied with 
the PRP system’s approaches to the formal 
and informal feedback which they receive?  
 
These questions are investigated and addressed in the planning and implementation of the 
research study. However, there are certain complexities to answering these questions, as 
noted in Chapter Two, which means that the application of investigative methods from the 
social sciences must be considered limited in its ability to fully resolve the problems raised. 
For example, the difficulty in how to measure performance in a meaningful way is discussed 
in Section 2.6, and the further difficulty of translating performance at the individual level to 
organisational performance is highlighted in Section 2.10.3. This limits the ability to 
comprehensively address both objective one and the main stated aim of the research. 
Notwithstanding this and other limitations, the research study hopes to cast light on employee 
and management perceptions of these issues. 
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4.3 Theoretical Foundation and Philosophical Stance 
 
Philosophers have been arguing over the relationship between theory, data and knowledge 
for a long time. Researchers such as Bryman (2006) state that thinking through such 
philosophical issues is imperative while visualizing the design of studies in management. If 
this is not done, it is contended that the quality of the research could be seriously 
compromised. Social constructionism and positivism are two opposite views which indicate 
how social science research should be carried out. Social constructionism views ‘reality’ not 
as exterior and objective, but as socially constructed and made meaningful by people. This 
view is represented by an inductive research paradigm which includes the notion of the 
researcher and research process interacting with the area being studied. The positivist 
position is meanwhile of the opinion that the social world lives externally and that properties 
should not be evaluated subjectively through sensation, intuition, or reflection, and that 
objective methods are more appropriate for this purpose. This view of the possibility of 
detachment and objectivity of positivist research is the deductive paradigm, and makes the 
preference quite clear that quantitative methodologies are favoured to explain phenomena. 
Interpretive methods on the other hand are a part of a group of approaches. Social 
constructionism is also a part of this, and depends mostly on qualitative date analysis. It is 
more effective in explaining and gaining a better understanding of human action, which stems 
from the sense that people are influenced by differing circumstances (Bryman, 2006).  
 
The above philosophical positions appear incompatible at first. However, there are several 
management researchers who feel that a middle ground can be found by taking a mixed 
methods approach. They suggest that this has been helpful in giving different points of view 
on the phenomena being explored (Denscombe, 2008; 2010). PRP literature has already 
developed a number of theories. This thesis intends to investigate the real influence of PRP 
systems in national firms in Saudi Arabia, whose pay systems have been explored very little. 
The research objective is concerned with improving insights and understanding through 
collecting rich, appropriate information from a small sample of cautiously chosen cases.  As a 
result, this research paper has preferred the social constructionist stance although the research 
design has also incorporated some points from positivist ideas. The subsequent sections will 
deal with the research design and methodology. 
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4.3.1 Selection of the research methodology:- 
 
There is no one perfect way to conduct social science research. Surveys, experiments, case 
studies, and histories are among the more popular approaches, and each present particular 
benefits and limitations. Three criteria should therefore be kept in mind while selecting the 
most suitable methods: “the type of research question posed, the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioral events, and the degree of focus on contemporary as 
opposed to historical phenomena” (Yin, 2003:5)  
 
These three points have been taken into account while determining the research method used 
in the current study. ‘How,’ has precedence in the form of the research question: “what is the 
performance related pay system’s effect on performance in Saudi Arabian national firms?’’  
 
 
4.4 Mixed Approach Research Methodology 
 
Defining a mixed methods approach is complex, as it has been ascribed many 
meanings which vary depending on the researchers and their field of research. The mixed 
methods approach has become more common in the most recent research where, most of the 
research published within the last 30 years entails the use of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. This process usually focuses on research questions for a real-time background 
understanding of multilevel perceptions and cultural influences while engaging rigorous 
quantitative studies in evaluating the magnitude and consistency of findings. On the other 
hand, thorough qualitative research explores the meaning and understanding of these 
conclusions. According to the European Academic Conference (2006; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2003, p. 11), a mixed methods research design is defined as an analysis which incorporates 
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various qualitative and quantitative approaches in a single project which may involve either a 
qualitative or quantitative theoretical drive. 
According to Donald, Jacobs and Sorensen (2009, p. 559), a mixed methods research 
design combines qualitative and quantitative research techniques in diverse ways, with each 
of the methods adding value to the understanding of the phenomenon. Academics across 
many fields now acknowledge the importance of a mixed methods approach and assert that 
combining many forms of data in a single study is not only legitimate but also more 
preferable. The primary goal of this technique is not to replace qualitative or quantitative 
approaches but, instead, to combine methods in constructive ways which utilize the strengths 
of each other within a single research work. According to Belk (2008, p. 199), the mixed 
methods approach has become a viable research technique which closes that gap between 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Often, mixed research methods are perceived to 
be eclectic, pluralistic and as decreasing traditional dualism. Furthermore, this design is said 
to be pragmatic and led by the research question instead of being controlled by paradigmatic 
postulations (Belk, 2008, p. 199; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). A mixed methods study is 
closely tied to a pragmatic paradigm which engages other elements to permit a practical 
choice of sources and methods required to achieve the intended outcome. 
 
4.5 Research Design and Sampling Technique 
 
 
Yin (2003) has asserted that each single piece of empirical research should have a 
research design which connects the data which are to be gathered to answer the initial 
questions of research. Five elements of a research design are of significance for any case 
study: a) the question, b) its plans, if any, c) its unit(s) of examination, d) the logic relating 
the data to the plans, and e) the criteria for deducing the findings. 
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This study has found the descriptive research design to be more feasible than others 
when conducting the case studies and employing other research techniques for qualitative and 
quantitative research. According to Monsen and Van (2008, p. 5), descriptive analysis is an 
efficient way to gather information used in constructing a hypothesis and suggesting 
relationships between variables. A case study research is descriptive if the data provides the 
details of a person, place, and time and that all these variables are related. Moreover, a 
descriptive case study encompasses correlational studies, case series, surveillance systems, 
case reports, relevant statistics and demographics. 
Primary data was restricted to the three selected firms and only covers the period 
under which the research was scheduled to be conducted, which encompassed December 
2013, January 2014 and February 2014 for companies A, B and C. Secondary research entails 
data that concerns PRP regulations and policies, and in practice were restricted in their 
content owing to the need for firms to preserve their confidentiality in terms of pay strategy. 
For clarity, and especially when addressing the research question of this study, case studies 
will cover three national firms whose operations have been determined to give a good 
background for the research. Selection of study samples usually creates an aspect of bias in 
study design. In order to ensure validity of the findings and assist in drawing conclusions, the 
research overcame this problem by examining companies which have for a long period 
utilized performance related pay determination systems. However, it is important to 
recognize that it is difficult to eliminate the weaknesses associated with historical data, since 
this type of information does not give a typical scenario for the contemporary phenomena. 
4.5.1 Number of Cases 
The most favourable number of cases in research design has long been a matter of 
question. Within this debate, it is frequently considered that single-case designs are mainly 
suitable for totally original, exploratory investigations (Meredith, 1998). In fact, if the 
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number of case studies is low, the scope for better quality of gathered data and intensity of 
observation is increased (Voss et al., 2002). Multiple-case study designs are singled out in 
cases where most of the phenomenon is in the dark, but at least some information is available 
(Meredith, 1998). No conclusion has been reached however about the ideal number of cases, 
as, “single-case designs are vulnerable if only because you will have put all eggs in one 
basket” (Yin, 2003: 53): Thus, multiple case designs are the common choice. Eisenhardt 
(1991: 622) is of the opinion that the optimal number of cases will be based on how much 
knowledge already exists and how much new information can be learned from incremental 
cases.  
 
4.6 Sampling 
There are usually significant numbers of potential interviewees who can qualify to 
take part in a research process. However, only a few people in a large population can usually 
be considered, which raises issues regarding ensuring validity of the research process, 
findings and final claims of the study (Denscombe, 2010). Traditionally, a population sample 
size which is representative of the workers is ideal, although it is problematic to organize the 
study design to include such a significant number. Moreover, a large group of data includes 
many errors and might give insignificant conclusions. Since this study involves a mixed 
method approach, both probabilistic and non-probabilistic techniques were used to identify 
the sample population. Sampling and sample selection is very complex, although choosing an 
appropriate sample is core to the success of any research project. Therefore, the sampling 
method and choice of the sample population should reflect unambiguously the goals of the 
research project. Most feasible probabilistic sampling methods include stratified and random 
sampling techniques, which were integrated here to ensure a quality sample was selected for 
this research. 
These sampling techniques were used to obtain both qualitative and quantitative data. 
The purposive sampling was based on the hierarchical differences between normal personnel 
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and executives and as to the extent to which they are separately impacted by a change in 
firm’s influence on performance related pay determination systems. Slightly different 
questionnaires were used in purposive sampling to obtain special information that might not 
be obtained through examining the study subjects through probabilistic approaches. 
Sample selection was carried out in parts, depending on the sampling technique and 
the target population. First, the participants were grouped into three categories as firm A, B, 
and C, and the total number of workers in each firm was recorded alongside every category. 
The three groups of the sampling population are what is described by the method as sampling 
strata. When a stratified sampling method is used, the study population is usually separated 
into non-overlapping strata (Bell, 2010). Then, the population samples to be involved in the 
research are chosen from each stratum independently. After the groups have been selected 
into the three different strata, random sampling will be used to determine and select specific 
individuals from each stratum. Although this method is known to be biased in choosing 
participants for research, it is the most appropriate for this study. Stratifying a sample and 
then randomly choosing from each stratum usually increases the statistical reliability of the 
probability-based research techniques. In most cases, strata guarantee that there exist some 
differences between any sub-sample groups but it maintains similarities within these sub-
samples. 
Therefore, a sample size of about one hundred from each sampling population was be 
randomly selected and analyzed in order to obtain data to provide a low confidence interval 
and high confidence interval. Access to the employees to request their participation was 
gained through contacts in middle management who had been pre-selected for interview, and 
was done via internal email with this assistance, representing a limitation in the sampling 
technique as it included a middle contact. Out of the total number of employees for each of 
the three firms, only 150 workers from each firm were successfully selected and asked to take 
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part in this research, once all of the participants examined through interviews and 
questionnaires are included. Since face-to-face interviews are known to be costly and time 
consuming, about ten line managers from each firm were interviewed. The small number for 
interviews was decided for the purpose of keeping the whole process within the estimated 
budget and ensuring that the interviews did not delay completion of the study exercise. This 
is common for studies of this type, but may also be regarded as a limitation.  
 
 
4.7 Data Collection 
The quality of the data collected and great caution with regard to ethical issues is what 
makes for good research (Miller, 2012).  The strategy for this research is flexible and able to 
respond to changes throughout the research and develop new shapes of thoughts with regard 
to the ‘what’ being observed. The research is qualitative and driven by work on social 
anthropology focusing on the attachment to people and their actions, what people do and how 
they do it. At the same time, a structured observation is carried out to measure the frequency 
of actions.  By its nature, the framework for this thesis is based on data about labour markets, 
hiring trends and fluctuations, and impacts of performance related pay on employee 
performance in the three selected firms. Hence, the project intends to collect data on 
performance related pay encompassing attitudes, policies and trends for turnover. Three firms 
have been identified which utilize performance related pay systems.  
 
4.7.1 Primary Data 
 
The goal of this thesis is to test the extent to which companies use performance related pay 
determination systems and examine the effect of these on employees’ performance. The 
researcher therefore selected three national firms which are operating systems of PRP in 
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order to influence employee performance. The three kinds of technique used in the 
collection of primary data include observation, questionnaires and interviews. Each 
method has a process by which it is used to conduct the collection of data, and meet the 
objectives which are meant to be met, after the process of data collection. For this research, 
primary data for the organisations selected will be obtained through face-to-face interview 
and questionnaire methods.  
Interview has been deemed to be the most satisfying method as far as the collection of 
primary data within a qualitative approach is concerned. Therefore, face-to-face interview 
was adopted for the study, allowing the researcher to record detailed discussion as well as 
observing facial communication and body language (Moser and Kalton, 1971).  
 
While interviews were conducted with line management to gather their perception of the 
PRP schemes used in their respective companies, questionnaires were utilised to record the 
views of front-line staff. Questionnaires represent a systematic approach to data 
assimilation from a group of participants as a sample of the larger population being studied 
(Hartley and Barling, 1998). They are formed from a series of question in a written 
document, and may be completed with or without the researcher’s presence. In this study, 
questionnaires were employed with general staff to investigate the way in which such 
individuals experienced and perceived the company’s PRP scheme. These questionnaires 
were distributed and received back via the firms’ internal email system. 
4.7.2 Secondary data collection 
  
Case study data collection has certain flexibility as it permits the scope to utilize 
multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003: 97). Different methods and multiple resources 
were put to use for the data collection to accomplish better outcomes from joining lines of 
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enquiry. Apart from structured interviews and questionnaires, this meant that documentary 
sources were also explored. Documents can be defined as a coded and physicalized or 
electronically recorded expression of human perceptions, which may then be replicated, 
distributed and adapted (Duffy, 2010). While there were limitations of the documentation 
which could be obtained for this research, due to the concerns of sensitivity and 
commercial confidentiality among the participating organisations, nonetheless, some 
important documents relating to the structure and administration of performance related 
pay within each of the three companies were accessed. This included individual and 
organizational payment sheets and guidelines for performance assessment. 
 
 
4.8 Questionnaire design:-   
 
The questionnaire used was semi-structured, and within it, participants were asked 
to answer questions targeting major aspects of PRP as identified from the literature review 
in Chapter Two, and covering areas such as individual performance, team performance, 
bias and the use of quotas. As part of this, strenuous efforts went into the avoidance of 
ambiguous or imprecise language (Bell, 2010). During the period spent designing the 
questionnaires, the preparation phased entailed creating a draft of research questions 
divided into various sections. First, the questionnaire design had an introductory section 
aimed at motivating respondents. This section also sought to explain the purpose of the 
inquiry, and provide instructions and researcher contact information for the participants. In 
addition, the design included a background information section, which had general 
questions asking for the background of the participants, including years of experience in 
their job. 
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The next section was about the participants’ experience with PRP, asking the 
participant a total of 15 questions regarding the effect of PRP upon performance, teamwork 
and multitasking. The last section contained open-ended questions about PRP, in which the 
employees were able to say anything they wanted in relation to the system. As regards the 
previous sections, the researcher designed a list of questions which call for certain answers on 
a scale of 1, with the meaning of strongly agree, to 5, meaning strongly disagree. The initial 
questionnaire was written in English, translated to Arabic and then translated back to English 
to ensure accuracy: this method is known as the back translation technique.     
 
4.8.1 Questionnaire Deployment 
The study was administered through the deployment of self-completion forms 
designed to be answered by the workers selected through sampling. These were emailed to 
participants via internal email, but completion could also be done through a website link 
which was given via a web provider service (SurveyMonkey). A time extension of one week 
was allowed to respondents to reflect the fact that they might have tight schedule. The steps 
considered before deployment included; questionnaire design, conducting a pilot test, 
revising the questionnaires and designing the final questionnaire. After the above steps, the 
questionnaires were ready for deployment. Effective distribution procedures were developed 
before survey deployment, and involved the use of contacts in the middle management tier of 
the organisation to assist with distribution and collection routes. After the questionnaire was 
ready, it was emailed to the participants using the internal company network.  
 
The disadvantages of email and online survey include the possibility of a lower 
response rate than for interview, as well as difficulty in determining consent, and security 
issues with data sending and storage (Bell, 2010).  However, the convenience of distribution 
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as well as ease of completion for the participant outweighed these disadvantages in the 
current study, particularly considering constraints of time.   
4.7.2 The survey  
 
The respondents to the survey were assured that their answers would be processed 
confidentially and that no identifying information would be asked for, in order to secure the 
protection of their privacy. Additionally, it was communicated to participants that the data 
provided would be securely stored and not used for any other purpose than the research 
project described to them. The letter enclosed with the survey questionnaire is included in 
Appendix 4, and the survey itself is reproduced in Appendix 5.   
 
 
 
Out of 856 surveys sent, a total of 494 were returned within the deadline, and this response 
rate may be viewed as a limitation of the study. 
  
4.9 Interviews 
Preparation for interviews is an essential and basic requirement for all researchers 
using this technique for data gathering, and usually comes after identification of an 
appropriate research design. This entails developing and phrasing the interview questions. 
According to Bell (2010), the phrasing of the final questions to be asked in the actual 
interviews calls for careful attention, with interview questions ideally being simple and 
succinct. Another consideration when planning open-ended questions is to phrase these in 
such a way as to engaging help participants feel free to give information about the topic in the 
manner of their choice (Bryman, 2006). This can be achieved through designing an interview 
guide which will act as a checklist during the preparation process and before the interviews 
are administered. Preparation for interviews must consider issues known to occur at this 
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stage. The first issue requires the researcher to decide how to deal with the interviewees and 
persuade them to take part in the study willingly, and this happens through the use of an 
advance letter. The second issue which a researcher needs to consider prior to administering 
interviews is the preparation of equipment for gathering data. The essential resources which 
will be relevant here include the interview guide and equipment for recording any audio 
information. Other issues that demand to be considered by the researcher include the need to 
establish a relationship with the interviewee and finally the transition process from 
interviewing to transcription.   
Furthermore, the prior interview process requires the researcher to recognize the 
significance of interviews and the entire process before administering interview and pilot 
testing. Before conducting the main interviews, the research should undertake pilot 
interviews, which include a number of interview sessions to test whether the research 
questions can be addressed through the designed interview questions to provide answers that 
allow the research to remain close to its objectives. It is important to ensure the survey is 
tested with a faction of trial participants whose characteristics conform to the actual study. A 
comprehensive pilot interview process gives researchers extra hands-on experience and even 
additional familiarity with the project (Bell, 2010). Ideally, understanding the pilot testing 
process and materials helps in understanding whether interviewees will understand the 
interview questions. The primary purpose in conducting the pilot interviews, therefore, is to 
inspect and revise the questions and the order of these questions and also test if the interview 
content is acceptable. The pilot interviews were carried out with a sample of workers working 
in different companies other than the three chosen firms, and who were known to the 
researcher and thus willing to assist in the research process in this way. Afterward, the results 
indicated that some minor modifications needed to be made prior to the main interviews, and 
these alterations were carried out accordingly.   
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Interviews are considered to be time consuming and additionally may be subject to 
bias: therefore, this research contains interviews with a necessarily limited sample of line 
managers in each of the three case study companies, with key management staff across the 
chosen sectors who are in a position to assess employee performance.  The selection of 
managers was restricted by their availability, and the access agreement in place with each 
company also stipulated that the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants would be 
carefully respected, in line with the ethical parameters imposed by the University for 
research. Thus, interviewees have been anonymized and any identifying details not included 
in the research thesis. The interviews were all carried out between December 2013 and 
January 2014, and were conducted in the head offices of the respective companies. Purposive 
and snowball sampling were used, as will be discussed later in the chapter. The table included 
in Appendix 6 gives details of the final interviews conducted. 
 
 
Each interview considers the question of assessment in relation to impartiality and bias (if 
any), as well as eliciting a general description of what is expected on the employee’s part. 
Also, the interviewer enquired about how rating is carried out in order to ensure this 
knowledge of the topic. The following strengths and weaknesses of interview in gaining 
appropriate data were also considered: 
 
 
Strengths and weaknesses of interview methods:  
 
 
Strength  Weakness  
Focused on the research question  
Insightful: able to provide perceived 
indications.   
Bias due to misunderstanding 
 
 
Bias  in responses 
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The final questions used for the interviews are provided below: 
 
Interview questions:  
 
1- Do you agree with the idea of linking pay to performance?  
2- How was the PRP system implemented? 
3- What were the most difficult aspects of implementing PRP?  
4- Has the PRP system helped to unite the goals of employees and the firm?  
5- How is the performance of the employees evaluated under the PRP scheme?  
6- As a section manager, what do you think of the introduction of the PRP system?  
A-  Can employees improve their performance by working harder?  
B- If they work harder, will they receive higher pay?  
C- What do the employees think of the additional pay they can receive through working 
harder?  
7-  As a section manager, has the introduction of the PRP system helped you to manage 
the employees?  
8-  Has the introduction of PRP helped you to motivate employees in management 
positions?  
9-  Has the introduction of the PRP scheme helped to encourage employees to achieve 
higher performance?  
10-  How important to you is the bonus you receive through the PRP scheme?  
11- Has the introduction of the PRP system helped to reduce any unwanted behaviour 
among colleagues in your sector?  
12-  Has the introduction of PRP scheme had any impact on cooperation between 
different groups of employees in your sector?  
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13- Has the introduction of the PRP scheme had any impact on competition among 
colleagues in the same section?  
14-  How were you (or any of your employees) involved in PRP’s implementation?  
15-  From your point of view, what were the achievements and what were the problems 
occurring during the introduction of the PRP scheme?  
16- From your point of view, what effect has the introduction of the PRP scheme had on 
the employees’ performance?  
17- From your point of view, how can the PRP system in SEC be improved?  
18- Do you have any further comments? 
 
During interviews, participants were asked follow-up questions where appropriate to prompt 
further information to be given, and the interviewer allowed participants time to develop their 
responses or bring in new ideas.   
 
4.10 Validity 
  
The concept of validity is ubiquitous in all research projects and this includes the 
fields of social science and business management (Denscombe, 2010). Validity in research 
describes the degree to which the research method and tools used in the project obtain or 
describe the findings and results that they are supposed to. According to Bell (2010), validity 
may be somewhat vague and hard to determine, but can be assessed by whether the weight 
provided by the interpretation of the results is able to be borne by the evidence provided 
therein. In doing this, it ensures that the research findings provide trustworthiness and 
credibility with reference to the activities of the study. 
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Internal validity attains credibility for research by showing the relationship between 
two or more variables of the project. This relationship may be of a causal manner, asserting 
the fact that the occurrence of one variable leads to the occurrence of the other. At the 
beginning of the project, it is only hypothesized that one variable is causative to another, but 
attainment of internal validity by the findings confirms this hypothesis (Denscombe, 2010). 
Strategies such as triangulation, or studying the same phenomenon using multiple research 
methods, member checks to obtain the informants’ perspective, prolonged contact, 
reflexivity, which enables chronological attention to contexts of knowledge construction in 
the research, and saturation are employed and described to assure internal validity. There are 
several threats that can distort internal validity, leading to untrustworthiness of the findings. 
These include: history effects in terms of independent events which affect the credibility of 
the findings, maturation in cases where the study is based on factors which are subject to 
temporal change, instrumentation where the tools of research are distorted, experimental 
mortality when participants drop out of the study due to one reason or another and causal 
time order which can make it difficult to ascertain whether the independent variable caused 
the dependent variable or the dependent variable caused the independent variable 
(Denscombe, 2010). 
External validity is also a crucial concept which many research projects seek to attain. 
This is because it enables the application of the findings of the research in other fields that are 
not necessarily equal to the ones in which the study was conducted (Yin, 2011). This helps in 
the transferability and generalization of the findings of the research. This generalization can 
be generalization within the population, in which case the findings are applied to the 
immediate population which bears similar qualities and characteristics, such as age and level 
of education as the population of the study.  The generalization can also be applied across 
populations in which the population differs from the study population in terms of structure 
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and composition, across contexts and settings which may include geographical locations, 
cultures and industries, across treatments in which case a the populations differ in terms of 
the conditions and circumstances in which they are put in and across time in which there is 
temporal difference between the study findings and the application of the findings in the new 
population (Bryman, 2006). There are a number of threats to making a research externally 
valid which include: selection bias, history effects and maturation highlighted above and 
constructs, methods and confounding factors which limit the extent to which the research can 
be projected to other particular groups. In light of these considerations, it is generally 
accepted that although the case study approach can provide rich information with which to 
support and extend theory, external validity is necessarily limited in this approach and 
generalizations are often employed here to support or expand theory rather than to a 
particular broader population (Yin, 2013).  
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4.11 Reliability   
Reliability is an important element of confidence in the findings of a research project, 
and is mandatory if the findings are to be applied more widely outside the immediate 
confines of the study. Reliability is described as the degree to which a study method or tool 
used in research provides similar outcomes under different conditions (Bell, 2010). This 
concept is a prerequisite for the validity described above, such that a research work must be 
reliable in order to be termed valid, but reliable research is not necessarily valid (Denscombe, 
2008). The two concurrently lead to an increase in transparency and minimize the chance of 
bias in a research project (Singh, 2014). 
 Any data collected, as in the current study through the questionnaire and interview, 
must be critically evaluated and the reliability of that data robustly examined for (Moser 
and Kalton, 1971).  For any measurement procedure used in research there is a degree to 
which the measured score varies from the actual score. This variance is due to the error 
component of the used measurement procedure which can be positive or negative and 
widely varies among various procedures. Depending on the approach used, one method 
may emerge as more reliable than another with a larger component of error (Denscombe, 
2008). 
 
The reliability of a research project is faced by many threats which can affect 
consistency of the findings by contributing to the error component of the result.  This affects 
the consistency of the values obtained by a particular research method. The threats can be 
from the researcher or observer, environmental changes and participant changes (Yin, 2011). 
The researcher contributes to the error when the personal influence of the researcher or 
observer leads to different values obtained by the same research method. . 
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4.12 Bias 
Research work in most cases contains bias in the information or conclusion drawn 
from the findings of the research (Bell, 2010). According to Creswell (2014), this occurrence 
may be with the researcher’s knowledge but in most cases it occurs without the researcher’s 
knowledge or willingness. Its description in the context of research can be said to be the 
exertion of a researcher’s influence on the project in order to influence the desired outcome. 
This is usually due to a prejudiced approach to the research such that it leads to a distortion of 
judgment and thereafter an unfair result. The fairness of the result can be difficult to assess as 
what may be deemed fair from the researcher’s point of view may be seen as unfair from 
another party’s view point. A research may be subject to a higher degree of bias if the 
researcher has a strong feeling or conviction of a particular topic they are conducting the 
research in (Bryman, 2006). 
Among the bias types is design bias, which can be introduced into a research work 
when the researcher fails to take into consideration bias which is inherent to a project. It may 
not be possible to completely eliminate bias from a research project but this inherent bias 
must be taken into consideration by the researcher. Bias can also occur when during the 
analysis of the research findings, the researcher does not factor in the initial counter thoughts 
which he/she had at the beginning of the project (Shuttleworth, 2015). Sampling bias occurs 
during the selection of the informants with which the research is to be conducted. It can be an 
omission bias in which case the bias is introduced by omission of a particular group due to 
inferiority of the overall population size which leads to unfair representation of the 
population. In most research projects, omission bias is not easy to avoid and must therefore 
be taken into account when analyzing samples. Sampling bias can also be inclusive bias, 
which happens when samples are selected for convenience, in which case the researcher picks 
samples that he/she feels will give an outcome which is in line with their opinion and line of 
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thought. Other types of bias include: procedural bias, which occurs when time constraints 
pushes the researcher to make conclusions on the research; measurement bias, which arises 
when there is distortion of judgment during data collection; interviewer bias, which occurs 
due to influence of the interviewer or interviewee on the research findings; response bias, in 
which the informant gives information which they think the researcher wants; and reporting 
bias, which occurs when the researcher express their influence during the dissemination of 
the findings in the literature (Shuttleworth, 2015). 
Although bias in research in most cases occurs unconsciously, the researcher ensures 
that it is avoided as much as possible and the inherent bias taken into consideration when 
putting down the findings of the research (Creswell, 2014). 
 
4.13 Ethical Impact of the Research 
In order to accomplish the intended study objectives, it is necessary for this research 
project to recognize the moral impact that the final study might have on the ethical rights of 
the participants. According to Bell (2010), the regulation of disclosure of personal 
information obtained during the final research is also imperative for this type of study project. 
Furthermore, assessment of risks and benefits can also play a role in maintaining the ethical 
standards for the research and its participants. Ethical considerations also entail careful 
evaluation of risks and benefits, and attention to the well-being of the subjects participating in 
the study (Miller et al., 2012). According to Miller et al. (2012), ethically responsible 
research calls for the researcher to set out different levels of involvement in the study, 
especially at beginning of the project. If not well addressed for its ethical ramifications, even 
well-stated research may result in harm to its subjects (Bell, 2010). Hence, many incidences 
show a choice between the integrity of a study and ethical obligations of the research, but it is 
advisable for researchers always to follow ethical obligations with human subject-oriented 
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research. Furthermore, the rapport of researchers also helps in familiarizing them with the 
field of study and participants as a way of solving the concern of invading the privacy of the 
participants and their culture.  Therefore, this research has taken great care regarding this 
issue: it has tried to made employees at lower levels anonymous by not requiring any 
information which might cover their identity, and the researcher has taken the necessary 
measures to prevent unethical use of the research, in line with the regulations and policies of 
the University of Wolverhampton’s ethical approval committee.  
 
4.14 Research Limitations 
Overall, the research methodology can be said to have been carefully planned, and has been 
justified in the preceding sections of this chapter. However, as with any research study, the 
methodology encountered certain limitations in planning and implementation. First, as 
discussed in Section 4.2, the literature lacks an accepted format for measuring employee 
performance, and as detailed in Section 3.8.4, the companies which form the cases for 
investigation take different approaches to performance assessment, and this renders it 
difficult to address the first objective of the research, which asks whether the introduction of 
the PRP system increases employees’ performance. Further, as previously documented, 
difficulties were encountered in obtaining a clear picture of the PRP scheme in place at each 
organisation, due to commercial sensitivity and confidentiality considerations. The access 
agreements reached with the firms also limited the ways in which the researcher could make 
contact with employees, as this was done through line managers, which might introduce bias 
through the influence of these managers or through self-selection bias if employees chose not 
to respond due to trust issues. In fact, the response rate in the survey may be considered a 
limitation of the study, although it is common for the distribution methods used (email and 
online survey) to attract a low response rate, and in this context the rate of return may be 
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viewed as reasonable. Access to such a large number of employees and interviews with line 
managers in three sizeable organisations may be considered as a strength of the study, and 
was achieved through development of contacts within the firms and the kind co-operation of 
the organisations involved.   
 
4.15  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out the research methodology used in gathering and analyzing the 
primary data for this study. An inductive approach was followed for the study, in which 
socially constructed realities are accepted. This choice flows from the nature of the research 
problem, which presents a little-explored area in terms of pay systems in Saudi Arabia, and in 
which a detailed picture of the case study cases was preferred to yield maximum relevant 
data.  Having said this, a pragmatic perspective was also adopted, allowing for elements of 
positivism also to be reflected through the incorporation of quantitative approaches also. 
The research tools were described in this chapter, with a discussion of the 
questionnaire and interview designed for the study. Detailed consideration was also given to 
sampling approaches, validity, reliability, bias and ethical impact for this research. The 
chapter which follows will present and discuss the findings collected from the three case 
study companies, with reference to the discussion of the literature chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS AND 
ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present and analyse the findings from original research carried within three 
case study companies in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Industrial Development Fund  (SIDF), Saudi 
Telecoms Company (STC) and Saudi Electricity Company (SEC). The research consisted of 
a mixed methods approach combining interviews with line management responsible for 
administering the PRP system with their subordinates, and a survey questionnaire distributed 
to lower level employees whose pay was affected by the system. This was conducted in each 
case with the aim of evaluating how far the PRP scheme was successful in each of the 
organisations under study. All of the research was carried out in 2014. 
 
This chapter is divided into sections by theme or section of the survey distributed. The 
themes selected, as identified from the relevant literature reviewed in Chapter Two. These 
firstly include the pay performance link, encompassing views on the power of monetary 
reward as a motivational force in the workplace, perceptions of a link between pay and 
performance, and the effects perceived from the application of PRP on the individual 
behaviours and performance of the workers. This is intended to test the premise of the power 
of extrinsic motivations to affect performance as per expectancy theory and also the ability to 
translate this into practical-level success in the given contexts. The second theme relates to 
perceptions of fairness and transparency, at system-wide level in terms of general 
application and appeals process, as well as in relation to favouritism by those implementing 
the scheme; teamwork, and PRP’s impact on colleague relations. Fairness or perceptions of 
such has been given a prominent place in the literature on PRP as a clear and debatably 
difficult to achieve basis for positive impacts to be made to greater extent than harmful 
effects (Belfield & Marsden, 2003; Kang & Yanadori, 2011). The next theme to be 
considered is organisation of work, as well as clear transmission of objectives and roles, 
which is both considered in the literature as a potential direct objective for PRP and has 
relevance for its feed-in to performance alignment. Fourthly, primary evidence was gathered 
on feedback and recognition for employees, in terms of both its implication for directing 
employee motivation and effort and in ensuring that PRP is perceived as bringing recognition 
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based on actual work. Fifth, the study investigates data on the theme of the amount of 
performance-based reward as a proportion of pay, as discussed in the literature as critical to 
impact; and finally, overall satisfaction is considered, drawing both a broad picture of the 
effects of the scheme from the employee’s point of view as well as a rich commentary on 
various aspects of implementation as well as an evaluation of the PRP approach in general 
from managers.   
 
For each of the companies with whom the research was undertaken, the results of the survey 
are presented alongside information from the interviews, and the findings are also considered 
in light of relevant concepts and viewpoints from the literature review presented in Chapter 
Three. Salient points from literature are not repeated in each case: rather they are made where 
it is felt to be most relevant and summarised later in the concluding sections of the chapter. 
 
 
5.2 Data Collection 
 
The research at SIDF was carried out during January and February 2014, at the main 
headquarters of the firm in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Survey questionnaire was sent out to lower 
level employees by email via the HR department, while interviews for the research were 
conducted with line managers in their workplace, with the scheduling arrangements 
facilitated by the HR manager. The research at STC was carried out during January and 
February, 2014, at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Survey questionnaire was sent out to lower level 
employees directly to their e-mail, while interviews for the research were conducted with line 
managers with in the firm regional headquarter. The findings are presented below and 
analysed in conjunction with relevant literature. The results of the SEC survey and interviews 
are presented in this section. The research at SEC was carried out during December, January 
and February 2014, at company headquarters, Saudi Arabia. Survey questionnaire was sent 
out to lower level employees via e-mail, while interviews for the research were conducted 
with line managers at their offices and the time was fixed by the quality management. 
 
The context of each of the three organisations is unique, and therefore each presents a 
different environment for the application of the PRP schemes, which also differ in important 
respects: Kessler (1994) and Wilkinson and Dundon (2006) advocate the tailoring of payment 
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schemes to suit the organisation, although it is unclear in these instances how the designs of 
the schemes were arrived at. According to Armstrong and Murliss (2007), political will also 
plays a part in PRP implementation, Saudi Arabia is likely no exception to this. Overall, 
although the cases differ, similarities emerge in the results across them, and this may be 
attributed to commonalities, whether universal or resulting from the national context and 
culture.  In particular, money is seen as a central motivational force, ad reward is perceived to 
enhance performance, but the validity of the connection between assessment and actual 
performance is not supported. The findings are presented in sections by theme and analysed 
in conjunction with relevant literature. 
 
5.3 Pay-Performance Link 
 
This section will examine the responses of the survey sample for each company regarding the 
link between pay and performance, and will encompass findings from the first three questions 
included in the survey. Relevant findings from interviews will also be considered here. 
 
5.3.1 Money as the most important motivator to work 
The first statement presented to respondents regards the importance of money as a motivator 
for work. Participants were asked how far they agreed or disagreed with the statement that 
money was the most important motivational factor for work. The SIDF sample responds 
positively to this statement, as set out in the table below. 
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Table 5.1 SIDF: Money as a motivator 
The most important motivator to work is money 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
52 88 0 18 3 
32.30% 54.66% 0% 11.18% 1.86% 
  
The findings related to the first statement in the survey reveal that a strong majority of 
respondents strongly agree or agree that money is the most important motivational factor in 
the workplace, with 140 individuals choosing one of those two options. Meanwhile, only a 
small minority, at 21 respondents, disagrees or strongly disagrees. There are no responses for 
‘don’t know’, indicating a certainty of opinion on this question.  The responses of the sample 
would seem to support the company’s intention to utilize financial reward as a lever to 
increase motivation, although the perception that money motivates does not in itself assist in 
evaluating the effectiveness of attempts to do this through PRP. The perception of money as 
the prime motive force in work seems to reflect a view as seen in PRP literature that reward 
affects behaviour or individual performance in a way which is meaningful for organisational 
performance (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Pfeffer, 1998; Rigby, 2001). This view is however at 
odds with the notion held by the humanist school that pay cannot influence motivation, as 
supported partially by the work of Yuan et al. (2013). However, the views expressed by the 
sample at the least suggest that employees would be receptive to schemes attempting to 
motivate through pay. 
 
Information was also gathered from interviews which falls under the theme of money as a 
motivator. Respondents’ views as given in the interview seem to also support the key 
importance of money in motivating employees, as exemplified by respondent 1, who states, 
“Yes more, the goal is money… the most important one at least”. This respondent therefore 
implies the existence of other motivational factors, but places money as the primary one. This 
is confirmed by respondent 11, who cites money as “a motivator for an employee”. 
Respondent 3 emphasizes this view, saying, “definitely, anyone says otherwise isn’t telling 
you the truth”, while respondent 9 elaborates that money is “the most important aspect for the 
employees and us the management and everyone I believe”.  However, respondent 3 adds a 
qualification here in the case of the pay for performance scheme: “in general yes, but as you 
told me earlier that your research is about bonus schemes, I think it makes more trouble for 
the employees rather than making them perform better.” Here, the respondent appears to 
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doubt the ability of PRP as a lever to influence performance in the way employers might 
wish.  
 
The findings from the question regarding the importance of money as a motivator for work 
showed strong support for this. Participants were asked how far they agreed or disagreed with 
the statement that money was the most important motivational factor for work. The responses 
of the STC sample are set out in the table below. 
Table 5.2 STC: Money as a motivator 
The most important motivator to work is money 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
69 82 3 20 11 
37.30% 44.28% 1.62% 10.8% 5.94% 
 
The table above shows that a clear majority of respondents agree or strongly agree that the 
most important motivator to work is money, with 82 and 69 respectively. In comparison, only 
20 disagree and 11 strongly disagree, while just 3 do not know. As with SIDF, the results 
here appear to underscore the importance of money as a motivator, and do not reflect theories 
of the importance or existence of intrinsic motivation, although the nature of the research 
approach in the questionnaire does not allow for more detailed comment or justification of 
answers from the employees.   
 
Information was also sought from management interviewees regarding money as a motivator. 
While there is general agreement in the interviews with management on this also, for 
example with respondent 12 stating that money is “one of the motivators for employees and 
that’s the goal behind a performance related pay system”, one respondent posits an 
alternative view for motivational reward, suggesting that “it is easier to find another method 
to reward employees better than money... you pay them holidays, employees love to have 
holidays so this could be a better way for it” (respondent 4). This appears to correspond with 
the ‘gift’ approach to reward as proposed by Frey, Homberg and Osterloh (2012) as avoiding 
negative impact on intrinsic motivation seen in traditional PRP, and endorsed by Bryson and 
Freeman (2014) as a link to performance. While this may be a viable alternative to the PRP 
system in place, no example of such an approach is contained within this study for 
comparison. Meanwhile, another respondent highlights family example and social obligation 
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as being equally valid bases for working motivation, considering that “everyone has his own 
motive that makes him come to work, I can’t speak about others but for me I am here for 
money and for other reasons. A man without work is nothing, so it’s important that you set an 
example to your sons and to other young people” (respondent 2). Others however underscore 
the key place which money occupies:  “If you have a better incentive please let us know 
about it, but from what I know, money is the most important incentive” (respondent 7), and 
this view appears to chime with the results of the questionnaire.   
  
The findings from SEC on the first question are shown in the table below:  
Table 5.3 SEC: Money as a motivator 
The most important motivator to work is money 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
76 56 0 12 4 
51.35% 37.84% 0% 8.11% 2.7% 
 
As shown in the table, a clear majority of respondents agree or strongly agree that the most 
important motivator to work is money, with 56 and 76 respectively, and a combined total of 
132 out of 148. Meanwhile, only 12 disagree and 4 strongly disagree: just over 10% of 
respondents. This tallies with the responses of the other two case studies and support the 
company’s aims in using financial reward as a lever to increase motivation, although the 
perception that money motivates does not in itself endorse the role of PRP in doing so. The 
perception of money as the central motivator in work seems to reflect a view as seen in PRP 
literature that reward affects behaviour or individual performance in a way which is 
meaningful for organisational performance (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Pfeffer, 1998; Rigby, 
2001). This view is disputed by the humanist school which holds that pay cannot influence 
motivation, and ignores intrinsic motivation, as supported partially by the work of Yuan et al. 
(2013). However, the views expressed by the sample at the least suggest that employees 
would be receptive to schemes attempting to motivate through pay. 
 
Management interviews held at SEC also explored the role of financial reward as a potential 
motivational tool. In relation to this and implementation of PRP at SEC, a management 
participant in the interviews considers that significant difference in monetary reward between 
grades at the company, “makes competition between the employees because everyone wants 
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it” (respondent 6). This suggests that money is generally seen as a strong motivator. 
Respondent 10 reinforces this view of financial reward as fundamental, feeling that “money 
attribution is very important in securing employees’ motivation to work harder. Money is why 
employees are here in the first place: with no money, no one will work”. Respondent 11 is 
also unequivocal that “there is no comparison, since the establishment of the system everyone 
competes to get the bonus”. However, Respondent 8 places monetary reward in a wider 
context of conditions for employees to feel valued:  
 
“Yes, I think [that money is important], but more than money, there are things which need to 
be given to the employees to make them feel important to the company. For example, 
recognition of their achievements and rewarding them with vacations. Some employees that 
we have prefer the vacations over money. I’m not saying that money is not important, of 
course, but there are more motivational things can be given to the employees who may be 
more successful in ensuring the employees’ motivation for work and to come to work 
motivated”.   
 
Respondent 7 meanwhile places emphasis on working conditions, stating that money is 
important “along with other things…such as if you’re talking about a desk job money is 
important, but we also have electricians who go to fix large  electricity generators, so other 
things are important such as providing them with safety equipment as well training them to 
avoid danger”.   
 
One respondent however is unsure about the primary power of monetary reward to impact 
upon motivation, stating that “even with the money we pay to the employees we have, you can 
see that many of employees are not motivated to work” (respondent 2).  It may be taken from 
this that in the view of the respondent, without intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation 
cannot be effectively applied (Beer and Katz, 2002). 
 
Thus, the responses from each company broadly concur in identifying money as a prime 
motivator in work, albeit with the caveat that this may not work for everyone. The general 
perception is in line with the use of expectancy theory to support PRP. Also, no mention is 
made of issues such as misalignment of goals to achieve reward, as considered by Bellfield 
and Marsden (2003).  
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5.3.2 Perception of a link between pay and performance 
 
 
The second statement presented to respondents sought to identify whether there existed a 
perception of a link between pay and performance. While each organisation operates a PRP 
scheme, the extent of the linkage of reward to performance cannot be assumed. Participants 
were asked to agree or disagree that pay was linked to performance in the company. The 
responses of the SIDF sample mainly agree with this statement, as set out in the table below. 
Table 5.4 SIDF: Pay-performance link 
Pay is linked to performance: 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
74 71 3 8 5 
45.96% 44.02% 1.86% 4.96% 3.1% 
 
In terms of the connection between pay and performance, 74 respondents strongly agree and 
71 agree that pay is linked to performance. A far smaller number, 8 and 5 respondents 
respectively, disagree or strongly disagree. An overwhelming majority of survey respondents 
therefore view performance and pay as being linked. Thus, the sample seems to support the 
basic premise that performance is linked to pay, although this type of information does not 
include reasons for views. 
 
Information was gathered from interviews regarding the pay for performance link also. 
However, the results herein are far more mixed than for those of the survey questionnaire 
conducted with employees. In fact, there is some ambiguity on this issue when considered by 
the SIDF interviewees. On the face of it, many of the respondents seem to agree with the 
notion of a clear and logical link, with statements being made such as:  “Yes, the only way to 
motivate employees... you work more, you get tired, so your reward becomes more” 
(respondent 8), which appear to link greater effort on the part of the employees to greater 
reward as a part of the scheme, while not directly addressing the performance factor in terms 
of output but rather looking at input. This is seen also in another respondent’s perception of 
this link, which he describes as occurring, “because it make employees work harder and it 
gives the employees a motivator” (respondent 5).  
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One of the interviewees goes further, in asserting that the actual practices of SIDF with 
regard to pay determination upholds this linkage, stating that the system within the company 
“works based on two features: performance and linking the work throughout the year” 
(respondent 4). However, several of the interviewees cast doubt on the extent to which the 
notional link between pay and performance as presented in policy is actually implemented 
within SIDF, with one individual commenting as follows: “That’s in theory, but in practice 
and from experience it does not have a direct link to performance” (respondent 2). This 
response brings to mind the criticism of expectancy theory, which generally underlies 
assumptions of the performance- pay link, by Kang and Yanadori (2011) in that there is not 
theoretical relation between this theory and actual practice in terms of how PRP can be 
implemented so as to harness reward as a lever for performance.  
 
Further, when considering decisions taken by managers regarding bonus payments, the link 
also appears to be weak or even non-existent: “The determination of the bonus is not set by 
the direct manager and on unknown bases” (respondent 2). This casts doubt on the practical 
steps taken by the company to set up and maintain a performance-pay link. Meanwhile, 
another respondent considers that the pay-performance link is present but is not effective in 
distinguishing between levels of performance which fall in the middle of the spectrum, 
commenting that “the system can recognise the difference between the very bad and the very 
good but leaves most of the employees in a grey area” (respondent 8). Another interviewee 
expresses confusion with the workings of the system and asserts that the performance 
assessments do not appear to influence pay outcomes: “I don’t know how it works, and when 
I rate my employees the rating does not mean anything because they have different 
compensation” (respondent 6).   
From the above, an interesting picture emerges, in that the employees, as represented by the 
survey sample, express a belief that their pay is linked to performance, and indeed the pay 
system contains within it a process of performance measurement, and yet managers reveal 
that the system may not actually be used in a way that creates a genuine link between bonus 
payments and performance ratings. This is worrying in the light of Belfield and Marsden’s 
(2003) view that only accurate evaluation of and fitting reward for performance will result in 
enhancing employee performance and organisational performance as a whole. They further 
state that where this is not in place, pay based on input is more beneficial.   
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Meanwhile, respondent 7 seems to reject the pay-performance link as it does not encompass 
effort, and sees no link with effort and pay under the pay scheme, “because linking the hard 
work of the employees to a financial fee is not the overall goal unless every one rewarded as 
the same but if you link money to some and ignore others then you’ll have a problem as the 
what we have at the end of each year”. This suggests that expectancy theory’s conditions of 
linking effort to performance and performance on to pay, as described by Lunenberg (2011), 
are not linked as the theory would expect at some point in the chain. Conversely however, 
respondent 9 puts forward a belief in the operationality of the system, stating that, “if you link 
the pay the employees get to their achievements in work then you’ll see competition as to who 
works better because everyone wants to get paid better”.  
 
Table 5.6 The responses of the STC sample to the statement on whether a link is perceived between pay and 
performance are set out in the table below: Table 5 STC: Pay-performance link 
Pay is linked to performance: 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
56 72 7 40 10 
30.27% 38.88% 3.78% 21.6% 5.4% 
 
From the STC sample, 56 respondents strongly agree and 72 agree that pay is linked to 
performance. However, 40 disagree and 10 strongly disagree, creating a larger proportion 
who disagree compared with the SEC and SIDF samples. Only 7 respondents out of the 185 
surveyed do not know.   Although it is not possible to follow up this result due to the nature 
of the research approach followed with employees in this study, this finding suggests that 
PRP is not an element in the conditions of the workforce as a whole, or that if it is, it is not 
widely publicised as such. Clearly, where pay is not considered by workers to be linked to 
performance, the scheme in such cases cannot be considered to achieve motivational or other 
aims. 
 
Information was also collected from management interviewees regarding the link between 
pay and performance as established at the company. A description of the system of reward in 
place at STC is provided by an interview respondent as follows: 
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“Well, the system we adopt in the company is what known as the bells system, in which you 
have a percentage of each classification of the employees, for example, 5% 15% 6% and the 
like and then depending on their rating they have their bonus which is different to the end of 
the year rise in salary” (respondent 1).  While the scheme outlined appears to include an 
element of reward for performance, the use of this approach in practice has doubt cast upon it 
by some interviewees however. For example, respondent 1 comments on the system’s ability 
to reward performance thus: 
“Well it’s supposed to be but you know you Arabian fellows, they don’t abide by the system”.  
This comment implies that the cultural context of the organisation does not allow for 
effective implementation of PRP, as it is perhaps not aligned with cultural preferences for 
ways of working within that context. Another respondent is more direct about the linking of 
pay to performance in the company: “Unfortunately, it’s not true” (respondent 4), while 
respondent 8 states that “it’s not always the case because the system is making more difficult 
decisions and makes the job more difficult for me”.  This dissatisfaction with the system may 
also imply that adjustment to this approach over traditional relations and approaches presents 
difficulties for managers and staff. The doubts expressed here may also explain why over one 
quarter of the survey sample do not perceive a link between pay and performance. 
 
The results on perceptions of the pay-performance link for SEC are set out in the table below: 
Table 5.7 SEC: Pay-performance link 
Pay is linked to performance: 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
44 84 0 8 12 
29.73% 56.76% 0% 5.4% 8.11% 
 
The link between pay and performance is made by 128 of the 158 respondents. From the SEC 
sample, just 8 disagree and 12 strongly disagree that such a link exists.  Thus, it appears that 
the company has communicated effectively the link which it is seeking to establish between 
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pay and performance, to a greater extent than the other two companies in the case study. 
While the reason for this finding cannot be established with certainty, speculatively, it may be 
a partial effect of the higher percentage reward at SEC. 
 
The picture which emerges from interviews with management at the company in the main 
supports this finding, with comments such as,   “if the employee works hard then he will get 
more bonus and more rewards” (respondent 2) and a comment that the system of reward in 
place at the firm “increases the performance of the employees and tries to give them a motive 
to compete between each other and tries to establish a link to increase performance” 
(respondent 6). However, while these comments seem to indicate a clear link in practice 
between performance and pay at SEC, the response of one interviewee conflicts with this, and 
suggests that performance is not linked to reward uniformly by all those responsible for 
implementing the PRP system. He describes his application of the reward scheme as follows: 
“every year I give the bonus to some people and then next year I give it to the other guys so 
it’s equally divided. All employees know about it” (respondent 3). This manager is seeking 
balance in the payments made, rather than the goal of reward for performance. His reasons 
for this are not elaborated.  However, the difficulties highlighted by Belfield and Marsden 
(2003) in rewarding performance accuracy, and deficiencies highlighted elsewhere in the 
interview discussions in relation to the scheme’s fairness may inform managerial attitudes to 
implementation.  Further, Kang and Yanadori (2011) suggest that implementation of 
management innovations from a Western context may be ineffectively applied in other 
contexts due to their mismatch with and lack of natural evolution from previous approaches 
and prevailing organizational culture. 
 
Respondent 1 casts doubt on the link between pay and performance, citing the ineffectiveness 
of the comparatively high salary offered to improve performance: “even now, our employees 
have relatively high salaries compared to other companies, but even though [that is the 
case]. There is no change in the performance, it’s true that they don’t leave the company and 
everybody wants to work with us. For example if you compare just employees, an electrical 
engineer with us he will be given 13,000 thousand riyal (2000 pounds), which is very high 
compared to other companies, but as I said that does not make them perform better, what I 
really think is if there were very intensive training programmes such as teaching the 
employee how to become more productive…” Thus, this respondent emphasizes knowledge 
and training over pay as an input to produce better quality output or performance.  
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Other respondents describe the nature of the pay-performance link as they see its operation 
within the company. For example, respondent 10 makes a simple link to quantity of output:  
 
“So we have an electronic system called the management performance system which is linked 
to me, when I access this system all my employees will appear and then I set tasks for each 
employee, general tasks but they are linked to a number of units or days and so I set a 
number of tasks and say for example I have a surveyor and I say, if you finish ten a week 
you’ll be excellent, if you finish five you’ll be very good, if you finish 3 you be good and less 
than that you’ll be below expectations and then he’ll not have any rise and he’ll not have a 
promotion for the same year and like that”.  
 
Respondent 5 meanwhile seems to raise the possibility that employees may be graded based 
on percentage quotas rather than strictly on performance, stating that “there are some 
employees who have the category of below expectations, I must have or they will say how 
come you don’t have anyone!”   
 
Overall, there is a strong indication from the survey results from each organisation that a link 
is perceived between pay and performance. However, management comments also cast doubt 
on the reliability of the ink, suggesting that a stronger assessment protocol might be needed to 
strengthen this link, if such a protocol is practicable. 
 
5.3.3 Perceived effect of PRP system on performance 
 
The third statement presented to respondents regards the effect of the system of pay for 
performance within the company on individual performance at work. Participants were asked 
how far they agreed or disagreed with the statement that the PRP system did not change their 
performance. The responses of the SIDF sample are set out in the table below. 
Table 5.8 SIDF: PRP does not change performance 
The PRP system does not change my performance 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
9 33 9 68 42 
5.59% 20.42% 5.59% 42.16% 26.04% 
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Interestingly, the clear majority of survey respondents disagree that PRP does not impact on 
their individual performance, supporting a definite impact of implementation of this reward 
system, even considering that the link of performance and pay may not in fact be fully 
implemented, as suggested by the interview findings in relation to the previous statement. 
Fernie and Metcalf’s (1999) study suggests a strong link between performance contingent pay 
and better results, although in their study the proportion of  performance-related pay is far 
more significant than for the employees in any of the case studies analysed here. Also, Beer 
and Katz (2013) question the effect on psychological factors in performance. 
Notwithstanding, the numbers of survey respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that PRP 
does not impact their performance total 42, which is over one quarter of the responses. This 
seems to indicate that PRP is by no means impacting upon all employees.   
 
Information was also collected from interviews with management on the effect of the pay for 
performance system on the performance of employees. There is some division among the 
interview subjects on this point, as some respondents report a noticeable impact of PRP on 
performance as “the only way to motivate employees” (respondent 8). This would appear to 
support the role of extrinsic motivation as important for effective control of performance, 
running counter to the argument of the humanist school that intrinsic factors are more 
influential. Meanwhile, other managers do not consider the scheme to have affected 
performance, with one respondent stating that “performance does not change and the bonus 
is steady” (respondent 2). This is also supported by another, who states that “the average 
production for the department does not change” (respondent 4). If this is the case, then the 
PRP scheme in place at SIDF does not form an effective lever in linking pay and 
performance, and also does not fulfil the rationale of effecting change within the company, as 
another key aim of PRP as cited in the literature (Yuan et al., 2013).  
 
An interesting point is raised by respondent 9, who describes a situation in which, 
“The changes in the employees are not long lasting, like two weeks after receiving the rise 
they would change but after that the normal performance comes back. And so I think the best 
employees do not need financial performance as much as recognition because the good 
employee will always be good and other employees are normal employees, so that does not 
change much in terms of performance.”  
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The respondent seems to be saying here that performance increases effected by the scheme 
are only temporary, and also that these differences are seen in those receiving the bonus. The 
temporary nature of changes seems to echo the effect of ‘gift’ pay as critiqued by Hennig-
Schmidt et al. (2010) and Gneezy (2006). It also chimes with Nunn and Devins’ (2012) 
assessment of performance management changes being temporary in their effects. Thus, the 
PRP scheme may not be creating value for the company if its effects are quickly neutralized 
and do not persist over the longer term, and this may pose a problem for SIDF. 
 
 The responses of the STC sample regarding the third statement are set out in the table below.  
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Table 5.9 STC: PRP does not change performance 
The PRP system does not change my performance 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
32 39 3 91 20 
17.3% 21.06% 1.62% 49.14% 10.8% 
 
More than half of the STC sample disagree that the PRP system does not change their 
performance, although most of those disagree rather than strongly disagree, with 91 as 
opposed to 20. However, 39 of the sample agree and 32 strongly agree with this statement, 
meaning that over a third of the sample do not perceive any impact on their performance from 
the PRP system in place at STC. This appears to link with the findings for the previous 
statement, with a sizeable minority seemingly untouched by a pay-performance link.  
 
Turning to the interview findings here, the impact of pay on performance is supported by 
several respondents. One comments that, “I think it has increased the performance of the 
employees because when they perform more they get better pay, that’s it”  (respondent 3). 
Another concurs, but allows for exceptions to this situation, stating that “I think it does in 
normal cases increase the performance of the employees and it gives them more incentive to 
work harder” (respondent 2).  However, another respondent finds that while PRP may impact 
upon employee performance, by its nature it excludes many employees and he finds this 
counterproductive:  
“Even if it does, this implies bad relations with your employees and as you know I can’t give 
it to everybody so it’s time and effort consuming more than just the basic introduction of it” 
(respondent 4). It is unclear whether this respondent means that bad relations are implied 
because managers ought to be able to manage performance through relations alone or that he 
means that the reward scheme causes employee-manager conflict. Notwithstanding however, 
Kessler (1994) views managerial support as a necessity for the successful implementation of 
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any PRP scheme, whereas it is clear from this comment and from many others across the 
three case studies that a numbers of managers feel disquiet about the scheme, whether in its 
basic principles, particular set-up, or implementation. Further, this respondent’s view that the 
scheme is time and effort-consuming is reflected in the literature, and extended to company 
level, wherein Belfield and Marsden (2003) highlight the expensive and time-consuming 
nature of the task of successfully enabling pay to reflect value to the organisation, as 
compared with provision of fixed pay. 
 
Further, respondent 7 questions the direction in which behaviours are altered as a result of the 
scheme, suggesting that this is not uniformly positive: “It does [change performance], but not 
always to a better performance. Sometimes it has a negative impact on the employees and 
establishes habits that we are in less favour of. Without mentioning them, but you know one 
or two colleagues work together but then don’t get the same rise. that’s not looking very good 
in the eyes of the one who does not get the full rise, and believe me no one will be able to 
convince them otherwise”.   Likewise, respondent 11 reports a negative effect on working 
motivation for those not awarded the bonus but who feel they have worked over and above 
their obligations, giving the following example: “the employee who doesn’t receive the bonus 
feels failed to be honest with you, and I have a case in which one employee came to me and 
said ‘I thought that I’d be taking the bonus for a year and now it’s this: don’t give me any 
extra work anymore, just let me be like the others’”.  This is interesting as it is in accord with 
a view stated in the literature that higher effort above a certain threshold brings forth negative 
feelings from employees, as well as highlighting negative impacts on those who do not 
receive a bonus, and a perception of being above average on the part of many employees. 
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The same question was answered by SEC participants, and the findings regarding this are 
presented in the table below: 
Table 5.10 SEC: PRP does not change performance 
The PRP system does not change my performance 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
16 28 16 44 44 
10.81% 18.92% 10.81% 29.73% 29.73% 
 
It is clear from the SEC survey that over half of respondents feel that PRP has an impact on 
their performance, with 88 of the sample disagreeing that it does not. A further 44 do not feel 
that the system affects their performance however, in line with the results seen for SIDF.  
 
 
Information is also sought from management interviews regarding the impact of the pay for 
performance scheme on employee performance. Again, looking at the findings from 
interviews, a range of views is uncovered amongst managers. Some respondents accept as a 
given that the system used is capable of affecting the performance of employees in an 
effective manner, for example in contending that “If it’s not increasing the performance you 
wouldn’t see all these companies applying the system” (respondent 6). This is not necessarily 
supported by recent literature however, which tends to lean more towards team-based reward 
as the emerging standard for PRP (Larkin, Pierce and Gino, 2012). Another concurs, stating 
that “if the employee works hard then he will get more bonus and more rewards and that’s 
what the company is trying to achieve with its employees, employee .......I think employees 
can improve through this system” (respondent 2). Support is given by respondent 2, but in 
less comprehensive terms, qualifying the effects of the system to apply only to some 
employees:  
“I think yes it does improve employees’ performance and it makes them work harder and 
compete with each other, it give them a target to achieve… so yes I think it’s improving 
performance for some employees”. 
For respondent 4, the scheme is only partially effective in terms of altering employee 
behaviour, as “It depends on the employee himself, some of them yes it does increase their 
performance, especially some employees who are young and enthusiastic and it gives them 
the opportunity to prove themselves”. Further, one participant in interviews with management 
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notes an effect on employees which is negative rather than positive, suggesting that the 
system is self-defeating:  
“the employees who do not receive the bonus usually decline for the next year because they 
feel disappointed and when this is tackled (percentage) then I think the system will work more 
effectively” (respondent 7). This links to equity theory, as discussed in Chapter Two. 
Another interviewee points to a possible cultural mismatch between the PRP system, the 
organisation and the wider cultural context. He comments as follows:  
“This system is brought to the company as a part of what they see as bench marking with 
American companies... but it’s not always necessarily true that if the system works there then 
it must work here…. everything is different, the culture is different and you can’t apply some 
of the methods used there here” (respondent 1). 
 
Overall, between a quarter and a third of each of the study samples were unsure or did not 
perceive n effect on their performance from the PRP system, suggesting that each system is 
failing to motivate a substantial minority of respondents. In addition, some management 
respondents perceived a negative effect on those not rewarded, or questioned the applicability 
of the system. 
 
5.3.4  Perceived effect of pay system on working behaviour 
The next statement concerns the way in which the pay for performance system affects 
employees in conducting their role. Participants were asked how far they agreed with the 
statement that “there has been no impact from PRP on the way I do my job”. The results from 
the SIDF sample are shown in the table below. 
 
Table 5.11 SIDF: No impact from PRP 
There has been no impact from PRP on the way I do my job 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
12 42 15 62 17 
8.1% 28.56% 10.2% 42.16% 11.56% 
 
The number of respondents who agree or strongly agree that PRP has not impacted the way in 
which they do their job is 54, and thus is similar to those who agree with the previous 
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question. However, a larger number disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, with 79 
individuals responding in this way: almost half of the sample.  
 
Information was also gathered from management interviewees concerning the impact of PRP 
on the way in which employees carry out their job role and the tasks involved in it. 
Considering the interviews, the managers are not united on this issue either, with one for 
example suggesting an impact on at least some employees in that “…the new employee fights 
to prove himself and that reflects on his performance” (respondent 5), a view which suggests 
greater efficacy for recent employees rather than longstanding ones. This contrasts with 
Forth, Bryson and Stokes’ (2014) proposal that PRP can reward long-standing employees 
who perform well, but raises questions for the effectiveness of the scheme in a culture where 
long service within organisations is the norm. Meanwhile, another respondent does not 
consider the system to be effective in influencing working practice, stating that “...the system 
is not working and it is not doing what it is supposed to be doing” (respondent 6). It is clear 
then that far from all employees and management perceive the intended impact of PRP as 
taking place within SIDF. However, this finds a parallel in the literature perhaps with the 
finding of Kessler (1994) in investigating the implementation and outcomes of the PRP 
scheme at Newsco, that PRP was cautiously introduced and played a minor rather than 
leading role in organisational change in that instance. Beer et al. (1984) also suggest a modest 
approach to cultural change or influence from PRP. Respondent 10 seems to agree with this, 
as he does not feel that the system can affect those who are already established in their role, 
unless reward were to be greater: “if you are old on the job there will be no impact of this 
whatsoever because everything has changed and you have children and this system will be 
the least of your worries because you’re not looking to prove yourself, but if the amount of 
money was greater than what it is now there would maybe be some kind of competition”.   
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Concerning the statement that “there has been no impact from PRP on the way I do my job”, 
the results from the STC sample are shown in the table below. 
Table 5.12 STC: No impact of PRP 
There has been no impact from PRP on the way I do my job 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
13 72 8 66 22 
7.18% 39.6% 4.4% 36.3% 12.1% 
 
The responses to the statement: “there has been no impact from PRP on the way I do my job” 
from the STC sample are divided. While 72 respondents agree and 13 strongly agree, slightly 
more respondents disagree or strongly disagree, at 66 and 22 respectively. Thus, the results 
lean only slightly toward disagreement with the statement. Kang and Yanadori (2011) point 
to an emerging situation wherein socially legitimized business practices are introduced in 
contexts where they may be challenging or not compatible, but in such a way that they do not 
materially alter the current organizational culture or operations, while being employed in an 
ineffective manner. In this analysis, the effects of introductions such as pay for performance 
may be slight due to their incompatibility with their context. 
 
The ambiguity in the findings of the survey on this point is reflected in the management 
viewpoint on the impact of the scheme on performance as given through interview, as one 
respondent claims that “the good workers will always be hardworking and the lazy will 
always be lazy” (respondent 1), presenting a fatalistic view of performance potential, while 
more respondents see a benefit here in that the system can “increase the performance of the 
employees”. These two opposing views are difficult to reconcile. Also, they do not appear to 
hinge on the particular implementation of PRP in this company, but rather are framed as more 
fundamental differences. Respondent 9 notes the difficulty in judging the impact of the 
scheme, and advocates a non-monetary approach to additional reward for performance: “I 
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can see an impact but I can’t judge whether it’s good for the organization as whole or not. 
The way it should be is a reward with more nonofficial gifts like holidays or recognition and 
the possibility of promotion”.  This coincides with the recommendations of Frey, Homberg 
and Osterloh (2012) for such an approach as minimising negative effects for intrinsic 
motivation. 
  
The results from the SEC sample concerning the same statement as above are shown in the 
table below. 
Table 5.13 SEC: No impact from PRP 
There has been no impact from PRP on the way I do my job 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
20 39 10 59 20 
13.6% 26.52% 6.8% 40.12% 13.6% 
 
The number of respondents who agree or strongly agree that PRP has not impacted the way in 
which they do their job is 59, while those who disagree or strongly disagree total 79, and just 
10 do not know. This pattern is very similar to the results of the SIDF survey on this point, 
and therefore in both companies, more respondents perceive an impact from PRP than those 
who do not. However, this finding may be seen as somewhat disappointing in that more do 
not feel that they have been influenced by the scheme.  
 
Management were also asked about the impact of the PRP scheme on working practice. The 
interviews with management at SEC also reveal a division of opinion here among the sample, 
ranging from the view that “it does improve employees’ performance and it makes them work 
harder and compete with each other” (respondent 2) to the point that for “some of the 
employees, the system does not work on them” (respondent 5). Respondent 11 supports this 
view of a partial positive impact, stating that “it has an effect on the employees’ performance 
but the problem is with employees as a whole. Some of them will perform well because they 
have a good rise, others will perform badly as a retaliation against you or the system and 
even if you set a task they will still do it but not the way you want”.   As discussed in the 
section concerning SIDF results, a modest of impact from PRP on the way in which 
employees conduct their tasks is seen in Kessler’s (1994) case study, and supported by Beer 
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et al. (1984) as a reasonable aim from implementing PRP. However, it should be noted here 
that the result in SEC is similar to that of SIDF despite a considerable difference in the 
possible pay differential achievable through the bonus system. A further difference between 
the findings here and those of Kessler (1994) however is that the scheme at the organisation 
investigated by Kessler was reported as not causing major conflict, and the same cannot be 
said from the findings here. 
 
These findings again show commonality among the case study companies, with only a slight 
majority perceiving an impact upon the way they do their job from the pay for performance 
scheme. This should inform assessments of the costs versus benefits of implementing PRP, if 
the intention is to have impact across the workforce, especially bearing in mind the evidence 
from interviews that PRP is having unwanted consequences also.  
 
5.4 Perceptions of Fairness and Transparency 
Several questions addressed perceptions of fairness of the system, both in its design and 
implementation. The results from the questionnaires and interviews regarding this aspect of 
the pay systems will be discussed here. 
5.4.1 Fairness of the system 
The fourth statement presented to respondents regards perceptions of fairness or unfairness 
within the pay for performance system in the company. Participants were asked to agree or 
disagree with the statement that the PRP system was not fair. The responses of the SIDF 
sample are set out in the table below. 
Table 5.14 SIDF: PRP system is not fair 
The PRP system is not fair 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
27 35 34 39 26 
16.77% 21.74% 21.08% 24.18% 16.12% 
 
In contrast with views on the impact of PRP on performance, the question of whether or not 
the PRP system is fair or not appears to divide opinion evenly at SIDF. While 27 strongly 
agree, one more than strongly disagrees, 39 disagree, while only 35 agree, meaning that there 
is a slight majority who disagree that the system is not fair. Uncertainty on this issue is 
reflected in the fact that 34 of the respondents do not know. This is highly problematic in 
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terms of the prescription in the literature that in order to be effective, any pay for 
performance system must be perceived as fair (Kang and Yanadori, 2011). The prevailing 
view here may therefore signal a major issue for SIDF in terms of harm done by the PRP 
scheme.  
Information was also gathered from management interviews which related to the topic of 
fairness within the PRP scheme. In respect of this point, interview subjects comment on 
problems with the way in which the system is seen and understood, for example in stating the 
view that “the system lacks transparency” (respondent 3) or “is not clear” (respondent 8). 
This again is problematic in terms of Kang and Yanadori’s (2011) prescription for effectively 
implementing PRP, as requiring both transparency and fairness. Another respondent 
highlights the perception of unfairness which he cites as inevitably resulting from the set-up 
of the system and the self-perception of the employees: “everyone thinks he worked hard and 
has not been fully appreciated. I can’t make everybody above average, the system does not 
allow me. For me sometimes I make my employees evaluate themselves so I avoid 
disappointments (respondent 3). This links with Woodfield and Kennie’s (2008) contention 
that most employees rate their performance as above average, and the respondent seems to 
echo Lewis’s (1997) suggestion based on Cannell and Wood (1992) that this forms a barrier 
to success in gaining from the scheme in terms of motivation of the majority. This may signal 
a damaging effect for SIDF from the scheme if many employees will inevitably sense 
unfairness as a result of the workings of the system. 
 
Other interviewees go further, associating the way in which aspects of the system work as 
opaque and unfair: for example criticising the use of a quota for performance bonuses by 
stating that, “I don’t support the use of the percentage because it is not just and I can’t make 
a judgment on all employees freely because of the use of the percentage” (respondent 10).  
This percentage is also seen as a hindrance by respondent 8: “the use of percentage limits my 
ability and I don’t make the final judgment” (respondent 8). Marsden and Richardson’s 
(1992) study concluded that feelings of unfairness and a more negative attitude to 
performance appraisal were engendered where employees thought that a quota had been 
allocated to the various gradings in the assessment.   
 Meanwhile, respondent 2 goes further in criticising the lack of clarity and inability of the 
manager to contribute in the process, commenting that, “the determination of the bonus is not 
set by the direct manager and on unknown bases”. Respondent 2 supports this, stating that 
“it’s not our fault, the percentage I’m given is limited by 15%, that the only people who 
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would have the full rise and the reset are distributed among the employees every one and his 
work”.  A more detailed description of the percentages used is given by respondent 9, who 
also feels that responsibility for awards is not squarely in the hands of the awarding 
managers: 
 
“The system has many faults which makes it to someone’s perspective not fair at the first 
look. First you have the percentage, which I’m given; 15%, 20%, 40% and then sometimes 
no-one falls under the last category, unless they don’t do anything at all or they are late 
every day, so the use of the percentage determines my judgment and even though sometimes I 
give a high rating to an employee, I discover that the employee is complaining to me because 
he didn’t get the full rise and then I show him my assessment to show him that it’s not my 
fault. So no one knows how this exactly works.” 
 
As detailed in the literature review, Marsden (2004, in Bryson and Forth, 2006) warns that 
flawed performance measurement tools and lack of staff consultation over measurement 
criteria are major factors in leading PRP to be seen as unfair, and from the management 
responses, these two factors may fairly be considered to be at play within SIDF. 
 
A different point is made by another interviewee concerning the perceived difficulty in 
applying a single system in a balanced way across a large company: “There is a problem in 
the system because there are 8 departments on the company and each one has its own work 
so one form of assessment is not going on, well no one has the same job” (respondent 11). 
This also echoes Marsden and Richardson’s (1992) study, in which respondents perceived the 
application of PRP as not suiting certain job roles.  
 
Another respondent (11) considers that introducing a pay-performance link is “not necessary. 
The system we have has existed in other national companies but I think that linking pay to 
performance is big mistake, because it puts the manager under the pressure of assessing his 
colleagues, which actually is a bit difficult knowing that some of them are your friends some 
of them relatives and so on. So it’s hard, it’s hard”. This indicates the possibility of internal 
conflict arising in managers when being asked to implement the system, which could be 
taken to imply that decisions taken may not at all times be guided by assessments of 
performance. This is dangerous for the effectiveness of the scheme and for the limitation of 
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any damaging impacts it may have: particularly in light of the prescription in the literature for 
PRP schemes to be seen to be fair if they are to work. 
 
The responses of the STC sample with regard to the fourth question are set out in the table 
below. 
Table 5.15 STC: PRP system is not fair 
The PRP system is not fair 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
44 33 42 51 14 
23.76% 17.82% 22.68% 27.54% 7.56% 
 
Unfairness within the PRP system is perceived by almost half of the STC sample, with 77 in 
agreement that the system is not fair, and over half of those strongly disagreeing. Meanwhile, 
65 respondents show disagreement, and only 14 of those strongly disagree. It is notable that 
this statement draws 42 ‘don’t know’ responses: far more than for any other questions, and 
over one quarter of the sample. The reasons for this are unclear, whether indicating a 
reluctance to answer or a lack of clarity in terms of how the system works. Kang and 
Yanadori (2011) highlight the necessity of employee perceptions of fairness and transparency 
in pay for performance systems if they are to work effectively to achieve the results expected, 
and on this basis it can be said that the results of this questions are highly problematic for 
STC.   
 
Information was also sought from managers regarding the fairness of the system in operation 
at STC. The responses of management interviewees on this topic are mixed, with some 
respondents dismissing the idea of any inequity in the implementation of the PRP system: 
“rest assured that this place has no bias, and everything is done according to the regulations” 
(respondent 3). This may not necessarily conflict with the findings from the questionnaire, if 
perceptions of unfairness arise from some feature of the system which is inherent to its design 
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rather than introduced during its implementation. Meanwhile, another respondent comments 
that “some people see that there is no fairness between the departments as some departments 
are given more than others”. One respondent relates unfairness to the problems of applying 
one system across various departments in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach: “there is a problem 
here because some departments have different work than others: for example technical 
support is different from maintenance but the form of assessment is the same” (respondent 2).  
This view was also put forward in the interviews carried out at SIDF, therefore highlighting 
an issue common to PRP practices across the two organisations.  Cumming (1988) also 
criticises performance related pay on the basis of the problem of setting goals which were 
equally possible to achieve across a wide range of jobs. 
 
A further view is put forward in interview which illuminates the concerns of the manager in 
administering the system: 
“Well it’s problematic here, for example some managers complain that they can’t rate a new 
chap who is better working than his colleague who he’s known him for ten years and he 
knows that he has a debt to the bank and this difference in ratings will make a big difference 
to him and his family while the new employee does not care and he wants more bonus 
anyway... it’s difficult it really is… you may lose some friends because of a system which is 
not designed for us”  (respondent 1). 
The respondent here highlights the importance of maintaining personal relationships with 
long-serving staff as balanced against performance considerations, and clearly places a higher 
value on the former. His view of “a system which is not designed for us” emphasises a 
perception of cultural disjoint, although whether this is between the PRP system and the 
company culture, the PRP system and the wider cultural context, or both, is not made clear. 
Kang and Yanadori (2011) highlight the point that in Eastern cultures, PRP does not 
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represent an evolution of existing practice but a replacement of a different system, and thus 
may face various problems of acceptance and/or applicability not considered in its original 
setting. 
In any case, the comment above suggests a certain amount of disregard for the aims of the 
system, and the widespread perception of unfairness seen in the survey findings may reflect 
this, as well as aspects of the system itself. It is obvious that any performance assessment 
scheme places responsibilities on the assessing manager in terms of workload and working 
practice (ACAS, 2015), and further, Storey and Sisson (1993) view managers as taking an 
essential role in relation to such schemes, through the tasks of communication, allocation of 
requirements and in performing the assessment itself (Storey & Sisson, 2000). Evidence from 
previous research is not comprehensive, but suggests that the manager’s role is indeed crucial 
(Gerhard & Rynes, 2003).  
 
Here, respondent 10 however complains of an impossible situation which is out of the hands 
of the manager, due to the imposition of quotas for gradings and the inability to act fairly in 
this circumstance: “it has nothing of justice, sometimes you find four who fit the same 
category but you are only allowed to take two”. As presented in the literature review, 
Marsden (2004, in Bryson and Forth, 2006) state that poorly designed performance 
measurement tools form a major factor in leading PRP to be seen as unfair, and from the 
management responses, this factor may be considered to be present within STC. Respondent 
5 on the other hand suggests that managers are able to ‘play’ the system to enable their own 
preferences, through setting irrelevant tasks as highly important: “there are some people who 
set a very ridiculous task so they can just reward the employees without doing anything and 
there are those who set reasonable tasks, so there must be follow up by the management to 
monitor the direct manager’s tasks they provide”.  Therefore, conflicting views are seen from 
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management, with some not identifying fairness as an issue, some placing the blame for 
unfairness on the system itself, and others suggesting that managers do not act impartially, 
whether for altruistic reasons from loyalty to staff and conflict of the scheme with cultural 
values, or for other reasons. 
 
Stronger perceptions of unfairness were noted from the SEC sample in response to the same 
question, as presented in the table below: 
Table 5.16 SEC: PRP system is not fair 
The PRP system is not fair 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
75 27 12 27 7 
51% 18.36% 8.16% 18.36% 4.76% 
 
In a more critical response than for the SIDF and STC surveys, 102 of 148 respondents in the 
SEC sample, just under two thirds of respondents, express the view that there is unfairness 
within the PRP system at the company.  Further, 75 of those 102 strongly disagree, indicating 
a strength of feeling on the subject. In contrast, only 7 strongly disagree, while 27 disagree 
and 12 do not know. Whatever the individual conditions within the firm which may 
exacerbate this, there is an argument in the literature that this is a direct result of PRP type 
schemes, as colleagues naturally make comparisons terms of reward received, and may 
become dissatisfied with their pay as a result (Brickley et al., 2009). While Brickley et al. 
(2009) view the alternative approach of providing equal pay among colleagues regardless of 
performance outcomes as wasteful and demotivating to high performers, and thus 
outweighing the harmful consequences of this comparison. However, it is clear in this case 
that the perception of unfairness is considerable, and thus if harm is connected to this, this 
might also be considerable.   
 
The responses of the interviewees on the issue of fairness also appear to indicate 
acknowledgement of issues in this regard, whether as a result of employee perceptions, as, 
“problems occur every year with the rating....I really get tired each year, if I give it to 
someone then some else will be thinking something” (respondent 1) or as a direct result of the 
structure of the system or even the very concept of PRP: “you can’t satisfy everyone….. the 
system does not allow it” (respondent 1). In terms of systemic unfairness, this respondent 
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explains further that “I can’t give all my employees ‘above expectation’ because the system 
does not allow more than 5% of my employees to have this rating” (respondent 1). As seen in 
the literature review, Lewis (1997) recognises just such a problem, considering that adopting 
a normal distribution curve which does not fit patterns of workforce performance is a 
common failing, and means that while many employees perform well, half of employees gain 
a below-average rating. In the case of SEC, the limited possibility of awarding ‘above 
expectation’ as reported here may gravitate against fairness, and certainly conflicts with 
employees’ self-perception, in line with Woodfield and Kennie (2008), who report that over 
50% of employees would grade themselves above the average.  
This would suggest a conflict between the requirement placed upon managers to assess a 
fixed number of employees as performing to each level, and the rating of employee 
performance according to fixed standards or criteria.  Respondent 2 does not mention such a 
mismatch, but appears to confirm that the application of set standards is involved in the 
process:   “at the end of each year the direct manager assesses his employees based on 
standards and his manager assesses him and it goes on like that” (respondent 2). 
In the literature, Bregn (2013) points to the grading given by managers as helping shape 
employee attitudes to management, change within the organisation and to the performance 
assessment process, and that lower grades were linked to more negative attitudes. If so, this 
has implications for the scheme in place at SEC, given the management comments above. 
However, feelings of the unfairness of the system is not universal among the managers 
interviewed, with respondent 3 providing the following defence of the scheme: “no one can 
say that because we have appeal system and through this appeal system, any employee can 
complain about his rise and ultimately they will take their right rise back, so no it’s fair and 
if it’s not as I told we have an appeal system”. Others highlight the use of the percentage 
again as behind the unfairness: “it’s fair if it applied without the use of percentage then it will 
be a correct system. Let me have the option of giving all my employees the excellent or 
acceptable” (respondent 8). Respondent 11 also refers to the appeals procedures in place: 
“there is an electronic system now which is a new addition which, it’s called the grievances, 
anyone can access this system but everyone can see that, which is not a normal thing, but we 
also have another system called hotline, in which you can complain to your superior, whether 
because of mistreatment or misjustification or ethical complaint, and this is confidential and 
serious, and this could include the PRP system as well.    
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Overall, while large numbers of staff perceive unfairness in the PRP system in place, there is 
a distinct difference when it comes to the results for SEC, in that a clear majority reort 
unfairness in the system. While factors unique to the company may contribute to this, one 
possible reason is the larger proportion of pay given over to incentive pay: reviewing the 
literature, it is proposed that the extent of the incentive being large enough to motivate may 
unintentionally result in an intervention which is also large enough to cause discontent.   
 
 
5.4.2 Perceptions of favouritism in pay system implementation 
 
Respondents and interviewees were also asked about favouritism in the running of the pay for 
performance schemes.  Participants were asked how far they agreed or disagreed that 
supervisors use PRP to reward their subordinates and ignore those employees who are not 
favoured by them. The responses of the SIDF sample are shown in the table below: 
 
Table 5.17 SIDF: favouritism 
Supervisors use PRP to reward their subordinates and ignore those employees who are 
not favoured by them 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
24 32 44 37 24 
14.88% 19.84% 27.28% 22.94% 14.88% 
 
The table above shows that respondents from SIDF are split on the question of whether 
supervisors use PRP to reward some employees while ignoring less favoured employees. One 
quarter of respondents state that they do not know whether this is the case. From the 
remainder, only 5 more respondents disagree or strongly disagree than agree or strongly 
agree, at 61 and 56 individuals respectively. While more respondents therefore do not 
identify favouritism among supervisors than identify this bias, only a minority of the overall 
sample deny that PRP is used in this manner.   
While data was sought from management regarding favouritism within the implementation of 
the pay for performance system at SIDF, none of the management interviewees comment 
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directly on this issue. However, respondent 10 appears to acknowledge the existence of a 
problem here, warning, “don’t unleash the direct managers alone when it comes to 
assessment”. This implies that left to themselves, managers may either apply favouritism or 
discrimination on the basis of personal like/dislike. Meanwhile, respondent 5 views this as 
simply not possible: “This can’t happen, because it’s not up to the direct manager to give, it’s 
partly but at the end of the day there is an appeal system and this manager has a manager 
too, so it’s not that easy”. This view seems to imply that direct managers, while carrying out 
assessments, do not have sufficient power within the PRP system to abuse it by applying 
favouritism.  
 An alternative view, but also one which is indicative of the lack of control of managers over 
assessment, is put forward by respondent 6, who states that, “at the end of the year they come 
to me asking about why the bonus is not right and I don’t know what to say to them” 
(respondent 6). This suggests that perceptions of favouritism may be fuelled by the arbitrary 
or opaque nature of the results of the system, as experienced by both employees and line 
managers.  
 
The responses of the STC sample to the statement on favouritism are shown in the table 
below: 
Table 5.18 STC: favouritism 
Supervisors use PRP to reward their subordinates and ignore those employees who are 
not favoured by them 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
48 69 17 39 12 
25.92% 37.26% 9.18% 21.06% 6.48% 
 
From the sample, 117 STC employees agreed that supervisors use PRP to reward some 
employees while ignoring others, and 48 of those strongly agreed with the statement. 
Meanwhile, 39 disagreed and just 12 strongly disagreed. The results therefore suggest that 
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perceptions of favouritism are common at STC.   This tallies with the previous finding that 
the system is unfair, and also echoes the findings on this in the other two case study 
companies. Beer and Cannon’s (2004) case studies found that newly-implemented PRP 
systems led to a loss of the trust and commitment which firms have historically relied upon to 
succeed, and in light of this, the findings with regard to favouritism and unfairness should be 
viewed with concern. 
 
Information was also sought from management interviews with regard to favouritism within 
the PRP scheme’s implementation at STC. Perhaps unsurprisingly, management interviewees 
on the whole claim that favouritism does not occur, stating that “this place has no bias, and 
everything is done according to the regulations” (respondent 3). Respondent 9, while 
conceding that this does take place, states that the repercussions are too serious for such 
practices to be widespread, stating that “some supervisors do that, but if you do it everyone 
will know that and the general view that people see you as a supervisor wouldn’t look that 
good and that could affect the supervisor’s promotions as well”.  Further comments include 
that, “there are basic standards to assess the employees based upon it, it’s not up to me or 
anyone else to assess the employees as they please” (respondent 2).  However, another 
confirms suspicions of favouritism, stating that “there is some favouritism from some of the 
managers and that’s what most of the employees complain about” (respondent 4). Further, 
and as echoed by one interviewee at SIDF, one respondent highlights a lack of monitoring of 
managers within the system, stating that, “the use of this system could be better if there was a 
better supervision over the manager assessment but this is impossible to apply, you have to 
look at the manager throughout the year” (respondent 12). Thus, perceptions of unfairness on 
the part of employees seem to be confirmed in this manager’s view. One respondent however 
presents a different view: “but you know you Arabian fellows, they don’t abide by the system” 
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(respondent 1), and as quoted earlier highlights the difficulty for managers in not treating 
long-serving employees according to their personal need. This suggests, as found in the SIDF 
results, that difficulties beset implementation of the PRP system as an approach designed 
within a different cultural context from that of Saudi Arabia, and throws up further doubt on 
the possibility of implementing it as intended. Kang and Yanadori (2011) suggest that where 
imported practices are not compatible with a culture, they are not always introduced in an 
effective manner, and this may be a relevant point here. In terms of favouritism, respondent 3 
also agrees that “this is among the problems we face”, while respondent 9 blames insufficient 
monitoring for this possibility, stating that “there are interests which come into it because no 
one to monitors, [there is] no one to follow up”.  
The responses of the SEC sample regarding the presence of management favouritism are 
shown in the table below: 
Table 5.19 SEC: favouritism 
Supervisors use PRP to reward their subordinates and ignore those employees who are 
not favoured by them 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
32 52 40 16 8 
21.76% 35.36% 27.2% 10.88% 5.44% 
 
The perception that supervisors use PRP to reward their subordinates and ignore those not 
favoured by them draws a different response from the SEC sample than for that of SIDF, 
suggesting that implementation of PRP also differs. While slightly more SIDF respondents 
disagreed than agreed, the majority of the SEC sample agreed or strongly agreed, at 84 
responses. Meanwhile, 40 respondents did not know. This was more than those showing 
disagreement, who totaled only 24 from 148 respondents in the sample. This result seems 
clearly to indicate a widespread perception of bias in implementation of the reward system at 
SEC. Beer and Cannon (2004) find that loss of trust and commitment can be introduced when 
PRP is implemented, and that this may counteract the positive effects of the system. In light 
of these results, this is something which SEC should consider, as such a high perception of 
favouritism is likely to impact negatively on trust. 
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Management views were also sought on this topic, and here they fall across a wide spectrum, 
with, at one end of the debate, a direct denial that bias exists within the company, or that it is 
likely to be a factor in such systems: 
“everyone knows his work and the ones at the top can assess the performance of the employee 
through standards, in which you can’t make mistakes even if you want to, so don’t worry 
these things do not happen in this company, and in most other companies because, let me tell 
you something, most of the employees will complain about the system if they didn’t get the 
rating they want” (respondent 6).    This statement does not however tally with the majority 
of survey responses.   
 
Others appear to acknowledge that favouritism has the potential to be a factor, with one 
interviewee stating that, “that depends then on each manager and his conscience” 
(respondent 2). Other managers who are interviewed appear to admit that they do not assign 
the reward purely on the basis of merit, although their characterisation of their approach is far 
removed from the idea of favouritism, appearing to indicate an unwillingness to be seen to 
favour any employee, even on the basis of performance. For example, respondent 4 states that 
“if my judgment is not accurate I’ll be ruining someone’s life so I just divide it equally and 
spare the regret” (respondent 4), while respondent 3 has similar concerns: “if someone 
actually takes it every year and his colleagues do not then in five years the salary of the first 
person will be double the second employee, which will make a huge problem to be honest”. 
Marsden and Richardson’s (1992) study also highlighted the point that favouritism was 
suspected by employees in implementation of the PRP scheme, and that these perceptions 
could be linked to suspicion of the existence of a quota system. Further, in the context of 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, in which PRP was introduced rather than developed, Kang 
and Yanadori suggest that implementation may not be effective as management and staff 
adapt systems to align with previous conditions rather than changing in response to these 
introductions. 
 
Respondent 11 provides a hypothetical dilemma facing the manager, suggesting that this type 
of scheme will always be subject to manipulation or adaption by managers due to the social 
obligations and values which bind them: 
 
“This is difficult, let me tell you, imagine you have an employee who’s been your friend for 
ten years and there is another new employee who works better than other employees. Now, 
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you know that your friend needs this rise because he has a debt to the bank and his son needs 
a car, so you know that this bonus, even though it might only be 700 SR (116 Pounds), but 
will change his life in a big way, but on the other side the new employee does not care about 
this and wants the rise anyway. Who would you give it to? To your friend or to the kid? You 
tell me? And let’s say I give it to the one who works better, do you think that I’ll be forgiven? 
So it’s difficult, but anyway we in our department sort this peacefully and each year a group 
of employees will take the full rise in a row each group will have the rise so no one complains 
about this,  not only us who do this but a lot of the other departments do the same”.    
 
In summary, the STC and SEC samples both show a considerable number more respondents 
agreeing than disagreeing that they perceive favouritism, while at SIDF, while the balance is 
more equal, the large proportion of respondents answering ‘don’t know’ is notable. Beer and 
Cannon (2004) suggest that the perception of favouritism may lead to negative impacts.  The 
interview responses also supports the contention that the ingrained cultural conditions may 
conflict with the aims of the scheme. 
 
5.4.3 Appeals Process 
 
The next statement explores the fairness of the system for lodging appeals against assessment 
as part of the pay for performance scheme, and forms part of the picture of the overall 
fairness and transparency of the schemes in place at each company. The responses of the 
SIDF sample on this topic are given in the table below. 
Table 5.20 SIDF: appeals system is fair 
The appeal system against supervisor assessment is fair 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
2 20 70 28 37 
1.24% 12.4% 43.4% 17.36% 22.94% 
 
The statement regarding the fairness of the appeal system against supervisor assessment 
received 70 ‘don’t know’ responses, and 65 disagreed or strongly disagreed.  This is 
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significant compared to just 22 responses showing agreement, and suggests that perceptions 
of the appeal system are not generally positive. 
 
Information was also sought from management interviewees on the question of whether the 
appeals system was effective for employees. Interviewees’ opinions on this matter vary, with 
some being generally supportive of the appeals system (respondent 8), “the appeal system we 
have involves more than my direct manager and it could go even further up. I myself, one of 
my employees was not happy with his rise and he made an appeal and we changed his rise 
after we considered his argument”.  This suggests that the appeals system does indeed offer 
an avenue for employees who are not happy with their appraisal or grading to seek redress. 
On the other hand, respondent 2. while considering that “you can’t say it’s absolute fairness, 
but we try our best to make the system as fair as possible”, also states that problems come 
from a possible inherent lack of fairness: “many complaints are arise not because of us but 
because of the system itself, so if there is an unfairness in this it might be the system”. Within 
such a situation, any appeals system is rendered ineffective as appeals can only be heard 
within the terms of the system. Alternatively, considering the lack of accountability and 
transparency in the workings of the system, this may lead to the prospect of appraisals not 
standing up to scrutiny and being changed on appeal while the system continues to bring 
forward more such results. 
 
 
For the statement exploring the fairness of the system for lodging appeals against assessment 
as part of the pay for performance scheme, the responses of the STC sample are given in the 
table below.  
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Table 5.21 STC: appeals system is fair 
The appeal system against supervisor assessment is fair 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
26 16 18 52 72 
14.04% 8.64% 9.72% 28.08% 38.88% 
 
The responses to the statement “the appeal system against supervisor assessment is fair” were 
similar in the STC sample to those found at SEC. A total of 124 respondents disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that the appeal system was fair, compared to only 42 who felt that the 
system was fair.  This is problematic in terms of views of fairness within all aspects of the 
system. 
 
Information was also sought from management interviewees on the fairness of the appeals 
system. Here, the indictment of the system shown in the survey results was not echoed 
specifically by those managers who were interviewed however, and comments gained mainly 
related to the theoretical workings of the appeal mechanism rather than any reference to its 
functioning and outcomes in practice: “Employees are aware of the fact that the system has 
an appeal mechanism so if someone wanted to he can raise this to the management and they 
decide then” (respondent 3). Another respondent suggested that there was no negative impact 
for employees of using the appeals system, stating that “all of the employees have the means 
to challenge the supervisor’s assessment and that won’t make any change in the relation 
between us”. Further, one respondent stated that “many of our employees complain at the end 
of the year because of  the rating given by the managers and this creates a bad environment  
even after the problem is solved because once you file a complaint, it’s hard to get  the 
relationship between the manager and their employees back again to what it was”. No 
reference was made here to the prospect of success for such appeals, but this respondent 
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makes the concern clear that the need for so many appeals creates disharmony in the relations 
between management and staff. 
 
The responses of the SEC sample regarding the fairness of appeals procedures are given in 
the table below. 
Table 5.22 SEC: appeals system is fair 
The appeal system against supervisor assessment is fair 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
22 5 26 56 39 
14.96% 3.4% 17.68% 38.08% 26.52% 
 
A majority of the sample, at 95 individuals, either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement: “The appeal system against supervisor assessment is fair”. 26 individuals chose 
the response “don’t know”, which was more than for any other statement except for that 
about supervisor favouritism in allocating reward. Meanwhile, only 5 agreed and 22 strongly 
agreed that the appeal against supervisor assessment was fair.  
 
Interestingly, the responses of the management sample interviewed for the study do not 
appear to support the majority view, as the appeals system is presented as offering a chance 
for dissatisfied employees to take effective action. This is seen by the following statements: 
“there is an appeal mechanism against the manager assessment...it has been successful a 
number of times” (respondent 2);  
“if he does not like this [the assessment result] he could appeal against it” (respondent 4); 
and  
“if the employee doesn’t get a bonus then he can apply through the appeal system” 
(respondent 7).  
5.4.4 Clarity and transparency of the pay system 
As discussed in Chapter Two, prescriptive accounts in the literature suggest that clarity and 
transparency are important qualities in the effectiveness of any reward for performance 
system. Hence, respondents were asked whether the system in place at their company was 
complex to understand. The responses of the SIDF survey sample are given below: 
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Table 5.23 SIDF: system cannot be understood 
The way the PRP system works cannot be understood 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
61 64 11 20 5 
37.89% 39.68% 6.82% 12.4% 3.1% 
 
The results for the statement that the way the PRP system works cannot be understood are 
telling for the implementation of the scheme, with the vast majority of responses, 125 out of 
161, agreeing or strongly agreeing with this. This is worrying in light of Kang and Yanadori’s 
(2011) appraisal that transparency is a key element of effective pay systems. The results of 
the survey however by their nature cannot reveal the reasoning behind answers to questions, 
and it is unclear from this whether the employees who feel that the scheme cannot be 
understood would attribute this to a lack of adequate explanation of the pay for performance 
scheme, or to the complexity of its workings. Both factors however are warned against by 
Kang and Yanadori (2011) as obstacles to effective implementation of pay for performance, 
as outlined in Chapter Two. 
 
Information was also gathered from management interviewees regarding the extent to which 
the PRP system could be understood. The picture painted by the survey questionnaire in this 
regard is echoed strongly in management interviews, as shown in respondent 7’s assessment 
that “the main problem with the system, it’s vague and there is no actual clear instruction for 
it. For us yes, but the people who work in the human resource department know how it 
works”. This indicates that this manager feels that those implementing the scheme at this 
level do not have access to the full information about how the scheme works, and that it is for 
this reason that the scheme lacks transparency. Another respondent qualifies the picture by 
explaining what exactly is confusing in the system: “the main themes of the system are 
understandable but how to get the employees’ rating fair is not set by the task setting and if 
that actually exists, it does not cover everything precisely.”  This comment is interesting as it 
implies doubt that there is a full underlying and logical system in place, but to which this 
respondent is not privy. Respondent 5 further considers that the scheme is confusing, and 
expresses his frustration: 
“It can’t be understood because we can’t clearly set every task of it in the assessment and 
since you’re here go and ask the HR department for the system rewards and how they intend 
to improve it because it’s not doing anything with the goals they set. And we in the 
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information technology department want to know more about the system”. Thus, it seems 
clear that neither administering management nor employees find the system transparent, and 
accountability seems low, with uncertainty as to who in fact set up the system, as expressed 
by respondent 3: 
 
“The system of Performance Linked Pay that exists in the company is not known. I challenge 
you to find someone who knows how this system works or who brought it to the company: 
even HR department, they don’t actually say that they are the people who recommended this 
system to be brought to the company, even when you ask them they say it’s not up to us but 
people in the higher management know it”.  From this, it can be taken that the management 
who implement the scheme directly with employees, as represented by the interview sample, 
do not understand fully how the system works, and further that it is not clear whether, the 
system is fully expounded at any level. This has worrying implications for SIDF when 
compared to prescriptions in the literature for effective implementation of PRP, and lack of 
trust in the systems of pay may have negative influence at many levels. 
 
 
 
The responses of the STC sample are given in the table below: 
Table 5.24 STC: system cannot be understood 
The way the PRP system works cannot be understood 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
75 49 8 31 22 
40.5% 26.46% 4.32% 16.74% 11.88% 
 
The majority of the STC sample, 124 individuals, identify difficulty in understanding the way 
in which the PRP system works. Strength of feeling on this point is suggested by the fact that 
75 strongly agree. By contrast, of the 53 who disagree, only 22 of those strongly disagree. 
Just 8 of the sample did not know.  This suggests a problem with either the system or its 
communication to staff, and this is problematic in light of Kang and Yanadori’s (2011) 
prescription for clear communication of the PRP system’s features and workings. 
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The information collected from interviews also includes statements related to the theme of 
clarity in the pay for performance system at STC. Here, the overall findings from the 
questionnaire statement are supported by interviews, in which one respondent complains, “I 
get tired over something your employees can’t understand” (respondent 4). Clarity in 
communicating the aims of a pay for performance scheme, as well as the processes involved 
in it, is viewed as essential if a PRP scheme is to succeed in achieving its goals, and this is 
seen as especially true in cases where part of the intention is to bring in cultural change 
(Armstrong & Murlis, 2007). The adoption of PRP in the case of STC may be seen in the 
context of wider changes in approach within organisations across Saudi as practices are 
imported from the west, and thus the scheme in this case would seem to fall into this 
category, as Kang and Yanadori (2011) highlight the point that in Eastern cultures, PRP does 
not represent an evolution of existing practice but a replacement of a different system. 
Therefore, the lack of clarity among employees, as recognised by the managers, may be seen 
as a major issue. Further, Kessler (1994) also emphasises the need for employees to be 
involved in setting up such schemes in their future success.  
In a different view, respondent 9 refers misunderstanding of the scheme to problems in its 
fairness, which lead individuals to believe that they have not understood properly, stating 
that, “even if you tried to understand it, it’s not going to be fair and that’s the main element 
of the system that makes you try over and over to understand it”. Respondent 7 also refers to 
this point: “the system as a whole is understood but you need someone to tell the higher 
management to improve it, to make it better or to cancel it so no one will complain about it”.   
Thus, these interviewees appear to critique the design of the system, and imply that 
expectations of it are different to what it is in reality, leading employees to feel that they must 
not have understood it. This view presents a major problem for STC, as PRP schemes must 
be carefully designed to be effective (Kang and Yanadori, 2011). 
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In SEC, there also appears to be confusion over the workings of the pay system, as shown in 
the table below:  
Table 5.25 SEC: system cannot be understood 
The way the PRP system works cannot be understood 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
31 48 9 40 20 
21.08% 32.64% 6.12% 27.2% 13.6% 
 
Inherent difficulty in understanding the PRP system at work in SEC is claimed by the clear 
majority, with 79 respondents. However, when compared with 60 disagreeing or strongly 
disagreeing it can be seen that opinion is also fairly divided on this issue. It appears from this 
that there is some confusion as to the system among employees, although perhaps not to the 
extent that this is seen in the SIDF survey.  
 
In terms of the management interview findings on this point, respondent 7 expresses a desire 
to “establish a more effective communication system between managers and the employees so 
they can discuss why the rating is like this” (respondent 7). Kessler (1994) emphasises the 
importance of communication, which would seem to support this suggestion. Respondent 5 
further explains his difficulty in maintain level performance standards across roles, stating 
that “for example,  I’m responsible for employees who have desk jobs as well as an 
employees who work as technicians in the street, and when I come to assessment I find 
difficulties. I mean if it’s by who works harder I think the one on street work deserves more 
than the one here taking cover from the sun’s heat, but that’s it, there are general standards 
and then we try to make the balance to not make everyone angry”. Thus, there appears to be 
difficulty in distinguishing, effort, performance and reward across various roles within the 
company, even at departmental level, as supported by Marsden and Richardson (1992). 
 
Thus, the overall picture from the three companies, and particularly from SIDF, is one in 
which there seem to significant concerns regarding the clarity and transparency of the pay for 
performance systems in place, as well as broader concerns that the concept of PRP makes 
comparisons between unlike tasks roles.  
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5.5 Teamwork 
The survey and interviews also covered the topic of teamwork, as there was some 
disagreement in the literature as to whether the requirement for team work was promoted or 
damaged by the PRP systems. 
5.5.1 Improvement to teamwork  
The fifth statement presented to respondents regards the role of the PRP system in teamwork. 
Participants were asked how far they agreed or disagreed with the statement that the PRP 
system helps to improve teamwork. The responses of the SIDF sample are set out in the table 
below. 
Table 5.26 SIDF: system improves team work 
The PRP system helps to improve team work 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
27 59 36 29 10 
16.77% 36.58% 22.32% 17.98% 6.2% 
 
When considering the impact of PRP on teamwork, a significant number do not know, similar 
to the issue of fairness. This may indicate a lack of the tools to evaluate the system on the part 
of respondents. However, a slight majority of respondents agree or strongly agree that PRP 
enhances teamwork, with 86 out of 161 answers. This is significantly greater than the 39 
respondents who disagree or strongly disagree. This is despite the fact that the set-up of the 
scheme at SIDF does not appear to specifically target team work, and that reward is set at an 
individual level, contrary to the trend observed as described in the literature chapter for a 
move toward team-based reward (Larkin, Pierce and Gino, 2012). 
 
Data were also gathered from managers on the subject of teamwork and its relation with the 
pay for performance system in place at SIDF. Considering the comments of the management 
interview subjects on this point, there also appears to be a divide, as for example one 
comments that “team work is affected positively” (respondent 11), while another states, “I 
don’t think it has any effect on team work” (respondent 6). This seems to reflect the lack of an 
overall consensus seen in the survey questionnaires, but is perhaps worrying as teamwork 
must be considered as an important point which the scheme might address. Further, to 
another (respondent 8), the idea appears as new, indicating perhaps a lack of emphasis on this 
within the scheme: “I have not thought about that before, but I think that it has no effect on 
team work because it does not evaluate that”. Respondent 5 confirms this, stating, “there is 
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no basis to evaluate team work…..but we rather take the performance as whole, so the direct 
manager monitors the employee’s performance and based on that he can decide the 
percentage”. Again, in light of the possible greater effectiveness of and move toward team-
based reward (Larkin, Pierce and Gino, 2012), the failure to include teamwork in the 
performance indicators used for PRP may signal an issue for the company not only in 
improving teamwork but in failing to safeguard against or monitor the negative impacts 
which individually-based PRP may have on teamwork.  
 
 
Management interviews also yielded data related to possible harms arising for teamwork 
from implementing the pay for performance scheme. When it comes to the views of the 
managers, several raise concerns about the PRP system’s harmful effects for teamwork. 
Respondents assert that the system “does cause harm to relations between employees” 
(respondent 4) and that “it has a harmful influence upon the relationships between the 
employees” (respondent 10). Another respondent broadens the scope of this harm, stating 
that, “it has a negative effect on work in general and between the employees” (respondent 8). 
There is therefore a need for SIDF to monitor this situation closely and consider impacts 
upon teamwork arising from the PRP scheme’s implementation. On the other hand, one 
respondent clearly disagrees that PRP harms teamwork: “I don’t think it makes any harm in 
the relation between employees because he knows that it’s his colleagues and that he obtains 
a better bonus because of the difference in performance” (respondent 5). Respondent 1 
supports this view: “there is no general consideration within the company that it harms team 
work basically because the employees are not competing with each other but rather 
cooperating, so we try not to make the evaluation on team work because this is not what it 
should be”. It is difficult to reconcile these views with the negative ones expressed by other 
managers, and it is therefore clear that a range of views exist on this topic within the firm. 
 
 
STC participants were also asked how far they agreed or disagreed with the statement that the 
PRP system helps to improve teamwork. Their responses are set out in the table below. 
Table 5.27 STC: system improves team work 
The PRP system helps to improve team work 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
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34 69 17 48 15 
18.36% 37.26% 9.18% 25.92% 8.1% 
 
As shown in the above table, 69 respondents agree that the PRP system enhances teamwork 
at the company, and a further 34 strongly agree, making a clear majority in agreement. 
Significantly fewer disagree with the statement, with 48 disagreeing, and only 15 strongly 
disagreeing. Meanwhile, 17 respondents do not know: a larger number than for most other 
statements in the survey. Therefore, it can be said that there is a general but not universal 
tendency towards the perception of positive impact upon teamwork, as supported in the 
literature by the findings of the LGMB survey 1994. However, this is not found in all studies 
or indeed in all case studies within the current research project, and the precise factors or 
features of the schemes affecting this are not clear, making interpretation of this finding 
problematic.  
 
Management were also asked about the effect of the pay for performance scheme at STC on 
teamwork within the organisation. From the management interviews, respondent 8 markedly 
disagrees with a supportive link between the PRP system and teamwork, citing the constraints 
of that system in not allowing equal remuneration if all have equal performance, stating that,  
 
“the system is biased because it does not allow me to have the full option. If I’m short 
in my authority over the system, how could I reward all the employees the same if they 
all did a good job, and even if no one did a good job I’d still have to give the rise to 
someone, imagine me returning the rise because no one deserved it: then it will go 
automatically to other departments and their manager will take the credit for 
rewarding his employees a full rise while I’ll be seen as the one who didn’t give the 
rise at all”.  
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In this analysis, not only is teamwork not rewarded, but the manager awarding the increase 
seems to be at risk of alienation from their team. Kang and Yanadori (2011) specify 
transparency in distribution of reward for effective PRP, and here the respondent seems to be 
saying that lack of transparency in this regard is affecting teamwork negatively. 
 
Further, one respondent states of the PRP system that “it does not generate conflict” 
(respondent 3), while another asserts, that “yes it does affect team work negatively” 
(respondent 1).  As with the statement regarding conflict, one respondent critiques the 
concept of differentiated reward as affecting colleague relations, while also casting doubt on 
the ability of any system to change what he views as the fundamental nature of individual 
workers:  
"If you reward one person and ignore the other players how would you think this team 
will perform in the next game? Definitely not in a good way… and here it’s the same, 
I don’t want to establish a conflict between my employees because I’m putting them in 
a different classifications, the good workers will always be hardworking and the lazy 
will always be lazy so I don’t see how this system is doing anything good” 
(respondent 1).  
This view echoes concerns put forward from the standpoint of equity theory in terms of a 
detrimental impact of inequitable reward among peers, and the particularly harmful effect of 
this for those engaged in team efforts toward a goal (Akerlof & Yellen, 1990). Thus, this 
respondent appears to have hit upon a common concern for such systems, and in light of the 
divided response of the survey sample, a potential issue for STC. Respondent 12 states that 
he avoids assessments of work done as a team in order to avoid this problem, stating that “it 
is difficult in terms of team working but the good thing is not to reward your employees based 
on team working because this will damage relationships and then all the workers will be 
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fighting instead of cooperating”. This however raises the question of skewed appraisals and 
whether the appraisal considers goals which are in line with company objectives. In addition, 
recent literature has highlighted the increased use and proposed the greater effectiveness of 
team-based reward, with 50% of PRP schemes reported to utilize team reward (Larkin, Pierce 
and Gino, 2012). In this context, the course suggested by the interviewee of avoiding harm to 
teamwork by not including it in assessment and reward may appear to be less preferable than 
the systemic inclusion of team goals within the performance related pay element.   
Another respondent (10) highlights the difficulty in assessing impact on teamwork and 
relations between colleagues from the manager’s perspective: “of course, this is a sensitive 
subject because not every employee can talk about the problems he has with his colleagues 
and from this perspective I can’t tell how performance related pay affects team work”.   This 
view highlights the potential for problems to go unobserved. 
 
 
At SEC, teamwork was also assessed, with the survey responses in the table below: 
Table 5.28 SEC: system improves team work 
The PRP system helps to improve team work 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
20 60 8 24 36 
13.51% 40.8% 8% 11.03% 24.48% 
 
In contrast to the previous point, a more positive view appears when considering whether the 
PRP system helps to improve teamwork, with 60 agreeing and 20 strongly agreeing that this 
is the case. However, a significant minority of 60 either disagree or strongly disagree on this 
point. This is roughly in line with the findings in the other two case studies. 
 
Several of the management interviewees do not perceive a link existing between the reward 
system and teamwork within the organisation, with one for example responding: 
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“I don’t see any relevance between the system and the team. Like what do you mean by team 
work? ... for example I set three of my employees to get one thing done but that has not got 
any relation with the system because there are particular standards in the system in which 
the direct manager assesses on” (respondent 1). 
This view is echoed by another manager, who states that “I don’t see how it affects team 
work” (respondent 2), and another sees only an indirect link between teamwork and the 
system: “we don’t have an assessment category based on team work, we have the 
relationship with his colleagues and that’s, yes that’s one factor on the assessment” 
(respondent 4). This would seem to indicate that teamwork is not an aspect of workers’ 
performance which the PRP system in place at the company is concerned with, or seeks to 
improve as a priority.   Respondent 7 also appears to confirm this point, stating that, “the 
system does not have a standard for team work”. This may be seen as worrying in light of the 
increasing trend towards and evidence for team-based reward, as well as the danger as 
presented in the literature that assessment should be made of how much of a company’s 
output may be related to goals and how much to individual, so as not to risk skewing 
priorities toward individual aims at the expense of company performance (Forth, Bryson and 
Stokes, 2014). Respondent 6 however points to the fact that promotion of teamwork is part of 
some roles, and that this may be set as an assessed target: “I have an employee who in one of 
his tasks is to work and teach and deal with other employees on how the work is done: 
especially if he has experience”.  
 
There is also a perception of harm to teamwork visible in the interview responses of some of 
the management sample. Respondent 5 indicates that the system “makes more negatives for 
the relations of the employees even if it’s not obvious, but it’s still there and that definitely 
affects the work environment” (respondent 5). A similar view is also put forward by 
respondent 7, in that “the system imposes some conflict in the relations between employees 
and their managers and that’s why the system is getting reviewed right now” (respondent 7).  
This indicates that a problem has been identified in terms of peer conflict caused by the 
system sufficient that action is being taken to address this. Further, respondent 11 seems to 
attribute this conflict to the nature of this kind of reward system, stating, “Well definitely, if 
you make the employees compete with each other rather than work together then you must 
expect conflict between them” and adds that management respond to this issue by adapting 
the way in which they apply the system: “we are trying to make the best of the system and 
ignore the aspects that make conflicts. For example, I don’t assess my employees when they 
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are in a team”.  At the same time, not all of the managers perceive any impact on teamwork, 
with one stating that “I can’t say that because I have not noticed any incidents happening as 
a result of team work” (respondent 8).   
 
analogous question sought to determine whether the pay system was viewed as harmful to 
teamwork at any of the case study companies as a cross-check to confirm the reliability of the 
data. the findings for each company are presented below: 
Table 5.29 SIDF: system harms team work 
The PRP system harms teamwork   
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
11 25 47 54 24 
6.83% 15.5% 29.14% 33.48% 14.88% 
 
 
Table 5.30 STC: system harms team work 
The PRP system harms team work   
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
29 65 11 52 28 
15.67% 35.1% 5.94% 28.08% 15.12% 
 
 
 
Table 5.31 SEC: system harms team work 
The PRP system harms team work   
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
30 47 16 39 16 
20.4% 31.96% 10.88% 26.52% 10.88% 
 
From the above, it is seen that the findings for SIDF and SEC are broadly in line with the 
previous question, while the data appears to conflict slightly regarding STC.5.5.2 Pressure 
from others 
The participants at each company were asked how far they disagreed or agreed that the pay 
system led to pressure being felt from others within the organisation because of the 
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comparisons between colleagues when awarding ratings. The responses of the SIDF sample 
are given below:  
 
Table 5.32 SIDF: pressure from colleagues 
I’m harassed by my colleagues because my good work affects their assessment 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
4 20 72 28 37 
2.48% 12.4% 44.64% 17.92% 22.94% 
 
The question regarding harassment from work colleagues based on impact to their 
performance assessment drew one of the two largest responses out of all of the statements for 
the category ‘don’t know’, with 72 such answers. From the remainder, 37 respondents 
strongly disagreed and a further 28 disagreed, with 20 agreeing and just 4 respondents 
strongly agreeing with the statement.  Thus, it appears from the evidence that only a minority 
of staff view their performance as a cause of conflict with their co-workers.  
 
 
This question was also raised in the interviews with management. The majority view is 
supported by some of the management staff interviewed, including respondent 9, who states 
that such conflict “does not affect employee relations, this does not happen” (respondent 9). 
However, others view the system as exerting “a harmful influence upon the relationships 
between the employees” (respondent 10).  This view is in line with Belfield and Marsden’s 
(2003) view of the negative impact of unequal pay. 
 
The next statement contained in the survey seeks to investigate the impact of the pay for 
performance system at the company on relations and particularly conflict between fellow 
employees. Participants were asked how far they agreed with the following statement: “I’m 
harassed by my colleagues because my good work affects their assessment”. The results from 
the STC sample are given in the table below. 
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Table 5.33 STC: pressure from colleagues 
I’m harassed by my colleagues because my good work affects their assessment 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
31 65 14 46 27 
20.26% 42.25% 9.1% 29.9% 17.55% 
The majority of respondents in the sample agreed or strongly agreed that they experienced 
harassment from colleagues because good performance affected others’ assessment, at 65 and 
31 respectively. Meanwhile, 46 respondents disagreed, and a further 27 disagreed strongly. 
The result for this question differs from that of the SEC and SIDF samples, in which 
disagreement was stronger than agreement. While the parameters of the schemes in the three 
companies differ, as do certain features of the companies themselves, it is not possible based 
on the available evidence to consider a reason for the different result of STC in this regard. 
 
Information was also sought from management interviews regarding conflict between 
colleagues as a result of assessment and reward. In terms of evidence from management 
interview, a strong split in opinion is also shown, from views that “it does not generate 
conflict” (respondent 3) and “there is no conflict here” (respondent 2), to the view that “there 
might be less integration in the working environment” (respondent 1). Another respondent 
meanwhile views the system as inevitably leading to conflict: “I don’t want to establish a 
conflict between my employees because I’m putting them in a different classification” 
(respondent 1), while respondent 12 concludes that “it might encourage some employees to be 
more hostile to others so there might be something in what you said, yes”.  
The results from the SEC sample regarding pressure from others are given in the table below. 
Table 5.34 SEC: pressure from colleagues 
I’m harassed by my colleagues because my good work affects their assessment 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
39 30 13 44 22 
26.52% 20.4% 8.84% 29.92% 14.96% 
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On the question regarding harassment from work colleagues based on impact to their 
performance assessment, 44 respondents disagreed, and a further 22 strongly disagreed. 
While this was more than those agreeing or strongly agreeing, who totaled 64, agreement on 
this question was far greater at SEC than at SIDF. While in both companies, a similar 
proportion of the samples disagreed, at SEC, a total of 69 agreed or strongly agreed, 
compared with just 21 at SIDF. This seems to indicate greater perceptions of conflict based 
on PRP. It is not possible from the evidence gained to determine why this should be, but it is 
interesting to note that this conflict is greater in the case study company where the possible 
rewards for a good assessment are perceived as more significant.  
 
Management were also asked about conflict arising from the PRP scheme. The results from 
the survey were not upheld in the comments of managers, with respondent 9 stating that such 
harassment does not take place, “for a simple reason, which is that we try not to assess them 
based on team work. Team work should involve more moral recognition, for example 
compliments or early release from work, that has a big impact on the employees’ 
performance from what I see”.  
5.6 Organisation  
 
The next topic to be addressed by the study concerns the effects of the pay for performance 
system implemented within the firm on the individual’s ability to organize their work. Thus, 
participants were asked two similar questions: the first regarding how far they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement that the PRP system had helped them to organize their work, and 
that because of this they know exactly what they are doing; while the second concerned the 
clarity of job objectives.   
5.6.1 Ability to organise work 
This question sought to test how far performance pay systems were being employed so as to 
enable improvements in work organisation. The responses of the SIDF sample are tabulated 
below: 
Table 5.35 SIDF: system helps organise work 
The PRP system has helped me to organize my work, and because of it I know exactly 
what I’m doing 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
9 34 43 50 25 
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5.59% 21.08% 26.66% 31% 15.5% 
 
While the majority of respondents find a link between PRP and improved teamwork, this is 
not the case when it comes to respondents’ individual organisation and knowledge of work. 
Here, approaching half of respondents disagree or strongly disagree that this effect occurs. 
Again however, over one quarter of respondents do not know whether or not this link exists. 
These findings appear to show that the pay for performance system as implemented at SIDF 
does not contribute to enhanced understanding of job roles and in aligning the work of the 
employees with what is intended to be achieved through their efforts. On this basis, it would 
be difficult to argue that the scheme can contribute in aligning employee effort and the goals 
of the organisation. 
 
Information was also gathered from management interviewees regarding the impact of the 
pay for performance scheme on clarity of job roles and tasks. The results of the questionnaire 
survey are underpinned by certain of the interviewees’ comments on the matter, which points 
to confusion, in that “there is no clarity on the system and assessment” (respondent 10). 
Respondent 11 meanwhile suggests that, rather than clarifying job roles, the PRP system in 
use has not taken this function on from earlier systems which it replaced: 
“We used to have a committee to upgrade the performance of the employees and it was  led 
by employees themselves, in which the employee writes his own job description and gets 
agreement on it then based on this his performance is measured...there is no doubt that the 
employee forgets some job tasks because of the bonus scheme” (respondent 11). This 
response therefore points to a possible harm arising from the way in which the scheme is set 
up, and links with the point made in literature that priorities and therefore effective 
performance may be affected by the narrow focus which can be imposed by PRP.  
Another respondent (7) again reiterates the lack of clarity in the system itself, saying that, 
“the system of performance pay is not clear. We need the HR department to explain this 
system precisely. I know what I’m doing in terms of assessments but still there are a few 
things missing”.  
Participants from STC were also asked how far they agreed or disagreed with the statement 
that the PRP system had helped them to organize their work, and that because of this they 
know exactly what they are doing. The responses of the STC sample are tabulated below: 
Table 5.36 STC: system helps organise work 
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The PRP system has helped me to organize my work, and because of it I know exactly 
what I’m doing 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
24 73 10 50 28 
12.97% 39.42% 5.4% 27% 15.12% 
 
A more positive picture of the effects of the PRP system emerges when considering impact 
on staff organisation skills. Most respondents agree that the PRP system at STC is helpful in 
allowing employees to organise their work and to know precisely what they are doing: 24 
respondents strongly agree and 73 agree. However, a significant minority of respondents are 
in disagreement, and 28 respondents strongly disagree, which is more than those who 
strongly agree.  According to one interview respondent, the system is designed to encompass 
all aspects of an employee’s job role: “there are basic standards to assess the employees 
based upon it…[with] everything covered and expected from his particular job” (respondent 
2). 
The next statement given in the questionnaire concerns the effects of the pay for performance 
system implemented within the firm on the individual’s ability to organize their work. Thus, 
participants were asked how far they agreed or disagreed with the statement that the PRP 
system had helped them to organize their work, and that because of this they know exactly 
what they are doing. The responses of the SEC sample are tabulated below: 
Table 5.37 SEC: system helps organise work 
The PRP system has helped me to organize my work, and because of it I know exactly 
what I’m doing 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
12 48 16 48 24 
8.1% 32.4% 10.81% 32.4% 16.2% 
 
In terms of helping with organizing work and allowing employees to better know what they 
are doing, twice as many respondents strongly disagree as strongly agree, while 48 
respondents agree and the same number disagree. As with other questions, the number of 
respondents choosing the category ‘don’t know’ is smaller in SEC than for the SIDF survey, 
but the result is clear in that a small majority do not feel supported by the system in 
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approaching work organisation and gaining clarity on job roles and tasks. This suggests a 
difficulty if the system is to be used to increase performance efficiency and/or effect change 
within the organisation. 
 
 
Information was also sought from management interviews on the issue of job and role clarity. 
Responses from the interview sample are also not unanimous on this issue, with one 
respondent claiming that “I think employees can improve through this system” (respondent 2) 
and that “it gives them a target to achieve” (respondent 2), thus emphasizing the role of the 
system in directing the efforts of employees, while another states that for “some of the 
employees, the system does not work on them” (respondent 5), and no clear exposition is 
provided in the interview material of an impact of the system upon organisation and clarity 
for the individual role. Another respondent suggests that the clarity afforded by the scheme is 
better for some than for others, perhaps as a result of more tangible aims in certain roles, 
stating that, “to some employees yes, but this does not work for everyone, so the system is 
good if you are taking the engineers as one segment because it clearly defines their work to 
some extent, but if you are taking the workforce as a whole then this might be a problem” 
(respondent 4).   
The picture overall from the above data is conflicting, with is conflicting, with STC 
appearing to perform better at bringing improvements in staff organisation through 
administering the PRP and appraisal scheme. 
5.6.2 Clarity of objectives and job role 
 
As related to the eighth statement in the survey, the next statement regards the role of the pay 
for performance system in providing job role and task clarity. Participants were asked to 
agree or disagree with the statement that “PRP helps to clarify my job: I know exactly what 
I’m doing”. The responses of the SIDF sample were as shown in the table below: 
Table 5.38 SIDF: system helps to clarify my job 
PRP helps to clarify my job: I know exactly what I’m doing 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
8 41 33 63 16 
4.96% 25.42% 20.46% 39.06% 9.92% 
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The table above presents the results to the question of whether PRP helps to clarify the jobs 
of employees and allow them to know exactly what they are doing. The largest category of 
responses here is for ‘disagree’, with 63 responses, and overall, agree and strongly agree gain 
only 49 responses compared to 79 disagreeing. A further 33 respondents, a significant 
proportion, state that they do not know.  These results are fairly similar to the results for the 
previous, similar statement that “The PRP system has helped me to organize my work, and 
because of it I know exactly what I’m doing”, in which 43 agree or strongly agree as opposed 
to 75 disagreeing, and this supports the validity of this result in reflecting the perceptions of 
the sample.   
 
Additional information regarding work organisation and PRP was obtained from members of 
management who were interviewed, which supports the view of the majority that the PRP 
system in place is not helpful in this regard, with this analysis: 
“It [the system] lacks objectives, there is no link between the goals of the employees and the 
company ...many aspects are absent from the system like keeping the time of the work 
valuable, initiative, the knowing of the regulations of the work” (respondent 7). The system 
therefore appears to ignore detailed examination of the employee’s work role and 
accomplishments, making it unlikely to be helpful in informing the detail of an individual’s 
approach to and knowledge of required tasks. Lawler (1990) emphasises the need for job 
tasks to be clearly set out within any PRP scheme. Further, this response suggests a gap 
between company goals and the detailed implementation of the scheme, which may signal a 
major problem, as Forth, Bryson and Stokes (2014) suggest that pay for performance may 
negatively affect effort and cause effort or behaviour to be misplaced and not expended in the 
appropriate direction if the company’s goals are not clearly embedded in the implementation 
of the scheme. 
 
   
197 
The difficulty in more meaningful application of the system in this regard is suggested by 
respondent 7: 
“The system does not cover all the aspects of work and therefore we try to calculate the rise 
overall, but this is different from one employee to another because they don’t all do the same 
job: some work in analysis, others in risk, others are accounting, so they have different job 
descriptions and therefore the system cannot cover all these aspects, but in general like 
punctuality and things like that, and physical appearance”.  
 
It is clear that there is no link from this description with the goals of the company, which may 
be considered as a major obstacle to aligning PRP implementation with meaningful results 
for performance at an organizational level.   
The responses of the STC sample regarding job role clarity were as shown in the table below: 
Table 5.39 STC: system helps to clarify my job 
PRP helps to clarify my job: I know exactly what I’m doing 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
14 72 22 55 22 
7.56% 38.88% 11.88% 29.7% 11.88% 
 
Opinion is fairly divided among the STC sample regarding whether the PRP system helps to 
clarify jobs and tasks. Here, 72 agree and just 14 strongly agree, while 55 disagree and 22 
strongly disagree, and a further 22 do not know. Thus, while more agree than disagree, this is 
less pronounced than for the similar previous question about job organisation. This finding 
suggests that more could be done to incorporate this function into the PRP scheme within 
STC. The uncertainty here also raises the question of whether priorities are shifted by the fact 
of setting specific goals for PRP, as suggested in some literature (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2011), 
with a consequent skewing of the priorities of workers, as considered in management 
interviews. However, it is not possible from these results to investigate this point further. 
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Information from the management interviews was also sought in relation to job and task 
clarity. In this respect, respondent 3 in the interviews feels that the scheme does not provide 
this guidance, stating that “there is no a specific direction which the employees can follow”. 
He makes the further contention that the PRP scheme may actually skew perceptions of job 
priorities, as “to some extent, even though, the employees can be focused on the things that 
are covered by the system and not going after the things that increase the overall 
performance”. This is supported in the literature by Lipsey and Chrystal (2011), as discussed 
previously. Another respondent gives a similar view, stating that, “the goals given are hard to 
achieve and many times are vague” (respondent 4). This suggests that they do not promote 
clarity of role or task, but may in fact do the opposite. 
 
The responses of the SEC sample were as shown in the table below: 
Table 5.40 SEC: system helps to clarify my job 
PRP helps to clarify my job: I know exactly what I’m doing 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
26 64 8 40 13 
17.68% 43.52% 5.44% 27.2% 8.84% 
 
On the question of whether PRP assists in clarifying respondents precise roles and tasks, a 
clear majority agree or strongly agree, while 40 disagree, 13 strongly disagree and just 8 do 
not know: which is a smaller number than from SIDF.  Also, this finding contrasts with the 
similar question asked previously: “The PRP system has helped me to organize my work, and 
because of it I know exactly what I’m doing”. For this question, 8 more respondents chose 
‘don’t know’, while more disagreed than agreed.  The findings of the survey therefore seem 
unclear on this point. The effectiveness of the system in giving clarity here is supported by 
respondent 7 from the management interviews, as he states that, 
 
“most of the employees don’t work by themselves and they need a supervisor to tell them their 
job tasks, and for us this has been easier with the system because it allows you to advise the 
employees of the job they need to do and that a rating is waiting for them at the end of the 
year”.   
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This seems to be an endorsement of the system in affording job clarity for employees. 
 
Confusingly, while STC had a clear majority endorsing the role of the PRP system in 
individual organisation, concerning the related concept of job role clarity, it is SEC where 
respondents appear to support this function of the scheme.  Therefore, the findings from the 
two questions do not match each other, and the overall picture is unclear. 
 
 
5.7 Feedback and recognition 
 
The next theme explored in the research, and one which may be linked to those on the use of 
the pay system to clarify tasks, relates to the provision of frequent feedback for employees of 
the company and enabling them to feel recognised for the contribution which they make. To 
explore this issue, participants were first asked how far they agreed or disagreed that “My 
supervisor informs me how good my work is on a regular basis”. They were also invited to 
agree or disagree that, “with the PRP scheme, my individual efforts are recognised’  
5.7.1  Feedback 
 The responses of the sample from SIDF regarding provision of feedback are summarized in 
the table below: 
 
Table 5.41 SIDF: my supervisor gives regular feedback 
My supervisor informs me how good my work is on a regular basis 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
14 52 11 48 36 
8.69% 32.24% 6.82% 29.76% 22.32% 
 
When asked whether or not they received regular feedback from supervisors on the strength 
of their performance, over half of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed. In fact, 
strong disagreement was expressed over twice as frequently as strong agreement. This 
suggests a possible issue with communication within the organisation in this area. Feedback 
may be considered essential in directing the performance of employees and in particular in 
helping them to target particular aims as set out in their performance targets: therefore, the 
apparent lack in this area can be considered a problem for SIDF.   
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Information was also gathered from management interviewees regarding the provision of 
regular feedback. The comments of management seem to support the findings of the 
questionnaire, with one commenting that “…some of the employees don’t know what their 
assessment was, they only notice the change in the salary” (respondent 5). On the basis of 
this, it would seem that formal as well as informal feedback is lacking. This is an issue, as 
Lawler (1990) states that for pay for performance systems to work effectively, relations 
between employees and managers must be open and supportive, indicating the need for 
communication and feedback. Respondent 7 points to the presence of feedback, but his 
statement suggests that it is not timely, nor sufficiently frequent: “this is at the end of the year 
when the assessment comes to pass and some of the employees want to know why the 
assessment is like that, they can come to their supervisor and he will inform them at the 
time”. While feedback at the time or following assessment is important, it would seem from 
this statement that such feedback is not automatically provided or built in to the system of 
appraisal. Furthermore, direct feedback prior at times of the year other than assessment may 
also be considered beneficial for retaining focus on goals, and this appears to be absent here, 
based on the remarks of the interviewees. 
The responses of the sample from STC are summarized in the table below. 
Table 5.42 STC: my supervisor gives regular feedback 
My supervisor informs me how good my work is on a regular basis 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
13 43 13 88 28 
7.02% 23.22% 7.02 % 47.52% 15.12% 
The responses to Question 9 indicate that respondents in general do not receive feedback 
from supervisors on the quality of their work, with 116 out of 185 responses either 
disagreeing or strongly disagreeing that the respondent is informed by the supervisor how 
good their work is on a regular basis. In contrast, 43 respondents agree and just 13 strongly 
agree, while a further 13 do not know. It appears from this that there may be a lack in the 
provision of both formal and informal feedback within STC. It is not clear from the findings 
whether this is as a result of the underlying organisational culture and communication, the 
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wider cultural context, the set-up and implementation of the PRP scheme, or a mixture of 
these.  It is noted however that this is also an issue emerging in the SIDF results.  
 
Interviews with management do not reveal a great deal of information regarding the feedback 
provided. However, from the management comments which were recorded, it is suggested 
that there is no formal, regular system of feedback in place, as employees must take special 
action to acquire it: “the employee if he likes he can come and ask about his performance and 
then his direct manager could provide him with an answer” (Respondent 5). this again 
denotes an unsatisfactory situation in which the giving of feedback is not integrated into the 
implementation of the pay for performance system, and raise the question of how effective an 
intervention PRP represents if employees are unaware of the details of their performance 
assessment, as they must logically therefore lack sufficient information to then make changes 
to increase their performance effectively next year if they are not given a good rating. Kang 
and Yanadori (2011) highlight transparency as a key element of effective pay for 
performance schemes, and it seem that lack of feedback would go against this condition and 
should be addressed by STC in order to maximize results. 
 
The responses of the sample from SEC regarding regular feedback are summarized in the 
table below. 
Table 5.43 SEC: my supervisor gives regular feedback 
My supervisor informs me how good my work is on a regular basis 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
24 62 9 40 26 
14.88% 38.44% 5.58% 24.8% 16.12% 
 
 
The findings regarding frequency of feedback from supervisors is more positive than for the 
other two case study companies, with a clear majority who feel that feedback is regularly 
given. Still however, more than one third of the sample disagrees.  
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Information was gathered regarding feedback from the management interviewees. Here, the 
more positive response of the SEC survey sample in this regard was underpinned by an 
explanation of a clearly delineated system of formal feedback. One managerial interviewee 
explains a structured quarterly system for feedback: “we have a session every a quarter of a 
year called a session of recommendation. In this session I inform the employee about his 
work: I say, ‘you are good or you are excellent or no you are not doing well and you need to 
have training on this issue’, and things like that” (respondent 8). This may be seen as a 
strength of the system designed and implemented at SEC, and suggests that PRP schemes can 
be designed so as to ensure regular feedback.   
 
From the above findings, it appears that feedback is an area where the possibilities of the 
performance appraisal system are not being fully realised in line with current acceptance of 
the value of feedback and in order to allow the employees to gain a clear sense of their 
performance in accordance with goals set and to act based on this, although in this regard 
SEC performs better than the other two organisations.  
5.7.2 Individual recognition 
 
The next statement relates to the ability of the performance pay system as implemented in the 
company to provide employees with appreciation for the individual effort which they expend. 
Participants were asked to respond to the statement that “because of PRP, my personal efforts 
are appreciated”. The responses of the SIDF sample are set out in the table below: 
Table 5.44 SIDF: my efforts are appreciated 
Because of PRP, my personal efforts are appreciated 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
9 64 33 41 16 
5.58% 39.68% 20.13% 25.01% 9.92% 
 
A different and more positive picture to that taken from previous results of the SIDF 
questionnaire emerges when considering how far PRP enables personal efforts to be 
appreciated. Here, more respondents agree than disagree. Meanwhile, 33 respondents or over 
one sixth of the sample do not know. While the slight majority who agree is encouraging, an 
overall majority however either do not know or disagree. The reasons behind answers cannot 
be ascertained due to the closed nature of the questions: however, it would be interesting to 
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know whether those agreeing with the statement are those who have received financial 
reward as a result of the pay for performance scheme.  
 
Information was also collected from management interviews regarding the appreciation of the 
personal efforts of the employees. Certain of the interviewees from management also take a 
positive view, with respondent 8 commenting that, “the one who deserves it will be given 
more bonus…” (respondent 8). This suggests a recognition of effort expended. Meanwhile, 
respondent 4 dismisses the feeling of lack of appreciation as inevitable, and supports the 
system, stating that “When it comes to appreciation, everyone thinks that he is not given what 
he deserves, but that’s why we have a system in place to distinguish the best workers and to 
give them the rewards they deserve”. While this suggests that the system is correctly 
identifying and rewarding the best workers, it does not address whether it allows the efforts 
of all to be recognised. This is echoed by respondent 11, who states, “well, the employees 
who contribute more and increase their performance will definitely be given the rise, but as 
you know with many, human nature is like that, they want more.”  
 
However, others disagree that appreciation of the employees’ efforts is successfully 
communicated through the scheme, as “…everyone thinks he worked hard and has not been 
fully appreciated” (respondent 3).This comment chimes with a view presented in the 
literature that employees tend to rate themselves as above average regardless of actual 
performance, and to the concern that in not reflecting this, pay for performance schemes can 
often lead to dissatisfaction among a majority of employees. Further, another interviewee 
takes a less positive view of recognition for employees overall, stating that “they work hard 
but there is no reward...the only reward they get is experience on their CVs” (respondent 9). 
Considering the reasons for this negative view, respondent 9 adds that “there is a general 
problem within it which is it’s vague...it classifies the best people with the good and can’t 
make a difference”, suggesting that any perception of lack of personal appreciation may be 
justified.  
 
The statement relating to the ability of the performance pay system as implemented in the 
company to provide employees with appreciation for the individual effort which they expend 
was answered as follows at STC:  
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Table 5.45 STC: my efforts are appreciated 
Because of PRP, my personal efforts are appreciated 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
31 77 4 44 29 
16.74% 41.58% 2.16% 23.76% 15.66% 
 
As seen in the other two samples, In the STC survey more respondents agree than disagree 
that PRP allows their personal efforts to be appreciated. While 44 disagree and 29 strongly 
disagree, 77 agree and 31 strongly agree, meaning that the majority of the sample agrees with 
the statement. Just 4 respondents state that they do not know. However, this still means that a 
sizeable minority feel that their efforts are unappreciated, and this could be interpreted as an 
example of the negative impact of unequal reward as related in the literature review in 
Chapter Two 
 
Information was also sought from the management interviews with regard to the feeling of 
appreciation of the efforts of employees in relation to the pay for performance scheme at the 
company. In this regard, one of the managers feels that the differentiation that the scheme 
makes between employees would not have the result of reflecting appreciation, stating that 
this is so “for some employees, but in general, which is the majority of the employees, will not 
be given the full rise, they will think that their effort is not appreciated” (respondent 10). 
Lazear (1995) reports a role of PRP in creating inequity in pay, and equity theory suggests 
that this may lead employees at the wrong end of this bargain to withdraw their effort, with 
attendant negative consequences for the firm. If this is the case, the lack of financial 
appreciation of a proportion of the staff may be just cause for concern. 
 
Participants from SEC were asked to respond to the statement that “because of PRP, my 
personal efforts are appreciated”. Their responses are set out in the table below: 
Table 5.46 SEC: my efforts are appreciated 
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Because of PRP, my personal efforts are appreciated 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
25 54 19 29 21 
17% 36.72 12.92% 19.72% 14.28% 
 
As seen in the SIDF sample, the SEC survey shows that more respondents feel that PRP 
allows for appreciation of their personal efforts than those who do not. Here, 25 and 54 
respondents respectively strongly agree and agree, compared to 21 and 29 respondents 
respectively who strongly disagree and disagree. The remaining 19 respondents state that 
they do not know. There remains however a sizable proportion of the sample who do not 
agree, and for whom equity theory would suggest a resultant withdrawal of effort (Lazear, 
1995). This appears also to be acknowledged among managers, although various suggestions 
are put forward for improvement at the same time: 
 
“It does appreciate the effort made by the employees but we can’t give everybody the rise 
they want and so this is why the system is not complete” (respondent 12). This statement 
reflects a perception that the system should seek to make all employees feel appreciated, with 
the unspoken implication that there is a negative consequence arising from approaches which 
do not do this. Another respondent states that “I agree if the employees work the way they are 
required to do this system is the best to reward them for their good work, but if you are a 
worker who comes late to work then this system won’t appreciate you in terms of money or 
the rise you get” (respondent 3). Another states, “I tell you that yes, but more importantly, 
there are the other rewards which are absent from this company, such as good words from 
the management to recognize performance” (respondent 5). In this last comment, the 
interviewee endorses the view that financial performance is one of a range of factors either 
desirable or necessary for performance to be maximized and loyalty created, in line with 
humanist approaches as well as authors emphasizing intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivation 
(Homberg and Osterloh, 2013; Beer and Katz, 2002).  
 
5.8 Effect of proportion of pay as reward 
In reflection of debate in the literature regarding the benefits and drawbacks of smaller or 
larger proportions of pay being linked to performance, the survey and interviews sought the 
perceptions of the study sample on this issue, with questions about satisfaction and effect of 
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this proportion, which varied across the case study companies. The results of this are 
presented in this section. 
5.8.1 Satisfaction with proportion of salary based on reward 
  Regarding the proportion of pay which was based upon performance, participants in the 
survey were asked how far they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “the 
proportional level of PRP is satisfying”. The results collected from the SIDF sample are 
given in the table below: 
Table 5.47 SIDF: level of PRP is satisfying 
The proportional level of PRP is satisfying 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
2 23 18 61 57 
1.24% 14.26% 11.16% 37.82% 35.34% 
 
The PRP system at SIDF is in general not considered by employees to offer a satisfying 
proportion of performance-linked reward, as shown in the table above. Only two individuals 
strongly agree and 23 strongly agree that the level offered is satisfying, compared with 61 
who disagree and 57 who strongly disagree. Only 18 individuals responded that they did not 
know. When viewed in tandem with the responses on the impact of the system on employees’ 
work, this could mean that the system in place at SIDF is neither satisfying for staff nor 
effective in directing staff behaviour.  In any case, the view of the extent of reward available 
at the company for good performance is not positive, and this is supported in the literature, 
which mainly sets a minimum of 10% if PRP is to be an effective motivational tool (Lewis, 
1997). 
 
Information was also gathered from management interviewees concerning the ability of the 
level of PRP offered to satisfy employees. The views expressed in the questionnaire are 
supported by evidence from interviews, whereby one respondent “would have wished the 
system were more rewarding” (respondent 5). Again, managers point to the inability of the 
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scheme to differentiate performance for the majority of staff:  “most are in the same basket, 
only the one who really deserves something unique will be given a bonus above the 
average...mostly, 70%, 80% have the same bonus...” (respondent 3). For another respondent 
6, the problem is the same: “the proportion level is satisfying, but the problem is in the 
percentage, I can’t give all what they deserve as a result of the system”. Another feels that 
the proportion is not large enough to give full results, stating that it satisfies “to some extent, 
but it is still not as we hoped for”. This implies that managers do not find the current level of 
reward offers allows them to gain the best use of PRP as a lever for performance. 
 
The results collected from the STC sample regarding their satisfaction with the proportion of 
PRP are given in the table below: 
Table 5.48 STC: level of PRP is satisfying 
The proportional level of PRP is satisfying 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
7 32 5 58 83 
3.78% 17.28% 2.7% 31.32% 44.82% 
 
Again, there was widespread disagreement with the notion that PRP was offered at a 
proportion which was satisfying. Here, 58 disagreed and a further 83 strongly disagreed, 
which was the same as for the previous statement. By contrast, 32 agreed and just 7 strongly 
agreed, while only 5 respondents did not know. This echoes the findings of the SIDF survey, 
and may reflect the need for a more significant move toward PRP as a proportion of overall 
pay if any impact on employee satisfaction is desired.  
 
In terms of the interviews, there was little acknowledgement by respondents of any problem 
with the proportion of PRP, aside from one respondent who gave the following summary: 
“Making a percentage for each department is not fair: for example a department or sub 
department which has 10 employees, based on their overall yearly performance the highest 
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management requires that 2 employees have 5 out of 5 and two have 4 out of 5 and three 3/5 
and two 2/5 and one 1/5, and then the direct manager has to give these assessments to his 
employees based on what he sees fit. So it’s not fair because the assessment is made for the 
direct manager already, he only has to split it to the employees” (respondent 11). This 
assessment highlights a lack of autonomy on the part of management, seen by Gerhart (2001) 
as a prerequisite for effective PRP schemes. Meanwhile, one respondent acknowledges the 
dissatisfaction of some employees but feels that overall the proportion is adequate: “it’s  
satisfying for some and not for others but what I see is that it’s not bad when you receive the 
full rise”. This comment does not however make any indication of whether the proportion is 
sufficient to incentivize those who do not receive it to work harder in pursuit of it, if indeed 
this is a realistic function of performance pay. In any case, the literature which does support 
this function prescribes a 10% margin for such incentives (Lewis, 1997).   
 
The results regarding the proportion of pay based on performance collected from the SEC 
sample are given in the table below: 
Table 5.49 SEC: level of PRP is satisfying 
The proportional level of PRP is satisfying 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
13 53 17 34 31 
8.84% 36.04% 11.56% 23.12% 21.08% 
 
The PRP system at SEC appears to divide employees on the question of whether it provides a 
sufficient proportional link to performance to be satisfying. Here, 66 strongly agree or agree, 
and 65 disagree and strongly disagree, although more strongly disagree than strongly agree. 
This finding contrasts with that in SIDF and STC, where a clear majority disagree with the 
statement. This greater award is in line with prescriptions in the literature for a minimum 
bonus of 10% of salary (Lewis, 1997). 
 
From the management interviews, it is clear that the bonus offered by SEC is considered to 
be substantial: 
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“…we have here a much higher percentage for the employees who are rated 1 2 3, which 
makes competition between the employees because everyone wants it” (respondent 6). 
“…there is a large difference in terms of rating and then its reflection on the salary: for 
example rating 1 is about 400 SR or 70 pounds different than rated 2, and over the course of 
a few years the salary will be much different” (respondent 5).   
 
Respondent 7 confirms this situation, but does not consider that this approach is effective, 
stating: “Now it is, we have more than most of the other companies, at 8% and 5% and 3%, 
but I emailed the management recently and I told them that they should change the 
percentage of the category instead of changing the percentage of the rise, because now they 
have changed it to 6% for excellent. We have employees who get 30,000 SR (5,000 pounds) 
as a basic, so he will be taking about 2,500 SR (416 pounds) as a rise!  Instead I told them to 
raise the percentage of the employees who fit under the category of excellent to have more 
getting the rise they want and lower the percentage of the rise…this way I think it will be 
better, you know”.     
 
However, this in itself, according to literature, does not guarantee success to a pay for 
performance scheme. Belfield and Marsden (2003) look at the application of PRP schemes in 
the 1990s, and conclude that although at the time rewards offered were frequently large 
enough to be significant to employees in terms of pay differential, there is no clear evidence 
that these schemes succeeded in achieving their goals. 
 
In summary, there appears to be a clear correlation between the amount of reward offered and 
satisfaction with that offering, and yet even at SEC, where the reward is larger, the proportion 
of respondents who are satisfied with this does not reach above half. It would be interesting 
to understand the proportion of reward which would satisfy those who report not being so, 
although this data was not collected. 
 
5.8.2 Importance of pay scheme based on proportion of performance-related pay 
 
The next statement in the questionnaire was regarding the importance of the PRP system to 
the individual taking into account the percentage rise which it was possible to attain. Thus, 
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participants were asked how far they agreed with the following statement: “the PRP system 
does not matter to me, because the percentage rise in my salary is little”. The responses of 
the SIDF sample are summarized in the table below: 
Table 5.50 SIDF: rise in my salary is little 
The PRP system does not matter to me, because the percentage rise in my salary is little 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
23 55 21 46 11 
14.26% 34.1% 13.02% 28.52% 6.82% 
 
Overall, more respondents at SIDF  agree than disagree that they do not find the PRP system 
is important to them due to the small percentage rise in salary it offers, at 78 as against 57. 
This finding raises questions as to the possible impact of the PRP system at SIDF, as only 57 
out of the sample of 161 disagree that it does not matter. This somewhat supports the findings 
of the previous statement, in which the majority of respondents were dissatisfied.  
 
Information on this issue was also sought from management interviewees. In considering the 
percentage difference possible from the bonus, the interview responses were also critical of 
the scheme, including the suggestion that “the bonus should be 10% and the problem is 
solved. The proportion of the bonus is very little” (respondent 2). This view is supported by 
other respondents, who feel that the bonus “should be more because it wouldn’t matter to him 
much if the proportion is small” (respondent 5) and that “the percentage of the proportion 
should increase” (respondent 5). This view is in line with much of the literature on PRP, 
which proposes that at least 10% of overall salary needs to be connected to performance in 
order to be effective in motivating employees (Lewis, 1997).   Respondent 11 concurs, stating 
that the motivational power of the scheme is not being fully harnessed through the amount of 
the reward: “we should make it a little bit more to avoid carelessness, if it’s small as now it 
does not motivate the way we want”.    
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The findings on this statement in the questionnaire are presented below for the STC sample:  
Table 5.51 STC: rise in my salary is little 
The PRP system does not matter to me, because the percentage rise in my salary is little 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
25 61 8 64 27 
13.5% 32.94% 4.32% 34.56% 14.58% 
 
 
In contrast with the findings from the previous statement, a slight majority of respondents 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed that “The PRP system does not matter to me, because 
the percentage rise in my salary is little”, at 64 and 27 respectively. This is almost matched 
however by the 61 agreeing and 25 strongly agreeing with the statement. It is clear therefore 
that opinion is divided on this issue.  
 
The views of management were also gathered on this topic, and results from the interviews 
reveal that some managers do not see an issue with the spread of reward across employees, as 
with the previous question, with one stating:  
“The percentage is fine. I’m aware that the system can’t offer more than this percentage to 
cover all employees, otherwise there will be no benefit of the system because it will not have 
a motive: if everyone took the best rating then why would anyone want to work more?”  
(respondent 3). This statement implies a belief that the system does provide a motivational 
incentive for performance across the workforce. Respondent 10 meanwhile highlights what 
he perceives as the importance of the scheme to employees, saying that “we can say that 
employees are less careless about it but in reality it’s very very important for them”.  
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 Regarding the following statement: “the PRP system does not matter to me, because the 
percentage rise in my salary is little”, the responses of the SEC sample are summarized in the 
table below: 
Table 5.52 SEC: rise in my salary is little 
The PRP system does not matter to me, because the percentage rise in my salary is little 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
26 31 11 39 35 
17.68% 21.08% 7.48% 26.52% 23.8% 
 
 
Similarly, when asked to respond to the statement, the results were more positive at SEC than 
at SIDF. As shown in the table, a total of 74 respondents either disagree or strongly disagree 
with the statement, compared to 57 who agree or strongly agree. Thus it would appear that 
the possible rewards for receiving a good assessment grade are substantial.  
 
Management were also asked to consider this statement. As one respondent explains, “if 
someone actually takes it every year and his colleagues do not then in five years the salary of 
the first person will be double the second employee” (respondent 3). This is also supported by 
respondent 5: 
“there is a large difference in terms of rating and then its reflection on the salary: for 
example rating 1 is about 400 SR or 70 pounds different than rating 2, and over the course of 
a few years the salary will be much different” (respondent 5). While these comments indicate 
a level of bonus which is sufficient to motivate as seen by Lewis (1997), it raises the issue 
considered as a disadvantage for PRP that such schemes tend to increase the pay differential 
between highest- and lowest-paid employees  (Forth, Bryson and Stokes, 2014). 
Respondent 6 also concurs, stating that “we have here a much higher percentage for the 
employees who are rated 1 2 3, which makes competition between the employees because 
everyone wants it” (respondent 6).  
5.9 Overall satisfaction 
 
The final statement aimed to gauge overall satisfaction levels with the pay for performance 
system in place at the company. The results for the sample from SIDF are summarized in the 
table displayed below: 
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Table 5.53 SIDF: I am satisfied with the PRP system 
In general, I’m satisfied with the PRP system we have here 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
7 31 15 59 45 
4.34% 19.22% 9.3% 36.58% 27.9% 
 
The final question seeks an overall picture of the views of employees regarding the impact of 
the PRP system. While certain of the previous questions received generally positive 
responses, a clear majority of respondents do not agree that they are satisfied with the PRP 
system in place at SIDF. In fact, almost 3 times more respondents disagree or strongly 
disagree than agree or strongly agree. Only 15 respondents state that they do not know, 
indicating that there is little uncertainty on this general question.  This is an obvious problem 
for SIDF, and is indicative that the PRP system as it currently stands within the company 
should be reviewed in light of the dissatisfaction it engenders in employees. 
 
When evaluating the evidence from interview, it seems clear that many of the managerial 
staff interviewed have criticisms in relation to the PRP system. One respondent comments 
that “PRP is the best tool for increasing performance if you use it fairly and the worst 
destructive tool if you misuse it” (respondent 11). Another response is unequivocal: “I’m 
against it...the employee is negatively affected when he does not have the proper incentive” 
(respondent 4), while a third complains that, “…at the end of the year they [the employees] 
come to me asking about why the bonus is not right and I don’t know what to say to them” 
(respondent 6).  There are also some suggestions made related to how the scheme could be 
improved which emerge from the interviews at SIDF. The first of these is that “the evaluation 
should be more efficient... it’s only three levels now it should be more” (respondent 3). This 
comment appears to reflect earlier concerns that the PRP scheme is too broad in its 
definitions or ratings of performance to allow managers to target performance increases for 
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the majority of staff. The second suggestion is that the scheme “should be something other 
than money” (respondent 3). While the reasons for this view may be hard to interpret on the 
available evidence, this suggests perhaps a recognition of the role of intrinsic motivation and 
the need to support this in a way which PRP is not generally considered to do. Frey, Homberg 
and Osterloh (2013) emphasise the need to include detailed consideration of intrinsic 
motivation in evaluating performance related pay, and report two types of intrinsic 
motivation: the first stems from the inherently satisfying characteristics of the content of the 
work for an individual, while the second is based in feelings of obligation which cause the 
individual to wish to perform work well. Neither of these considerations can be said to be 
addressed in the PRP scheme at SIDF, nor indeed by PRP in general. 
“…in terms of PRP...employees should be asked about how they would like to be assessed” 
(respondent 4).   This last comment is a view supported by Kessler, who regards it as 
important that workers are involved in the planning of the pay for performance scheme.  
  
The results for the final statement with the sample from STC are summarized in the table 
displayed below: 
 Table 5.54 STC: I am satisfied with the PRP system 
In general, I’m satisfied with the PRP system we have here 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
5 30 7 42 101 
2.7% 16.2% 3.78% 22.68% 54.54% 
 
The results for the final statement, “In general, I’m satisfied with the PRP system we have 
here” provide a clear picture of employee dissatisfaction with the PRP system in place at 
STC. A majority of respondents, at 101, strongly disagree, and a further 42 disagree. In 
comparison, only 30 agree and a mere 5 strongly agree. This is somewhat similar to the 
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situation outlined within SIDF, and presents a picture of negative perceptions of the PRP 
scheme which may be down to multiple factors and certainly suggests a problem for STC.  
 
Managers interviewed were also asked for comments regarding general satisfaction with the 
pay for performance scheme as it currently stands, as well as suggestions for future action. In 
terms of the STC interviews, while some clearly support the scheme, one feels that it “implies 
bad relations with your employees” (respondent 4) and is therefore not wholly supportive of 
the scheme. Another is clearly against the scheme, but makes suggestions for its 
improvement:  
“The system, if it has to remain, I wish they’d remove the percentages and allow supervisors 
more abilities to reward their employees. Also, I don’t, I think we should implement more 
effective rewards than a bonus scheme which might do more harm than good...we could 
reward the employees as a team” (respondent 2). This fits in with the prescription for 
autonomy of managers (Gerhart, 2001), as well as with the suggestion of a 10% minimum 
reward (Lewis, 1997). Respondent 12 also calls for an end to the percentage, as well as 
greater clarity: “it could be enhanced by eliminating the percentage and by making the 
explanation to the system so no one can say I didn’t understand”. A fuller explanation of the 
problems caused by the percentage rule in practice is offered by respondent 3:  
“In general we are not satisfied. I’ll tell you, it has a problem with the implementation of it. I 
have a number of good employees and I must exclude some of them because of the use of the 
percentages. Ok, if I downgrade him by one category he might still be somewhat satisfied, but 
sometimes I have to put a good employee in category 3 and then he will ask, why should he 
be working hard? And I told him it’s not your fault but the percentage took it from you and I 
promise to compensate him next year”. 
 
   
216 
The idea put forward here that significant damage might be wrought as a side effect of 
implementing a bonus scheme is strongly supported by widespread evidence and theory from 
the literature to suggest that implementation of PRP schemes can give rise to unforeseen 
problems such as a dampening of creativity, reduction in collaboration and partial negation of 
the positive influence of intrinsic motivation in employees (Amabile, 1988; Beer & Katz, 
2003; Pfeffer, 1998). 
The overall satisfaction with the PRP system at SEC was returned as shown below: 
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Table 5.55 SEC: I am satisfied with the PRP system 
In general, I’m satisfied with the PRP system we have here 
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly disagree 
13 44 4 52 35 
8.84% 29.92% 2.72% 35.36% 23.8% 
 
When asked about their general satisfaction with the PRP system at SEC, the majority of 
respondents disagreed that they were generally satisfied. A significant minority agreed, with 
44 agreeing and 13 strongly agreeing, while just 4 did not know. Therefore, this case study 
company has given different results to the other two in terms of general satisfaction with the 
PRP system in place: more respondents here are satisfied with the system and a smaller 
proportion strongly disagree that this is so. However, the overall picture remains one of 
general dissatisfaction here also.  
This finding is supported in many of the comments made during interview with management 
at SEC. As one respondent reveals, “the system is going under review now because of many 
complaints against it” (respondent 7). However, another respondent casts doubt on the 
necessity or even desirability of achieving universal employee satisfaction: “satisfying 
everyone is craziness” (respondent 6). This view finds support from Lewis (1997), who casts 
doubt upon the concept of fairness in this context as being a goal of management, who rather 
seek to increase productivity. This is in contrast to Torrington, Hall and Taylor’s (2005) view 
that fairness should form the basis of pay calculation. Views on what constitute the failures of 
the system therefore vary, as do recommendations for improvements to the current situation. 
In the view of one respondent, 
“Basically what the system is lacking is the small percentage rate of people who would 
receive the top rating (use of quotas). If this could increase to reach 10 percent then it will 
give more space to the assessor to reward more employees and then increase performance” 
(respondent 7).  
Another respondent concurs with this view, stating that, “I know it’s not possible, but the 
percentage of the employees should be raised to 10% instead of 5%” (respondent 4). 
This issue forms a common theme across all three of the case studies, with the capping or bell 
curve of bonuses being cited as a problem for perceptions of fairness and in preventing 
conflict and dissatisfaction. Cannell and Wood (1992) found that the most important benefit 
of PRP – more so than in providing motivation, was that of rewarding good performance. If a 
system is unable to reward all good performance through the capping of the number of 
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employees to be rewarded, then such a pay scheme cannot be seen as fulfilling the reward for 
performance strategy however.  
 
 Respondent 2 also takes the view that the PRP concept is suitable but that its application 
should be rethought, and considers that the company’s approach should be reviewed and 
modernised, commenting that, “I wish the system could be improved to a higher standard and 
to look at what’s new in this field and bring it in” (respondent 2). 
 Meanwhile, another respondent sees a more fundamental problem with the PRP concept and 
the pressure which it places on management, 
“Its negatives overcome its positives...it makes a lot of pressure on the managers and I say 
even managers are misjustified by being put in that position in which they have to rate their 
employees and then determine the bonus of it” (respondent 5).   
This view is interesting in representing the feelings of the respondent regarding their own 
position in relation to the PRP scheme being implemented at SEC. Kanter (1987) and Lawler 
(1990) suggest that managers dislike being placed in a position where they must make 
judgements which are not popular or affect their relations with employees.  
 
Another respondent signals his view that a system would be preferable which treats 
employees equally without differentiating substantially based on performance ratings: 
“I wish that the PRP system would be cancelled and be enough with the end of the year 
increase for each within his position and if there is a PRP system, there should not be that 
much of a difference between employees” (respondent 5).  This view seems to favour an 
internal labour market approach, using grading and promotion and pursuing long-term aims 
rather than incentivising short-term goals (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2011). 
The other view which emerges in the interviews at SEC is the idea that there are cultural 
issues which are at odds with the introduction of this type of pay system within Saudi 
companies, as two respondents take issue with the idea that such concepts can be transported 
across cultures. One respondent comments on the PRP system as follows: 
 “This system is making a huge problem in the company to say the truth, it’s not applicable 
for us, maybe in the West where everyone is responsible for himself only and it does not 
matter to him, but here, no, it does not work like that” (respondent 3).   
Armstrong and Murliss (2007) suggest that every organisation is placed within an individual 
context, within which the planning and design of the payment and reward system is based 
upon contingency and not upon the shape of schemes with similar aims in other settings.  In 
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light of this, the comments of the respondent may reflect a feeling that the system has been 
‘imposed’ rather than being a natural ‘best fit’ for the organisation’ 
The same point is made by respondent 1: “This system is brought to the company as a part of 
what they see as bench marking with American companies... but it’s not always necessarily 
true that if the system works there then it must work here” (respondent 1).  
The view described by Baker (1993) as common, in which fixed pay is seen as allowing a 
culture of entitlement to prevail and acting against flexibility and competitive advantage, may 
not be shared here, therefore, and the de-emphasis on organisational hierarchy implied by 
varying rates for the individual (Baker, 1993) might be more disruptive to apply in a 
paternalistic culture such as that of Saudi Arabia. Further, one aim of the introduction of PRP 
as mentioned in the literature is to change the organisational culture, in the main to become 
more performance-focused (LACSAB, 1990b:8).  If this is the case in the scheme at SEC, 
this drive would appear to be encountering resistance.  
 
Kessler (1994) states that choice of approach within the organizational context drives 
success, but also that such choices are subject to strong influences coming from this same 
context, in terms of organizational culture and history, as well as the influence of the 
particular objectives held for the scheme on the part of management. In light of this, it would 
appear that there is a mismatch here between the organisational culture and, according to the 
interview respondents, their wider context, and the choice of approach. 
 
5.10 Summary of findings by case and comparisons drawn 
Presented in this section are the summaries of key findings for each of the case study 
companies, before a comparison of results is presented. It should be noted here that 
interpretation of the findings must be approached with an element of caution considering the 
difficulty in accessing sufficient information regarding the exact nature and application of the 
PRP systems in place in the organisations surveyed. Further, the limitations in fieldwork as 
highlighted in Chapter Four introduce the possibility of sampling bias. The relatively high 
proportion of respondents selecting ‘Don’t know’ for some statements is also worthy of 
consideration, and, speculatively, may suggest an element of caution in expression of 
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negative views, and, perhaps concerns regarding confidentiality and anonymity, despite the 
assurances given.   
5.10.1 Summary of Findings at SIDF 
In general, the findings regarding perceptions of the PRP scheme currently in place at SIDF 
are more negative than positive, for both lower level employees, the majority of whom are 
dissatisfied with the scheme, and line managers. The key points found are summarised briefly 
below: 
 
 There is a clear emphasis in responses on the importance of money as a motivating 
force, and also an agreement among the survey respondents that a link exists between 
payment and performance. However, the interview responses cast doubt on the extent 
of the linkage actually achieved between pay and performance at SIDF, citing the 
restrictions of the quota system and a disconnect between the assessments made and 
the final outcomes. 
 While most survey respondents perceive an impact on their performance of the bonus 
scheme, one quarter do not and the managers are divided on this issue.  
 Fairness is a divisive issue, with almost equal numbers of survey respondents on 
either side and a proportion who do not know. Line managers meanwhile highlight 
problems of motivating those not classed as above average, lack of clarity in the 
scheme and difficulties in application across departments. 
 Few employees trust the fairness of the appeals procedure. 
 Impact on the way in which employees work was seen by a small majority of survey 
respondents, while interview respondents are similarly disunited, giving evidence of a 
minor influence on ways of working. 
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 Slightly more than half of the survey respondents perceive a positive impact on 
teamwork, while several managers perceive a negative impact on co-worker relations 
and/or on work.  
 There was little perception of a positive impact of the pay scheme for job organisation 
and clarity of role, and one interviewee suggested that this function had not been 
successfully continued from the performance committees, and thus that certain job 
tasks were being forgotten. 
  A large minority of survey respondents identify favouritism, supported by one 
interviewee’s comments. Other themes linked to this in interview relate to lack of line 
management control over ratings and the appearance of discrepancy in assessments 
resulting from this. 
 A minority of respondents felt harassed by colleagues due to the PRP system, while 
views of line managers range from categorical denial of this to the identification of a 
harmful influence on colleague relations. 
 Employees in general do not find the proportion of pay for performance within their 
salary satisfying, and managers concur that reward should be more. 
 Recommendations of the managers include creating more grading levels, seeking 
greater efficiency, using rewards other than purely financial, and greater consultation 
with employees on assessment. 
5.10.2 Summary of findings for STC 
The key findings from the STC survey and interviews are summarised below: 
 Money is a key motivator for employees, although one interviewee proposes a need to 
find other paths to motivation.  
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 Most employees view a link between pay and performance, but several line managers 
state that this link is not made in reality. 
 Strong perceptions of unfairness and favouritism are seen among the employee 
sample, as supported by several interviewees. 
 Only a slight majority of the survey sample view an impact on the way in which they 
do their job arising from the PRP scheme, and management respondents also present 
opposing views on this which seem to stem from basic beliefs about human nature 
rather than the scheme’ implementation in particular here. 
 The scheme suffers from a lack of clarity about its workings. 
 There is a lack of feedback from management to employees on performance. 
 The majority report harassment from colleagues based on the system, showing 
evidence of conflict caused by the scheme or its implementation (different from other 
two case studies). 
 128 of the survey group are dissatisfied with the system overall, against 30 satisfied 
overall. 
 
5.10.3 Summary of SEC findings 
The key findings from the SEC research are summarised below: 
 Money is seen by the vast majority of respondents as a strong motivator for work, and 
this is supported in the main by the statements of managers. 
 The link between pay and performance is also seen clearly, and the managers 
comment upon the large level of pay differential possible 
 Almost two thirds of survey respondents feel that the system is unfair, more than for 
the other two case studies. This is interesting here given that potential rewards for 
performance are more significant in this case, giving a greater importance to 
perceived fairness and/or possibly magnifying any perception of unfairness. While it 
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is not possible from the data gathered to understand clearly the reasons behind the 
greater sense of unfairness within this sample, this could be a possible explanation. 
 The majority of respondents perceive favouritism by managers in the implementation 
of the bonus system. 
 A slight majority perceive beneficial effect on teamwork. However, it is clear from 
the responses of management interviewees that the system in place does not 
specifically target or prioritise teamwork. A significant minority view a harmful effect 
of the pay system on teamwork. 
 The results regarding PRP and job role organisation and knowledge of tasks are 
unclear. 
 Unlike for the other two case study companies, employees at SEC in general find that 
the PRP system in place there offers a significant pay difference for those achieving 
high grades. 
 Cultural mismatch between the system, developed in the west, and the Saudi Arabian 
cultural context is flagged up by a number of interview respondents. 
 
 
5.10.3 Comparison of findings 
When considering the findings across the three case study companies, it must be borne in 
mind that the unique cultural conditions across those companies vary. Thus, important factors 
influencing the set-up of these schemes varies, and also the context in which PRP is 
implemented in each organisation is necessarily unique. Kessler (1994) states that the success 
of any PRP scheme hinges on basing the design and implementation of the system on the 
context of the company, but that decisions are also impacted by that context and by 
managerial aims in introducing the scheme. While there are notable differences in the design 
of the scheme in one of the three companies, difficulties for the researcher in accessing full 
information regarding the systems can make findings difficult to interpret.  
However, Armstrong and Murliss (2007) also points to political influence at a national level 
driving introduction of performance related pay, and the widespread move toward 
introducing PRP may also be impacted by this in the Saudi Arabian context, and in the case 
studies in particular. It is also reasonable to assert that there may be similarities in the way in 
which systems of pay which are similar in nature may be received in a similar way within the 
same broader cultural context, and also in general based on universal human response, 
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although care must be taken when generalising out from these findings, as each case study is 
placed within its own unique context.  In the three case studies undertaken for this research, 
various similarities are noted in the results, along with certain differences, and these features 
are detailed below.  
 One finding which is universal across the case study companies is that a strong majority of 
the survey samples agree that money is the key motivator in their work. This is also in the 
main supported by line managers’ comments. A further noteworthy similarity however is that 
while the survey results in each case support a link between pay and performance, in each 
case several line managers cast doubt on the basis of this link in reality, due to reluctance in 
SEC to apply the assessment method, concerns at SIDF over the quota system and 
connections of assessment to outcomes, and at STC, the problem of distinguishing ratings in 
the middle ground is brought forward, as well as concern at how far managerial assessment 
relates to final pay outcome, as at SIDF. Therefore, at each company issues appear if taking 
Belfield and Marsden’s (2003) view evaluation of performance in PRP must be closely 
related to reality if it is to work better than input-based pay. 
 
In two case study companies, STC and SIDF, the percentage rise in salary based on 
performance is perceived as too little by the majority, and employees are dissatisfied.  In one 
company however, SEC, it appears from interview comments and survey results that the 
potential reward for a good performance assessment rating is more significant. Interestingly 
however, although the findings related to general satisfaction are less negative at SEC, a 
majority of respondents are still dissatisfied overall with the scheme. It is not possible to say 
whether the slightly more positive response is given on the basis of this greater potential for 
benefit from the scheme to the high-performing individual. If so however, this benefit 
appears outweighed by drawbacks of the scheme, at least if the company’s objectives are 
related to employee satisfaction. There is discussion in the literature regarding possible harms 
resulting from employee dissatisfaction where there is no performance element in reward 
(Brickley, 2009), but also concerning the harm arising in consequence of unfavourable 
comparison of rewards with co-workers. In both cases, a demotivating effect is assumed, 
which is linked with drops in performance.  Line managers’ comments regarding their own 
satisfaction with the working of the scheme and their role in implementation for it are divided 
across all three case study groups.  
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In terms of impact of the PRP schemes in place at the three case study companies on the way 
in which work is completed by employees, the results show a marked similarity, with 
approximately half of each sample asserting that impact from this exists, while the remainder 
either do not view such an impact or do not know.  Managers’ are also divided in each 
company, with some in each case suggesting that the scheme either does not work or does not 
impact all employees equally. Motivation is also considered, and in this case. 
Perceptions of fairness are higher in SIDF than for STC and SEC, with SEC showing 
particularly strong perceptions of unfairness on the part of employees. However, even in 
SIDF, fewer than half of respondents perceive the system as fair. Managerial comments 
across the companies suggest dissatisfaction with the fairness of the bell curve system for 
quotas of employees receiving each grade, while others speak of difficulties in maintaining 
good relations while implementing the scheme fairly.  
Another issue to emerge strongly from both surveys and interviews in each company is that 
of clarity, with problems highlighted in understanding the schemes, in communication of 
their objectives and processes to both line management and staff, and in terms of the frequent 
provision of feedback.  Further, several managers in the various organisations report a sense 
of cultural mismatch in the introduction of PRP schemes, considering that they are not well-
received or appropriate in the cultural context of Saudi Arabian companies. 
 
5.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented and discussed the findings gained from three case studies, 
involving interviews with line managers and survey questionnaire employees at companies 
SIDF, STC and SEC.  The results for each company were presented in statistical form for the 
survey questionnaires and using direct quotation when discussing the results of the line 
management interviews. The findings were discussed in relation to relevant literature, and 
later the findings were compared across the three case study companies, bearing in mind the 
limitations of the data which it was possible to collect. Considerable divisions of opinion 
were uncovered with respect to the success of the schemes in linking pay to performance 
reliably, and in terms of fairness and clarity in each of the organisations under study. Further, 
while the amount of pay differential which it was possible to achieve was reported as more 
significant within SEC, this was considered a problem in the other two companies, and while 
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at SEC greater overall satisfaction was reported with the scheme, perceptions of fairness were 
lower. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the findings obtained through questionnaire and interview 
with employees and managers across three case study organisations. The findings reveal a 
picture of widespread dissatisfaction amongst staff and managers with the PRP schemes in 
place in two of the companies, and concerns among some management that the assessment 
processes and allocation of bonuses does not allow for genuine assessment and reward for the 
best performing employees. There are also concerns raised about the underlying wisdom of 
differentiating between workers in providing different pay, in that it may undermine 
teamwork and go against the norms of working culture in Saudi Arabia. There was also some 
evidence of moves to adapt what was being implemented in line with these norms. Further, in 
two of the case study organisations, there was a clear sense among employees that the 
proportion of pay related to performance assessment was insufficient to motivate, raising 
issues regarding how best to implement PRP. At the same time, there are also voices in 
support of the schemes at each company, and in SEC, overall satisfaction was expressed with 
the system in place. 
 
Following on from these findings, Chapter Six is intended to provide final remarks on the 
research conducted for this thesis, the findings of the primary research conducted to address 
the research questions and the conclusions which may be drawn from these results. Thus, the 
research questions will be revisited and the findings discussed in the previous chapter, the 
findings and analysis chapter, will be applied to those questions. Further, within the 
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constraints of generalisability as considered in the methodology chapter of this research 
work, a wider application or interpretation of the findings from the three case studies will be 
attempted. Thus, conclusions regarding the feasibility of pay for performance systems and 
issues regarding their implementation can be drawn at company, national, regional and 
international level. Following on from this consideration of conclusions to be drawn from the 
findings, a series of recommendations will be presented.  
 
In tandem with the conclusions previously described, these range from recommendations for 
the specific companies which participated in the research project to recommendations at a 
wider level. In addition, this chapter will consider the research presented in terms of both its 
achievements and its limitations, reflecting on the issues which may have acted as obstacles 
to the research and considering how these might be addressed in the future, as well as 
summarising the limits of generalisability of the knowledge produced and how it may be 
used. The study will also be evaluated in terms of its reliability and validity. Finally, a further 
important input which this study seeks to make is to suggest fruitful areas for future related 
research projects arising from the findings uncovered here. This will be discussed in this 
chapter, prior to the final concluding remarks.  
6.2 Findings as Applied to Research Questions 
This section of the chapter will provide a brief recapitulation of the aim, objectives and 
research questions formulated for this study, based on existing evidence, before applying the 
findings drawn from the three Saudi case studies to address and answer those questions.   
6.2.1 Review of Aims, objectives and research questions 
The main aim of this research was to investigate and analyse the role and impact of 
Performance Related Pay schemes in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on performance in Saudi 
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national firms, as conducted through a case study of three indigenous Saudi organisations, 
namely: The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF; The Saudi Electricity Company 
(SEC) and; the Saudi Telecoms Company (STC). The main question posed to drive the 
research process was as follows:- 
What is the impact of PRP on employees’ performance in Saudi national firms in Saudi 
Arabia?   
   This question was developed into a series of sub-questions which were divided into 
categories of performance, teamwork, cultural role, fairness and feedback. This was based 
upon an extensive review of the related literature, exploring the theories which underpin PRP 
such as agency theory and expectancy theory, and encompassing previous studies carried out 
in various national contexts worldwide. The questions composed and pursued based on this 
process are recapped below: 
Table 6 Research questions 
Performance  Q1: Does the introduction of the PRP system 
increase employees’ performance?  
Q2: Does the introduction of the PRP system 
make employees work harder?  
Q3: Will employees be more highly paid if 
they work harder?  
  
Team work  Q 4: Has the introduction of PRP helped in 
encouraging effective work as part of a team? 
Q 5: Has the introduction of PRP helped in 
unifying the goals of both parties within 
industrial relations?  
 
Culture role  Q 6: How has PRP influenced organizational 
culture?  
Fairness  Q 7: How fair is the PRP scheme from the 
employee’s perspective?  
Feedback  Q 8: How far are employees satisfied with 
the PRP system’s approaches to the formal 
and informal feedback which they receive?  
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By seeking answers to the questions in the table above, the research aimed to provide a clear 
picture of the impact of PRP within each of the case studies undertaken, in order to facilitate 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the effectiveness of the organisations’ use of pay as a lever 
for performance, as well as adding to the body of more general research about the 
effectiveness of PRP at a broader level. The findings will be matched to these questions in the 
following subsection. 
6.3  Summary of findings from the case studies as applied to the 
research sub-questions 
 
Each of the questions identified above were explored in each of the three case study 
organisations, and this process revealed numerous issues facing these companies in terms of 
employee and managerial response to the pay schemes as implemented. Many of the results 
were broadly comparable across the case studies, but not all, emphasising the importance as 
laid out in the literature for assessment of the individual application of pay for performance in 
what is a broad category of payment scheme.  In this summary, results will be summarised 
for each category, by case study where differences are seen, and in conjunction with 
literature.  
6.3.1 Performance 
Performance is identified in much of the literature on performance related pay as a main part 
of the rationale for this type of pay approach, as suggested by the title of such schemes at the 
individual level, and also in relation to company performance (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; 
Pfeffer, 1998; Rigby, 2001; Rosenthal et al., 2005). The first question addressed within this 
category is as follows: does the introduction of the PRP system increase employees’ 
performance?  Surveys at SIDF, STC and SEC each show a majority who view an impact of 
the schemes implemented upon working practices and performance. This is not viewed as 
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universally the case by management, and doubt is also cast on the ability of individual effects 
of the scheme to pay into team or company performance. Considering the findings from all 
three of the case studies, this research project supports the notion that the schemes 
implemented have an impact, but do not increase performance across the whole of the 
employee base, with between a quarter and a third of employees in each case study finding no 
impact on their performance. Further, doubt is cast by interview responses on the ability of 
this impact to extend to all, to be sustained and to feed departmental and company 
performance, and the range of views appears to reflect the conflicting positions in the 
literature, which may be seen as puzzling when reflected within one individual organisation. 
While some of the material from interview points to increased individual performance for 
those who are rewarded, there is little support for wider effects based on expectation of 
reward. Further, the issue of a damaging effect on the performance of unrewarded staff as 
supported by Trevor, Reilly, and Gerhart (2012) finds support from management in these 
case studies.   Interestingly, Marsden et al. (2000) find no immediate downward effect of 
performance in the short term on introduction of PRP, although they find workplace relations 
to be damaged by this. However, they postulate that any gains in performance from PRP are 
not sustainable over the long run. 
 
The second question in the performance category is as follows: does the introduction of the 
PRP system make employees work harder? Again, the findings here conflict, with a small 
majority of employees in each company perceiving an impact on working practices, and 
division among management. Manager interviews also suggest that this is not universal to all 
employees, and a recurring theme within this are the idea that younger or more recently 
recruited employees are more influenced by the PRP scheme to work hard than are older or 
more established workers. In addition, lack of reward in one year is linked by managers to 
decreased performance or lowered effort the next, supporting the notion of a demotivating 
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force in addition to a motivating force and as opposed to a simple lack of impact (Forth, 
Bryson and Stokes, 2014).  
The third question set to explore performance is as follows: will employees be more highly 
paid if they work harder?  It is interesting to note here that while employees across the 
three case study organisations note a link between performance and reward for that 
performance; this is particularly strongly expressed at SEC, which documentary sources 
reveal has a far larger reward for performance element than the other two companies studied. 
Importantly however, managers in each of the organisations studied cast doubt upon the link 
between performance and reward in practice, and this may feed into the issues of fairness as 
considered in the group of research sub-questions discussed in Section 6.3.4. 
6.3.2 Teamwork 
The first question set for the area of teamwork is as follows: has the introduction of PRP 
helped in encouraging effective work as part of a team? Across each of the case studies 
conducted as part of this research, a majority view a beneficial effect of the pay for 
performance scheme implemented on team work. Meanwhile, at SIDF and SEC, a significant 
minority perceive a damaging impact on teamwork from the same, and in STC a slight 
majority do the same, making reconciling the views of benefit and harm challenging. One 
further aspect of harm raised in qualitative evidence is the notion that harms to relations 
between employees and their ability to work together as a team is necessarily hidden to 
management to some extent, as employees may be reluctant to discuss conflicts. Further, 
some light is shed on benefit versus harm by the response of management, who mainly do not 
appear to relate the work conducted to appraise performance with team relations or with team 
performance, implying that these impacts are not planned for and teamwork is not a focus of 
the scheme. At SIDF, it appears that teamwork is not a part of appraisal, whilst comments at 
STC indicate that some managers avoid appraising employees based on team efforts 
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specifically to avoid conflict. This may be expected to lead to skewed appraisal of work done, 
as well as priorities for that work. This seems to highlight a deficiency in the system and a 
strong example of an issue which has been raised previously in the literature. In addition, it is 
not in line with moves toward greater use of team based incentives as recorded by Larkin, 
Pierce and Gino (2012). 
The second question in this category is as follows: “has the introduction of PRP helped in 
unifying the goals of both parties within industrial relations?” Evidence from 
management in SIDF suggests difficulty in aligning performance targets with company 
objectives, as supported by Kang and Yanadori (2011), while at STC, it is suggested that 
goals are shifted to fit the requirements of performance measurement rather than falling in 
line with the true requirements for employees’ work. Further, the evidence conflicts in terms 
of the ability to clarify employees’ tasks and therefore the unifying capacity of PRP is not 
supported by the study. There is a slight tendency toward perceiving PRP as aiding clarity of 
role at SEC and STC, while in SIDF this is not seen, and PRP appears to have reduced this 
clarity from previous approaches at the firm.  
 
6.3.3 Cultural role 
Culturally, it is identified in the literature that an organisation may implement an innovation 
from the wider business world to little effect, as organisational culture adapts the innovation 
rather than changing in itself in a meaningful manner. This reality is supported by qualitative 
evidence from this study, in which management implementation of the scheme ranges from 
rigid interpretation of performance to a turn-taking system of awarding bonuses. Thus, the 
question set for the cultural role of PRP: How has PRP influenced organizational culture? 
can be answered in terms of a partial effect at best, as while employees’ mainly feel that their 
working approach has changed, management describe how they adapt the scheme to fit their 
idea of how to manage effectively.  Further, cultural mismatch between the system, 
developed in the west, and the Saudi Arabian cultural context is flagged up by a number of 
interview respondents. Kang and Yanadori (2011) suggest that where imported practices are 
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not compatible with a culture, they are not always introduced in an effective manner, and this 
is also a relevant point here.  
 
6.3.4 Fairness 
Fairness has emerged from this research as a major issue within the PRP systems and their 
implementation analysed in the three case study companies. The research sub-question set to 
examine fairness was as follows: how fair is the PRP scheme from the employee’s 
perspective? Overall, a significant number of employees in each case study perceived 
unfairness in the system of pay for performance implemented within their respective 
companies. In fact, a majority of STC respondents perceived unfairness, and almost two 
thirds of respondents at SEC. The larger numbers at SEC are highlighted here, as while each 
company has its own prevailing culture which is complex to analyse and is undoubtedly a 
factor in such results, the possible association of this with the higher percentage of the 
performance element of pay within SEC for top performance ratings as compared with the 
other two organisations cannot be ignored. This situation may lead employees to place a 
greater importance on the perceived fairness of the system, and/or possibly magnify any 
perception of unfairness. While it is not possible from the data gathered to understand clearly 
the reasons behind the greater sense of unfairness within this sample, this could be a possible 
explanation. 
The evidence for fairness or otherwise in the PRP schemes studied as evidenced by both 
employees and managers can be broken into two broad strands; fairness in the way the 
systems are designed, and the fairness of management and HR in implementing those 
systems. Taking the design of systems first of all, a further obstacle to perceptions of fairness 
is identified in terms of understanding the structure and workings of the PRP system in place. 
There is significant reporting of difficulty in understanding the workings of the pay for 
performance scheme across employees of STC and SIDF, and also in SEC to a lesser degree. 
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This is supported by qualitative data from management. This may lead to perceptions of 
unfairness, regardless of the reality of the assessments. Further, this issue is not simply 
between line managers and employees, line managers at SIDF highlight the point that they do 
not have full control over setting grades and are not involved in the process by which this is 
finally decided. In terms of the possibility of gaining additional reward, each of the case 
studies reveals use of a bell curve or capping system, in which a certain proportion of 
employees may receive a given grade. This has implications for assessment and assignment 
of grades which are highlighted by the managers interviewed, some of whom state that this 
leads to the frequent impossibility of selecting grades based solely on merit. This may form 
another element behind the significant perceptions of unfairness of the scheme. 
 
The second element contributing to perceptions of unfairness is favouritism, as supported in 
the literature by Marsden (2004, in Bryson and Forth, 2006) (see Section 2.8.2), and this is 
perceived as an issue across each of the case study organisations, but in particular it is 
reported at both STC and SEC by a large majority of employee respondents, corroborated by 
managerial interviews, with emphasis given by STC managers to a lack of monitoring of the 
appraisals given by managers, coupled with strong distrust of the appeals system. Overall, it 
can be stated in answer to the research question here that most employees consider the PRP 
scheme to be unfair in some aspect, and that this is based on issues of favouritism, lack of 
transparency and the nature of the system itself.  
 
6.3.5 Feedback 
Across all studies there is a majority perception that the pay for performance scheme allows 
the individual to feel more appreciated by management, perhaps implying that the act of 
appraisal functions to provide attention and thus recognition, in addition to the concept of 
financial appreciation. A significant proportion at each company does not feel appreciated as 
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a result of the scheme however. The research sub-question for feedback asks: how far are 
employees satisfied with the PRP system’s approaches to the formal and informal 
feedback which they receive? The principle finding with regard to this is that feedback is 
seriously lacking within two of the case study companies, and at SIDF and STC comments 
suggest that even yearly feedback on appraisal is not universally provided. This lack of both 
formal and informal feedback calls into question the ability of the PRP systems as currently 
implemented to affect employee behaviours in a manner which is targeted to increase or 
focus performance or to alter company culture based on the aims of the organisation. 
Regarding SEC, the two-thirds majority citing regular feedback suggests a more positive 
situation and the implication taken from this result is that feedback through the PRP system 
as a strength of that approach depends on implementation within the individual organisation. 
This is an aspect already suggested in literature as an obstacle to attempts to clarify the exact 
repercussions of taking a PRP approach, but adds to the body of evidence to guide 
implementation (see Section 2.10). 
 
6.4. Conclusion: main research question 
The findings and conclusions drawn to address the sub-questions of the research feed into the 
main research question set for this thesis, which was:  What is the impact of PRP on 
employees’ performance in Saudi national firms in Saudi Arabia?   
The findings discussed in the previous subsections of this section indicate both positive and 
negative impacts from PRP on employee performance. An alteration in performance and 
behaviour is acknowledged by the majority, yet the evidence casts doubt upon the ability of 
the schemes to align the effort of employees with the objectives of the organisation, to 
provide guiding feedback and to accurately measure performance. A failure to address 
teamwork is a part of this picture. Qualitative data on favouritism and fairness brings forth 
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culturally based dimensions of manager-employee relations which conflict with the 
requirements for implementing PRP fairly and effectively, as in doing so, managers are asked 
to disregard social ties and length of tenure in the course of awarding sought-after bonuses. It 
is not concluded here however that this cultural context, common to Saudi firms, is the 
principle or only reason for perceptions of unfairness however.   
 
Unfairness was identified to a particular extent within SEC, the only organisation whose PRP 
scheme contains a significant performance-related element of pay as defined by. The link 
between the two conditions is speculative, but may be seen as a double bind, whereby smaller 
reward elements are viewed as ineffective but larger ones may increase the likelihood and 
impact of perceived unfairness. Beer and Cannon’s (2004) case studies found that newly-
implemented PRP systems led to a loss of the trust and commitment which firms have 
historically relied upon to succeed, and in light of this, the findings with regard to favouritism 
and unfairness should be viewed with concern. Linked to fairness, there are difficulties 
described in the literature in constructing a genuinely valid appraisal of performance, aligned 
with company objectives (Marsden, 2004, in Bryson and Forth, 2006), and these are reflected 
in evidence from this study. Further, issues of combatting demotivation for those not selected 
for reward, whether this arises from systemic unfairness, favouritism, damage to intrinsic 
motivation through a focus on extrinsic factors, or from a poor fit of self-perception to 
managerial appraisal, also emerge from the current findings These are issues which seem to 
raise considerable barriers to the possibility of a fully effective pay for performance scheme, 
and at the least suggest that it is not practically possible to gain benefit from PRP without 
also incurring damage.  However, the conclusions drawn here are firmly within the context 
from which they are derived, which is that of the three Saudi companies studied, and 
arguably the wider Saudi Arabian business world.   
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6.5 Recommendations 
 
The following recommendations are provided for the benefit of those companies who 
participated in the research, and where they do not apply to each of the organisations, this 
will be stated. Further, the recommendations may be considered by other firms within similar 
conditions ore where similar issues arise. Additionally, these recommendations support the 
literature on implementation of PRP. 
 
The overall design as well as the individual decisions taken must be clear to all parties if 
perceptions of fairness are to be improved. This involves channels for dialogue between HR, 
top management, line managers responsible for conducting staff performance appraisals, and 
staff within the PRP system. At present, the final responsibility for decisions regarding award 
of grade and reward is not communicated clearly to all. 
 
The adoption of a bell-curve grading system is causing problems for the reputation of the 
schemes, with evidence of quotas for grades producing arbitrary assessments and increasing 
perceptions of unfairness. This should be taken into consideration in the planning of future 
modifications to the pay scheme used. 
 
The forms of PRP in current operation at STC, SEC and SIDF does not prioritise or reward 
team working, and management comments indicate that assessment of this may be actively 
avoided in some cases. In light of recent evidence to support the trend towards team-based 
reward (Larkin, Pierce and Gino, 2012), and considering concern on the part of line managers 
as to a lack of cultural fit for individual PRP in the Saudi context, consideration should be 
given to explicitly incorporating teamwork and team goals into the reward system.    
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The strong dissatisfaction with the pay for performance schemes in place within SIDF, STC 
and SEC represents a serious cause for concern, as do comments by managers that the 
scheme is damaging relations within the firm. Therefore, consideration should be given to the 
aims of the scheme and how far these are being achieved as weighed against possibly 
unintended effects.  Within this, it is not to be assumed that any dissatisfaction is purely due 
to cultural mismatch, although this is suggested by some of the interview material. As 
presented in the literature review in Chapter Two, there is a considerable amount of research 
in an international context which points to certain negative impacts arising from the 
implementation of PRP, and this is presented both in terms of approaches to applying such 
systems and aspects inherent to the concept of PRP. As such, it can be considered that these 
findings contribute to this body of evidence, with the inherent challenge of accurately linking 
performance to measurements and then rewards being highlighted here, as well as the 
damaging impact of perceptions of unfairness, which may be unavoidable in when pay is 
variable based on performance assessment. 
6.6  Validity, reliability and limitations of the study 
 
This research study was subject to careful consideration in terms of its design so as to 
ensure that results were reliable and internally valid.  For this, data was triangulated through 
the use of quantitative and qualitative data gathering approaches, as well as collection and 
analysis of primary source documents. However, the first objective of considering whether or 
not performance pay increased employees’ performance in the case study companies could 
not be fully addressed, which may be said to affect validity, while the results gained are still 
valuable. External validity is not considered achievable through case study, but this approach 
can be used to consider or extend theories previously suggested. While a three case approach 
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provides a broader view of PRP in the Saudi Arabian context than would be offered by a 
single study, nevertheless it must be stated that the results of this study cannot be freely 
generalized to other organisations without considering the particular circumstances or 
context. Other limitations include access to secondary sources due to commercial 
confidentiality, as well as the possibility of bias introduced in participant selection and self-
selection due to the contact methods used. However, the results of the study provide a picture 
of the implementation and impacts of PRP in the Saudi environment however, which 
represents a significant addition to literature assessing PRP across a global context.  
6.7 Future research directions 
This study has provided a revealing portrait of perceptions of the pay for performance 
systems in operation in three companies within Saudi Arabia, and its contribution marks an 
addition to the body of knowledge regarding PRP systems, their implementation, contexts 
and consequences, at the international level. In particular, the study has contributed to a 
knowledge gap due to its situation in the developing world and in Saudi Arabia in particular. 
However, such a study cannot be comprehensive in scope, and therefore, from the limitations 
of the current study, future research directions emerge. 
 
Firstly, this is a cross-sectional study, and it would be interesting to provide a longitudinal 
study to observe how PRP systems are adopted and adapted over time by organisations. This 
is particularly so in regard to the question of the sustainability of any advantage, but also to 
the long term effects of any harmful impact of the introduction of a particular system, as 
discussed in the literature review, the findings chapter and in this chapter.  Secondly, this 
study drew on the perceptions and experiences of those to whom the PRP systems were being 
applied, as well as to those directly responsible for implementation, but did not take into 
account the views and intentions of decision-makers in introducing and shaping the pay 
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systems in place. A future study might gain greater insight through access to this group, so 
that comparisons might be drawn between the intended results and the reactions to the pay 
system in practice. This is particularly so as it is not clear from the literature precisely which 
motivations for introducing pay for performance are generally held by firms who decide to 
utilise this practice. 
 
Third, while a significant research gap was identified in the literature review which pertained 
to the understanding of the impacts of PRP schemes on different segments of the workforce, 
this was beyond the scope of this study to address, due to the varied roles of the employees 
surveyed which were not articulated, and the focus on other parameters. Future studies in 
PRP could very usefully address this gap by comparing the perceptions of different 
professional and non-professional groups. 
 
A final point which might be explored in more depth in the future concerns the cultural 
context of the case study companies, being Saudi firms. While cultural elements were 
considered through literature review and the research sought to include these in the primary 
research, the picture of the way in which cultures interact with imported HR practices which 
were developed in different cultural settings is an area which requires further study to form a 
clear picture. It is hoped however that this study has provided a basis from which future 
studies on PRP in the Saudi Arabian context might grow. 
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Appendix 2: STC Pay Scheme. Documentary sources 
 
Performance Appraisal General Guidelines 2014 
 
In light of the company’s desire to improve its employees performance, we are glad to share the 
general guidelines that will be applied in the 2014 performance appraisal cycle. 
 
General Guidelines for the performance management 
 
 Determining the employees objectives by his immediate manager and discussing these 
objectives with him. All the objectives must be SMART (Specified, Measurable, Applicable 
and has a timeline). These objectives must be minimum of four objectives for one 
employee. 
 The evaluation will be based on the employee’s objectives & competencies during his 
working time for the same period. 
 There have to be a continuous feedback & follow up internally between the managers and 
the employees. 
 If the employee rejected the objectives set for him by his boss, or he refused to discuss 
these objectives, he shall be referred to the Next level Manager to resolve and if this fails, 
then it should be referred to Employee Care Relations department to take disciplinary 
actions for this attitude and hence the objectives set by his boss are approved. 
 If the subordinate did not accept and return back the performance form showing his 
objectives to his manager in the specified time for any reason during objective setting and 
discussion and it was difficult to present his performance appraisal forms, they can be 
submitted by the boss in coordination with Performance and Development department and 
next level Manager provided that they are discussed with the employee later. 
 In case of relocation, loan or promotion where employee objectives have changed, 
additional objectives are to set for the employee according to the new job. Coordination 
has to be made between immediate supervisors regarding evaluation provided that 
evaluation is approved by the latest boss. If this transfer has occurred before closing the 
cycle by 90 days or more, the employee will be inserted into his new sector curve. 
Whereas if the period was before closing the cycle by less than 90 days , the employee will 
be inserted into his old sector curve. 
 Employees on consultant contracts shall be treated according to their contracts. 
 Temporary employees at the call centers and specified period contract non-Saudis are 
treated like full time employees in performance measurement. 
 The manager must justify automatically in the system if one of his employee score a rating 
that is below or above his previous rating by two grades. 
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 No employee will be evaluated after closing the cycle, until the legal affair department 
reviews his case file. 
Guidelines for Evaluating Absent Employees (suspended employees, employees on 
exceptional or study leaves, seconded employees and employees on scholarship and new 
employee) 
 A new employee shall not be evaluated if his working period was less than (90) days 
during a performance evaluation cycle. 
 Employees who are on suspension shall not be evaluated but they have reported back to 
work and they are to be evaluated based on the actual work period if they spent on job 
(90) days or more. 
 Employees who are on exceptional or study leaves, those on loan to other organizations 
shall evaluated if that the period they spent on job is (90) days or more. 
 Those who are on loan to STC Group affiliates outside Saudi Arabia shall be evaluated as 
per external assignment policy. 
 Employees who are on loan from STC Group affiliates outside Saudi Arabia shall be 
evaluated outside the Bell – Curve. 
 Employees who on scholarships or who enrolled in developmental diplomas that last for 
(90) days or more shall be evaluated according to study results at the respective 
universities or institutes in a way that would be in line with the performance rates stated in 
the performance policy, and Career Development sections shall be responsible in this 
regard. If the student returned back and reported to work for six months, he shall be 
included in the current performance cycle and shall be evaluated proportionately by the 
manager. 
 
Objectives rating 
 
Definition Assessment 
The average of  achievement  based on  the required indicators is 
126% and above 
Significantly Exceeds 
Expectations 
The average of  achievement  based on the required factor is 111% 
- 125% 
Exceeds Expectations 
The average of achievement based on the required factor is 91% - 
110% 
Meets Expectations 
The average of achievement based on the required factor is 76% - Partially Meets 
   
283 
90% Expectations 
The average of achievement  based on the required factor is 75% 
and below 
Does Not Meet 
Expectation 
 
 These following percentages are subjected to comparison, and it depends on the 
achieving percentage of the objective. 
Competencies Rating 
 
Definition Assessment 
Always shows all behavioral indicators that meet the required 
level of efficiency and agreed on for his job and seek to 
develop them and consider a model to the others 
Significantly Exceeds 
Expectations 
Mostly show the behavioral indicators that meet the required 
level of efficiency and agreed on for his job. 
Exceeds Expectations 
usually show the behavioral indicators that meet the required 
level of efficiency and agreed on for his job 
Meets Expectations 
Rarely shows the behavioral indicators that meet the required 
level of efficiency for his job and his level of work 
Partially Meets Expectations 
Mostly doesn’t show the behavioral indicators that is required to 
succeed in his job. This is effect negatively on the work and the 
team. Need development and training in most of the required 
behavioral indicators. 
Does Not Meet Expectations 
 
 
 
 
  
   
284 
Appendix 3: SEC Performance Pay. Documentary sources.  
 
 
 
Level Saudi  Non Saudi Transportation 
Allowance 
     Deputation 
First  Middle End First  Middle End Internal External 
40          
41          
42          
43          
44          
45          
46          
47          
48 5567 7953 10339 3656 5222 6789 600 400 600 
49 6315 9022 11728 4212 6018 7823 600 400 600 
50 7293 10319 13545 4941 7058 9175 600 400 700 
51 8315 11879 15442 6370 9100 11830 600 500 750 
52          
53          
54          
55          
56          
57          
58          
59          
60          
61          
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Workers rating system:- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example of how the PRP system works:- 
  A Saudi worker on grade 48 receives a basic of 9000 SR. He received a rating of ‘above 
expectations’ and received a promotion to grade 49. The average salary of grade 48 is 7953 SR.   
The percentage of the promotion to grade 49 is: 5%. Since his current salary is 9000 SR. which is 
more than the average of his class level then the PRP scheme became 5%.  
And therefore:-  
:- 5%+5%=10 %.  
:-  (9000*10%) +9000= 9900 SR.  
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
distribution 
percentage 
More than the 
middle until 
the end of the 
class level 
Between the 
least to the 
middle of the 
class level 
Below the 
least of the 
class level   
Category of  
performance 
assessment  
15% 7% 8% 12% Much above 
expectations  
20% 5% 6% 10% Above 
expectations  
60% 3% 4% 8% Achieved all 
expectations  
5% 0% 2% 6% Achieved the 
least of 
expectations  
 0% 0% 0% Did not 
achieve 
expectations  
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Appendix 4: Text of letter attached with survey 
 
 
Dear Sir,  
 
Kindly complete this survey regarding the PRP scheme applied in your 
organisation. Please remember that there are no right and wrong answers and 
that your impartial point of view does matter to the research. Your assistance 
in this research will be of benefit in improving the well-being of employees 
across the firm. Any personal information you provide will be held in the 
strictest confidence and will not form part of the published research. 
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Appendix 5: Survey 
Employee Information 
 
Years of employment :            
 
 
Date: 
      
Grade: 
       
 
Review Guidelines 
 
Please complete the evaluation of the PRP scheme using the following scale: 
1 = strongly agree 
2 = agree  
3 = NA 
4 = disagree 
5 = strongly disagree  
 
Your Evaluation  
 
To what extent do you agree 
with the following statements? 
(5) = strongly 
disagree 
(4) = disagree (3) = NA (2) = Agree 
(1) = Strongly 
agree 
  The most important motivator 
to work is money        
 
Pay is linked to performance        
 
PRP has no effect on my work 
performance          
 
The PRP system applied is unfair       
 
 PRP has helped contribute to 
more effective team work      
 
The PRP system harms 
teamwork      
 
 
The way the PRP system works 
cannot be understood      
 
 
PRP has helped organizing my 
job: I know exactly what to do in 
each task       
 
 
My supervisor informs me how 
good my work is on a regular 
basis      
 
 
With the PRP scheme, my 
individual efforts are recognized           
 
 
With PRP, my work objectives      
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are clear and I know what my  
job is   
 
 
 
 
Managers use PRP to reward 
their favourites and penalize 
those who they don’t like       
 
 
PRP has had no impact on my 
working behaviour       
 
I’m harassed by my colleagues 
because my good work affects 
their assessment      
 
The appeal system against the 
manager’s assessment is fair        
 
I am satisfied with the 
proportion of PRP to basic pay.        
 
PRP scheme does not matter to 
me because the proportion to 
my basic salary is small   
       
Overall, I am satisfied with the 
PRP scheme applied in the firm   
       
Any additional comments: 
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Appendix 6: Interview schedule 
 
Case Study A  
 
Respondent 1 
 
 
Respondent 2) 
 
 
Respondent 3 
 
 
Respondent 4 
Respondent 5 
Respondent 6 Policies Unit) 
 
 
Respondent 7 
 
 
Respondent 8 
 
Respondent 9 
 
Respondent 10 
 
 
Respondent 11 
 
Respondent 12 
 
 
 
45 minutes 04 January 
2014 
 
1.15 minutes 04 January 
2014 
 
30 minutes 04 January 
2014 
 
50 minutes 04 January 
2014 
 
1.45 minutes 04 January 
2014 
 
55 minutes 04 January 
2014 
 
35 minutes 05 January 
2014 
 
45 minutes 05 January 
2014 
 
45 minutes 05 January 
2014 
 
1.00 minutes 05 January 
2014 
45 minutes 05 January 
2014 
 
45 minutes 05 January 
2014 
 
Case study B  Respondent 1 
 
Respondent 2 
Respondent 3 
 
Respondent 4 
 
Respondent 5 
 
Respondent 6 
Respondent 7 
 
Respondent 8 
45 minutes 19 December 
2013 
 
1.15 minutes 19 December 
2013 
 
40 minutes 19 December 
2013 
 
50 minutes 19 December 
2013 
 
1.0 minutes 19 December 
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Respondent 9 
 
Respondent 10 
 
 
2013 
 
55 minutes 19 December 
2013 
 
35 minutes 19 December 
2013 
 
45 minutes 19 December 
2013 
 
45 minutes 19 December 
2013 
 
1.0 minutes 22 December 
2013 
 
1.0 minutes 22 December 
2013 
 
40 minutes 22 December 
2013 
 
Case study C  Respondent 1 
 
Respondent 2 
 
Respondent 3 
 
Respondent 4 
 
Respondent 5 
 
Respondent 6 
 
Respondent 7 
 
Respondent 8 
 
Respondent 9 
 
Respondent 10  
 
 
45 minutes 09 January 
2014 
 
1.20 minutes 09 January 
2014 
 
50 minutes 10 January 
2014 
 
55 minutes 10 January 
2014 
 
 
1.30 minutes 10 January 
2014 
 
55 minutes 13 January 
2014 
 
1.15 minutes 13 January 
2014 
 
 
40 minutes 13 January 
2014 
 
45 minutes 05 January 
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2014 
 
 
1.00 minutes 05 January 
2014 
 
40 minutes 05 January 
2014 
 
 
